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Abstract 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
The growing internationalisation of governance in the modern era means that states are increasingly 
interconnected. In this process, democratic governance has often taken second place to the 
demands of a neoliberal system that emphasises market-based solutions to social organisation and 
deregulation of structures based in the democratic realm of states. This dissertation is an exploration 
of the role democracy plays in regional governance bodies, focusing specifically on the European 
Parliament and its role in the European Union as an example of this. 
 
The dissertation argues that there is a role for democracy in global governance, and that the 
European Parliament represents a positive step towards introducing the wishes of citizens into 
political structures above the level of the state. It uses a three-stage immanent criticism developed 
from the early work of Max Horkheimer to explore the parliament in its historical, present, and 
potential functions. Built on a critical philosophy that understands the social world as a product of 
historically materialist action, this dissertation seeks not just to describe the functions of the 
Parliament, but also to suggest ways in which they might develop past their current limitations. 
 
Following a methodological discussion on the application of immanent criticism, the dissertation 
engages in a theoretical analysis of the complex concepts of democracy and governance as a prelude 
to the exploration of the Parliament.  The dissertation then utilises a range of interviews and 
documentary evidence to present a thesis that has two main claims. Firstly, it argues that the 
European Parliament represents a new form of democratic regional structure that represents both 
states and citizens, and introduces an element of democratic accountability to governance above the 
level of nation states. Secondly, the thesis contends that the Parliament, as part of the wider Union, 
possesses the potential for greater democratic function. In making this argument, the dissertation 
suggests a range of practical ways to improve democracy and governance in the Parliament, and by 
extension in other similar regional political bodies. These include the introduction of greater 
democratic influence on decision making, increased transparency, dedicated European political 
parties, and a stronger role for civil society bodies.  
 
The dissertation concludes that democratic governance has the potential to present an alternative 
to the dominant neoliberal structures that currently shape much of the international political, 
economic, and social environment.   
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction: Democratic governance and the European Parliament 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1.1 Introduction: democracy, governance and the European Parliament 
1.2 Key arguments of the thesis 
1.3 Researching Democratic global-regional governance and the European Parliament 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction: Democracy, Governance and the European Parliament 
 
Democratic governance is one of the cornerstones of modern politics, and the right for 
citizens to participate in the management of their state is a central aspect of many 
contemporary political systems. Despite this, Held (2003: 353) argues that we are living 
today ‘at a fundamental point of transition’ in which globalising pressures are changing 
the nature of democratic governance. As the boundaries between national and 
international action become blurred, states find it harder to function in isolation.  At the 
same time, an increasing number of unaccountable, undemocratic governance structures, 
influence state policies at the international level.   
 
In a world of changing political and social structures, democracy is under threat. 
However, a growing globalisation of political authority need not be at the expense of 
democratic governance. There are ways in which participatory politics may be 
internationalised and citizens involved in the decisions that structure their lives. Rather 
than being subsumed by globalisation, democracy can play a vital role in shaping future 
forms of governance, as Shaw (2002: 169) argues democracy is not ‘just about the form 
of government within individual states, but about the shape of world order’. 
 
Many theorists have discussed the role of democracy in world political structures. Dahl 
(2000), Held (2003), and Keane (2009) amongst others, argued that a reinvigorated 
democracy has the potential to bridge the emerging gap of accountability in international 
governance.  For these theorists, as well as for this dissertation, democracy may provide a 
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means through which citizens might retain (or regain) control of the forces that influence 
their lives.  
 
One body that attempts to extend the rights of the citizen beyond the traditionally 
demarcated state is the European Parliament. Functioning as part of the wider European 
Union, the Parliament brings a level of democratic politics to governance at a global-
regional level. At the turn of the 21
st
 Century, Philippe Schmitter (2000:1) spoke of the 
EU as ‘an emerging polity’, growing from its beginnings as a regulatory institution 
responsible for collective management to become a Union of political and social 
jurisdiction. Along with growth of the EU, the European Parliament took on increasing 
responsibility for democratic involvement in decision making, and today represents 27 
member states and over 500 million citizens. What started as a loose collection of states 
with regulatory interests has emerged as the world’s foremost multi-state democratic 
regional governance body. 
 
The presence of the European Parliament in the EU means it is the only democratic 
governance structure operating above the level of the state, allowing a legally mandated 
citizenry to exert democratic influence over the decision-making process. The EU’s place 
as the foremost democratic regional governance body makes it substantial to the future of 
global governance. As McNamara (2003: 357) claims, ‘the EU experience underlies the 
importance of political institutions in shaping the progress of globalisation and its 
outcomes’.  
 
This dissertation uses the European Parliament as an example of how democratic politics 
functions beyond the state, at a regional level. Through an adapted form of Horkheimian 
immanent criticism (1946; 1992), which has its roots in critical theory, the dissertation 
provides several ways to evaluate democracy and governance, and then applies these to 
the European Parliament. In doing so, it proffers a range of practical suggestions for 
improving both democracy and governance in the Parliament. 
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1.2 Key arguments of the thesis. 
 
This dissertation presents a thesis of two parts. The first part argues that the European 
Parliament is a new form of democratic governance structure that represents citizens at a 
supranational level. It maintains that there is no other body, regionally or globally, that 
does this in the same way.  Consequently, the first part of the thesis claims that the 
Parliament’s presence in the EU shows democracy to be a genuine system for regional 
and international governance.   
 
The second part of the thesis proceeds to claim that there is greater potential for 
democratic governance in the European Parliament than is currently evident. In doing so, 
it produces a set of practical methods to strengthen the nature of the Parliament’s 
democracy. This second part also suggests that the democratic element the Parliament 
brings to governance includes the potential to challenge the dominance of neoliberalism, 
not just in Europe but globally.  
 
In presenting the two arguments of the thesis the dissertation utilises an original 
adaptation of Max Horkheimer’s immanent criticism (1946; 1992: 200) which argues that 
the structures of a modern capitalist society are a product of historical inequalities and 
inherently unfair because of this. Implicit with Horkheimer’s philosophy is the idea that 
research should not just explore the social world, but seek to orientate action for its 
improvement. This focus on praxis underpins the second element of the thesis, which 
moves beyond a description of democratic governance in the European Parliament to 
provide a set of practical suggestions through which it may better fulfil its role. 
 
 
1.3 Researching democratic global-regional governance and the European 
Parliament 
 
The form of Horkheimian immanent criticism applied in this dissertation delineates its 
explanation of the European Parliament into three stages. Initially, it explores the 
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Parliament’s historical development, setting out the forces that were influential on its 
growth within the EU and the ways in which these shaped its current functions. It then 
makes use of a range of first-hand interviews, treaties and Parliamentary reports to 
examine the actual functions of the Parliament, and in so doing begin a discussion on the 
ways in which Parliament’s democratic and governance functions could be developed. 
The final stage of immanent criticism continues this discussion by suggesting a number 
of practical ways to nurture both democracy and governance in the Parliament’s 
structures.   
 
The focus on democracy and governance in the European Parliament requires some 
theoretical background. However, the problem with constructing this background is that, 
for both democracy and governance there is little agreement on which structures and 
ideologies serve each concept. For example, Dahl (2000: 2) states that, despite being 
‘discussed on and off for about twenty-five hundred years’ democracy still remains 
without universal definition. Similarly, Keane (2009: 842) argues that democracy is 
‘nothing but a time–bound, geographically limited’ way of life.  
 
As with democracy, defining the parameters in which governance occurs is difficult. 
Diverse interpretations of the role that ideologies, technologies, and political decisions 
play in global structures sometimes create very distinct models of global functions. 
Conceptions of the manner in which a body such the European Parliament works depend 
heavily on the ways in which an individual interprets the many factors that influence its 
operations. 
 
In order to overcome the difficulties in defining democracy and governance in the 
European Parliament, this dissertation constructs a theoretical basis for each concept. 
This basis provides a background to the subsequent immanent criticism and a guide to the 
types of strategies than may develop democracy and governance further. Chapter 2 
outlines this in more detail with a methodological discussion and an account of 
Horkheimian immanent criticism. Following on from this, Chapters 3 and 4 discuss ways 
to evaluate democracy and global governance respectively. Chapter 3 conducts an 
 5 
historical analysis of democratic systems that culminates in three key principles of 
democracy that guide the exploration of democracy’s functions and potential later in the 
dissertation. Chapter 4 constructs three interpretations of global governance, which are 
presented as discrete ontological models. These models outline particular perceptions of 
global structure and the role that regional governance bodies such as the European 
Parliament would play in each case. As with the principles of democracy, they 
compliment the immanent criticism later in the dissertation with a set of analytical tools 
for exploring the Parliament’s present and potential role. 
 
The second part of the dissertation develops the immanent criticism of the European 
Parliament. Divided into three chapters, each examines democracy and governance in the 
Parliament from one specific aspect. Chapter 5 provides a critical history of the 
Parliament’s inception spanning the end of the Second World War to the present day. 
This first part of the immanent criticism sets out the Parliament’s role in the context of 
the forces instrumental in its construction. Chapter 6 builds on this by dealing specifically 
with the Parliament’s current functions and the ways in which its democracy and 
governance work. It does this by reference to a wide range of Parliamentary publications 
and documents, as well as set of nine interviews with MEPs, leading academics, and 
those with experience of working with or for the European Parliament. Chapter 7 initially 
applies this analysis of the Parliament to further a critique of its democracy, and then 
moves on to consider a range of practical methods through which democracy may better 
function and governance ma more readily be understood.  
 
The dissertation concludes with a summary of the arguments in the immanent criticism, 
paying special attention to the proposals as to how the European Parliament might 
enhance its democratic functions. It then identifies the practical constraints these 
proposals face in a complex and evolving global political environment. Finally, the 
concluding chapter reflects on the dissertation as a whole, discussing the wider role of 
global democratic governance, and some ways to extend the studies findings beyond the 
European Parliament. 
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Chapter 2:  
Methodology, the philosophy and practise of researching the European 
Parliament 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2.1 Epistemology and the importance of methodology 
2.2 Developing a sociology of knowledge 
2.3 The application of critical theory to the European Parliament 
2.4 Immanent criticism of the European Parliament 
2.4.1 Chapters 3 and 4: The theory of democracy and global governance 
2.4.2 Chapter 5: Immanent criticism Stage 1, a critical history  
2.4.3 Chapter 6: Immanent criticism Stage 2, a critical examination  
2.4.4 Chapter 7: Immanent criticism Stage 3, an exploration of Potential  
2.4.5 Chapter 8: A summary of the thesis and its approach 
2.5 conducting the research for immanent criticism 
 2.5.1 Maintaining reflexivity in the interviews 
2.6 Methodology: a summary 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
2.1 Epistemology and the importance of methodology. 
 
This chapter sets out the methodological framework of the dissertation. It describes how a 
form of Horkheimian immanent criticism is adapted for this work and the ways in which 
this approach informs both the structure of the dissertation and the research methods it 
applies.   
  
Although there are already a number of very good examinations of the European 
Parliament, many of these originate from the political sciences and therefore focus on 
structural and functional analysis. For example, influential accounts by Lipgens (1982), 
McAllister (1997), Hix (1999 & 2007), Schmitter (2000), and Dedman (2010) all provide 
valuable insights into the workings of the EU and its Parliament but are predominantly 
historical and structural in their frames of reference. This dissertation is distinct from 
many of these accounts as it bases its interpretations in the discipline of sociology. This 
foundation in sociology means that rather than an emphasis on the political, structural, 
and functional roles of governance, it explores the European Parliament in terms of its 
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impacts on the lives of individuals and groups. The focus on democracy and governance 
in this work therefore has wider implications than their application in the European 
Parliament, conceptualising these aspects as part of a wider set of social functions and 
structures. 
 
The essential starting point for research based in the discipline of sociology is to establish 
an understanding of the nature of social relationships and the types of structures that these 
relationships engender. C Wright Mills (1970: 143) argues that ‘the line-up of a man’s 
problems – how he states them and what priority he assigns to each – rests upon methods, 
theories and values’. Only by constituting a basic set of relationships may deeper 
interpretations of social action take place. For sociology, the concept of methodology 
represents this process. Methodology in its proper context refers to a set of 
epistemological and theoretical interpretations that translate the social world. As such, it 
provides a structure for making sense of everyday action, and a context for social 
research.  For Habermas (1990: 44), it provides a ‘system of reference within which 
reality is systematically explored’. 
 
As the starting point of methodology, epistemological understandings enable us to 
conceive the basis of social reality and the types of relationships this generates. For 
Hamlyn (1995: 242), epistemology is the ‘possibility, scope and general basis’ of the 
world around us. Therefore, different epistemological positions lead to different ways of 
interpreting the social world. For example, the empirical sciences, and those that may 
wish to appear as such, often base their interpretations on an epistemology that 
understands an objective world of facts that is ‘always there’. Consequently, the physical 
collection of information is often a largely functional process, designed to ‘discover’ a 
particular facet of our social or physical environment. In the case of this research 
however, knowledge represents more than an arbitrary process of cause/effect deduction. 
Rather, as Natanson (1963: 15) puts it, research into our social lives ‘considers the 
intersubjective world as constituted in the activity of consciousness’.  
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An example of the epistemological position this dissertation takes is evident in the ways 
that interpretations of democracy vary dramatically between states. Democracy in the 
People’s Republic of China involves very different structures to democracy in the United 
States of America. Not only do contemporary interpretations vary, but democratic 
systems do not exist in isolation; they are the product of ongoing social processes and the 
manifestation of particular social forces. Consequently, interpretations rely upon 
underlying understandings and assumptions, as Natanson (1963: 15) puts it, our 
‘intersubjective world’. 
 
In an intersubjective world, social reality, i.e. that which we perceive as the actual in our 
lives, is not objective fact but social construction. For this epistemological interpretation, 
‘truths’ do not exist externally from their moments of realisation, but are complex sets of 
interactions between aspect, subject and culture. Adorno (1973: 11) argues that truth and 
meaning are therefore ‘moments of the reality that requires their formation’. There is no 
intrinsic quality of an object, but the object is an artefact brought into meaning by social 
action.  
 
An epistemology which views reality as ‘the product of man’s own activity’ (Remmling, 
1975: 22) places emphasis on subjective meaning rather than objective fact. There is 
philosophical and sociological support for this approach in the works of Berger and 
Luckmann (1966: 13), who famously argued that ‘reality is socially constructed’. As with 
Berger and Luckman (1966), Bachelard (1967 [1934]: 14) argues that knowledge as a set 
of social facts, does not exist as an objective reality but ‘all knowledge is in response to a 
question... Nothing proceeds from itself. Nothing is given. All is constructed’. For Weber 
(1963), this idea of reality as a function of social interaction extends beyond the social 
world to incorporate the natural sciences. He argues that ‘even the knowledge of the most 
certain proposition of our theoretical sciences – e.g., the exact natural sciences or 
mathematics, is, like the cultivation and refinement of the conscience, a product of 
culture’ (1963: 361-2).  
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Horkheimer (1992) claims that an epistemology based in subjective and constructed 
meanings contain a dual process for interpreting the social world. On the one hand, the 
structures and meanings of society are manifest in ‘the historical character of the object 
perceived’, whilst on the other, these historical characteristics are also subject to 
interpretation ‘through the historical character of the perceiving organ’ (1992: 200). In 
other words, knowledge is a product of the ongoing social processes that shape our world, 
as well as subjective interpretations of those social processes made as we seek to take 
meaning from the world around us. This dual process, Horkheimer (1992: 200) argues, 
means that our understandings are ‘not simply natural; they are shaped by human 
activity’; all knowledge is therefore a product of historical and social interaction. 
 
In a world shaped by social interaction, Marx conceives of the individual not as single 
unit, but as a social being constructed through the lens of historical relationships. For 
Marx (1961: 67) ‘it is not the consciousness of men that determine their being, but, on the 
contrary, their social being determines their consciousness’.  As a result, we can 
understand human action as a product of the environment in which it occurs, where the 
meanings and structures that shape social life are the result of historical patterns of 
influence.  Horkheimer (1992: 200) supports this philosophy of Marx, arguing that ‘the 
world which is given to the individual and which he must accept and take into account is 
… a product of the activity of society as a whole’.  
 
Both Marx and Horkheimer’s emphasis on social processes are based in a socially 
constructionist epistemology. Berger and Luckmann (1966: 211) describe this 
epistemology as one conceiving ‘a human world, made by men [sic], inhabited by men, 
and, in turn, making men, in an ongoing historical process’. Although this places a great 
deal of emphasis on recognising the constructed nature of social reality, it does not mean 
that arguments built on this position must succumb to the extreme relativism of 
postmodernism or the empiricism of objective and supposedly scientific approaches. On 
the contrary, social constructionism stands between the extremes of outright postmodern 
subjectivity and of empirical objectivity by seeking to ‘salvage relative truths from the 
wreckage of false ultimates’ (Horkheimer, 1946: 183). While it acknowledges a 
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constructed world of interpretations as many postmodern philosophies do, it moves 
beyond this by arguing that these interpretations are collective products of the dominant 
forces that shape the whole of society. Similarly, it does not suffer the paralysis of 
empirical objectivism in which ‘every thought has to be held in abeyance until it has been 
completely corroborated’ (Horkheimer, 1950: 297). Rather, social constructionism 
embraces a world constructed through historical meanings and actions, therefore seeking 
to confront ‘the existent in its historical context’ (Horkheimer, 1946: 182). 
 
Implicit within an epistemology based on social constructionism is an understanding that 
social inequalities and imbalances are the product of historical action: in a world that is 
the product of human action it can only be human action that creates unfairness. This key 
part of the epistemology underpins this dissertation’s exploration of democracy and 
governance in the European Parliament. As a body purporting to structure the lives of 
over 500 million individuals, the European Parliament enjoys a key role in shaping the 
future of democratic governance. Critically examining the functions of the Parliament is 
therefore important for understanding the ways in which democratic governance above 
the level of the state may develop, both in the European Union and in other global 
political structures.  
 
The role that methodology plays in exploring democracy and governance in the European 
Parliament is vital. By transcending simple ‘statements of method and arguments about 
them’ (Mills 1970: 136), a robust methodology ensures that this research is both coherent 
within its own confines as well as transparent in its conclusions. The rest of this chapter 
sets out the ways this socially constructionist epistemology informs this research, 
applying Scheler’s (1925) concept of ‘sociology of knowledge’ to illustrate how these 
decisions came to inform both the methods adopted and the structure of the analysis. 
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2.2 Developing a sociology of knowledge  
 
Whilst epistemology informs us about the foundations of social knowledge, it does not 
hold an implicit way of understanding the nature of those relationships or their outcomes 
in terms of social structures. Translating epistemology into functioning understandings of 
real-world structures, such as the European Parliament, requires that we employ what 
Max Scheler (1925) called a Wissenssoziologie: a sociology of knowledge. For Goff 
(1980: 112), a comprehensive sociology of knowledge allows us to determine ‘what it 
can possibly make sense to say about specifically human reality’. It is both a 
philosophical tool for formulating basic understandings of the nature of social reality, and 
a functional guide which allows us to construct ‘a methodology appropriate to this 
reality’ (Goff, 1980: 112). As such, a sociology of knowledge provides a bridge between 
epistemology and interpretation by allowing us to apply conceptual tools to the 
exploration of social objects. For Berger and Luckmann (1966: 15), it provides us with 
‘the relationship between human thought and the social context within which it arises’.   
 
Applying a socially constructionist epistemology to research, particularly research that 
seeks to explore the potential of a body such as the European Parliament to structure 
social action, involves an approach that is both consistent with the ideas of a constructed 
social world as well as inherently geared towards critical analysis of the structure that 
social world contains. There are two main positions that could accomplish this: the 
scientific or critical realism of Bhaskar (2008); and the critical theory of Horkheimer and 
the Frankfurt School for Social Research.  Although similar in many ways, the important 
distinctions between these two positions have significant impacts on the ways to examine 
democracy and governance in the European Parliament.   
 
In its modern incarnation, scientific or critical realism owes much of its reinvigoration as 
a philosophical approach to Bhaskar’s (2008) work and the idea that we can distinguish 
the actual from the empirical. Bhaskar (2008: 46) argues that ‘there is a distinction 
between the real structures and mechanisms of the world and the actual patterns of 
events’. For Bhaskar (2008: 185), there is a greater truth of a scientific reality, which is 
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not a ‘product of man’ but the ‘intransitive and structured character of the objects of 
knowledge [that] exist and act independently of the operations of men and the patterns of 
events alike’.  
 
Bhaskar’s (2008: 262) philosophy imagines a ‘transcendental ontology of enduring and 
transfactually active structures’ in which the process of critique is one of attainment. 
Knowledge of the scientific world represents a progression towards the transcendental; a 
world which is always there.  Yet despite this, on a social level knowledge is still subject 
to interpretation through human consciousness, and Bhaskar (2008: 185) argues that 
‘knowledge is produced by knowledge’ insofar as ‘the objects from, and by, which 
knowledge is generated are … always themselves social products’  
 
Bhaskar’s ontology draws a distinction between a scientific ‘real’ world and the world of 
human thought and action used to interpret it.  Bhaskar is dismissive of society as an 
antecedent to knowledge of our ‘real’ scientific world. Knowledge generated through 
human action is ‘true’ in a social context; it is true because we believe it to be so, and 
because we base our actions upon those beliefs (2008: 185).  It is not true as an 
‘intransitive’ reality however; as Bhaskar (2008: 189) argues, it ‘has no foundation – only 
a structure in time’. 
 
Bhaskar (2008: 196) explains the division between a physical reality and a social world, 
constructed by human action: 
 
‘It is not necessary to explain society as such; but only the various 
structures responsible for differing societies and their changes … As so 
conceived, society may be regarded as an ensemble of powers which exist, 
unlike other powers, only as long as they are exercised … [through]…the 
intentional action of men’  
 
Bhaskar argues that two worlds of intransitive reality and human interpretation coexist. 
To explain this, he uses a metaphor that describes reading a piece of text that is 
‘independent of any language’ (2008: 196). Such a text would contain a meaning that was 
both a ‘correct’ and ‘communicatively successful’ (2008: 197); there would be its actual 
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message as well as the message the reader took from it using their own socially 
constructed terms of reference. 
 
The difference between truth and meaning for Bhaskar (2008: 185) intimates that ‘it is 
not necessary that society should continue’ for the ‘enduring mechanisms’ of the world to 
exist. The impact of this on researching aspects of our human world is less evident in 
Bhaskar’s work. Certainly, he argues that the social world is one of interpretations, and it 
is the job of the ‘skilled scientist’ to ‘attempt to understand the mechanisms of 
phenomena’ (2008: 197), and it does create an understanding in which humans ‘are not 
passive spectators of a given world, but active agents in a complex one’ (2008: 117).  
 
As an interpretive approach, Bhaskar (1986) adopts the basic premise of Marx’s ideas on 
the applications of critical reason as a tool to discuss human potential, particularly in 
respect of the ability to achieve social action that is more enlightened. In his most recent 
work, Bhaskar (2011: 192) maintains his critique of capitalism, and argues for a ‘socialist 
emancipation’ using critical realism to challenge the rhetoric and structures that are part 
of contemporary political ideologies.  
 
Bhaskar (2011: 190) seeks to apply critical realism as ‘a critical tool at the political 
level’, yet offers little in the way of functional methods through which to do this. His 
separation of physical and social reality do create the human world as an inherently 
malleable object, and one that is subject to the unequal forces of historical influence, but 
there is little guide for ways this may occur. Therefore, although Bhaskar makes an 
important contribution to critiquing positivist approaches to interpreting social action as 
well as stressing the importance of critique in understanding human action, much of his 
work remains in a philosophical mode. He gives little suggestion for direct action or 
associated method outside of suggesting possibilities for rethinking how emancipation 
might translate into political action. He does however generate a valuable insight into the 
role critique plats, suggesting that it ‘must be internal to (and conditioned by) its objects; 
or it will lack both epistemic groundings and causal power’ (Bhaskar, 2011: 114). 
 
 14 
An alternative applications of Bhaskar’s (2008) critical realism and the world which is 
always there, is that of Merleau-Ponty (1963) for whom the existence of a ‘real’ world 
outside of human experience does not necessarily mean that truth is inexorably tied to 
this external reality. As with Bhaskar (2008), Merleau-Ponty (1963: 501) envisages 
meaningful truths as relative to their moments of conception, arguing that, ‘if history 
envelops us all, it is up to us to understand that whatever we can have of the truth is not 
to be obtained in spite of our historical situation, but because of it’. Differing from 
Bhaskar however, Merleau-Ponty argues that once we recognize that truth is socially 
constructed, we cannot ignore the intrinsic reality of that truth:  
 
… having once recognized that through this situation I have become part 
of all action and all knowledge that can be meaningful for me, and that it 
contains … all that can be for me, then my contact with the social in the 
finitude of my situation reveals itself as the origin of all truth. … Since we 
are in truth and cannot escape it, the only thing left for us to do is to define 
a truth within the situation.  
(Merleau-Ponty, 1963: 501) 
 
Distinct from Bhaskar’s (2008: 185) world which is always there, Merleau-Ponty (1963) 
argues that although it is possible to understand a world which ‘exists’ aside from human 
action, without human action this world contains no meaning. It is a world conceptualised 
in the enlightenment philosophy of Hegel (1966:590, cited in Held, 1980:152) in which 
‘matter has no intrinsic experience’ and ‘material things’ are given to us as ‘pure’ objects 
with ‘no further determination of any sort’. Even though Bhaskar (2008) acknowledges 
the social truth in objects, he simultaneously restricts that truth to the realm of human 
conception, apart from a world of real physical truths.  
 
As with Bhaskar and Merleau-Ponty, Horkheimer (1992: 196) is critical of an empirical 
approach in which the social sciences is an exercise to ‘integrate facts into conceptual 
frameworks’. For Horkheimer (1992: 196), this traditionalist approach is part of a 
positivism that focuses on ‘independent, “suprasocial”, detached knowledge’ rather than 
on actual understandings of social action. Horkheimer (1992: 188) terms this ‘traditional 
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theory’, a supposedly scientific reproduction of knowledge which he argues both 
‘belong[s] to the existing order and help[s] make it possible’. 
 
In answer to the failings of traditional theory, Horkheimer (1946: 167) uses critical 
reason to embrace the constructed nature of a social reality in which ‘each concept must 
be seen as a fragment of an inclusive truth in which it finds its meaning’. Horkheimer 
(1946: 210-11) argues for a form of ‘critical thinking’ that rejects the detached 
knowledge of empiricism: 
 
Critical thinking is the function neither of the isolated individual nor of a 
sum-total of individuals. Its subject is rather a definite individual in his 
real relation to other individuals and groups. 
 
In order to make sense of a world formed through historical and material relationships, 
Horkheimer (1946: 168) argues that we must embrace ‘the logic of the object as well as 
of the subject’. This creates a form of social knowledge that is inseparable from the social 
processes that generate it, and represents the collective reality of social constructivism. It 
is through knowledge of our social world that we may come to reason what we believe to 
be true and right. Reason therefore allows us to imagine the structures and functions of 
our social world as part of an ongoing process of possibility.  Marcuse’s (1973: 145) 
reading of critical theory emphasises this idea of knowledge as a transforming tool, 
arguing that ‘the real field of knowledge is not the given facts about things as they are, 
but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form’.  
 
Critical theory and its application to the structures of social life is not the ‘rationalization 
of the world’ (Held, 1980: 66) embraced by empirical sciences, nor is it the same as 
Bhaskar’s separation of the human world from one of ‘intransitive and structured 
character of the objects’ (2008: 185). Rather, critical theory understands the world as a 
wholly constructed environment in which praxis, the culmination of thought and action, 
provides the key to overcoming the inequalities that come about as part of this process. 
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The roots of critical theory derive from the work of Marx (1961: 67) and his central 
argument that ‘the mode of production of material life determines the general character of 
the social, political, and spiritual processes of life’. In applying the principles of 
knowledge and reason to human action, Marx famously envisages other forms of social 
structure that would provide better vehicles for human thought and action. Adopted in 
large part by Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School for Social Theory, this Marxian 
reading of the social world creates a requirement of knowledge that ‘cannot be separated 
from political commitment and the struggle for emancipation’ (Delanty, 1997: 60). 
 
Critical theory differs from the highly philosophical work of Bhaskar (2008; 2011) as it 
provides a functional approach to researching and understanding the social environment. 
Developing Marx’s idea of praxis in philosophy and function, Horkheimer and the 
Frankfurt School sought to create a ‘link between philosophy and social science’ 
(Delanty, 1997: 71).  Building upon Hegelian principles of potentiality with a broadly 
Marxian understanding of the functions of capitalist society, the aim was to produce a 
method of enquiry that embraced enlightenment ideals of potentiality, freedom, and 
equality. 
 
As a form of Hegelian-Marxism, this historically materialist consideration of social 
history focuses on the relationship between agency and structure and the overall ability of 
the mechanisms of social order to provide a vehicle for enlightened human action. More 
than just a way to explore our social world, critical theory aims to be a transformative 
mode of thinking which gives the agent ‘a kind of knowledge inherently productive of 
enlightenment and emancipation’ (Geuss, 1999: 2).  
 
Despite the requirement for critical theory to produce work that is both explanatory and 
transformative, it does not provide the same definitive guide for action that other more 
empirical ontologies do in their ‘quest for certainty’ (Horkheimer, 1946: 167). Indeed, the 
Horkheimian 
 form of critical theory applied in this dissertation believes that the ‘weakness of 
positivism’ is in the ‘implicit assumption that the general empirical procedures used by 
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science correspond naturally to reason and truth’ (Horkheimer, 1946: 79). Rather, this 
thesis embraces what Geuss (1999: 88), working on the philosophy of Horkheimer, 
identifies as Wissenschaft: ‘a body of systematically interconnected propositions which 
gives reliable guidance for successful action’.  So even though critical theory does not 
offer functionally defined methods, it does provide a structure for exploring the social 
world: a way of researching rather than a mode of researching.  
 
For this dissertation, critical theory bridges the gap between a socially constructionist 
epistemology and a practical route to exploring the nature of democracy and governance 
in the European Parliament. The following section of this chapter outlines the specific 
application of critical theory in this dissertation.  
 
 
2.3 The application of critical theory to the European Parliament 
 
Critical theory represents a way of researching rather than a specific set of methods. 
Horkheimer (1992: 242) argues that ‘there are no general criteria for critical theory as a 
whole, for such criteria always depend on a repetition of events and thus on self 
reproducing totality’. As a response to this problem, Horkheimer (1946) describes a form 
of immanent criticism as a practical application of critical theory.  Immanent criticism is 
central to applying the concepts of critical theory to this exploration of democracy and 
governance in the European Parliament. This section of the chapter sets out the 
application of immanent criticism in this dissertation and its influence on the research 
structure. 
 
Raymond Geuss (1999: 1-2) outlines three criteria that an approach based on critical 
theory should fulfil. In the first instance, he argues that ‘critical theories have special 
guides for human action’ insofar as they are ‘aimed at producing enlightenment in the 
agents who hold them’ and are ‘inherently emancipatory’ (1999: 1-2). For Horkheimer 
(1946: 186), the use of theory as a guide to action is an essential aspect of research, and a 
key distinction from traditional theories that have a tendency to ‘confuse thinking with 
 18 
planning’.  Unlike many traditional theories, Horkheimer (1946: 186) thought of critical 
theory as a ‘corrective of history … mankind’s memory and conscience’, elevating 
critique above the level of deconstruction and using it as a tool of social and human 
justice.  
 
The focus on praxis and knowledge as a transformative tool is a central aspect of critical 
theory’s application. In this dissertation, this means the exploration of democracy and 
governance in the European Parliament is part of a wider comprehension of social 
structures and their potential. This resonates with Horkheimer’s (1946: 183) argument 
that critical theory ‘takes existing values seriously but insists that they become parts of 
the theoretical whole that reveals their relativity’.  The process and purpose of this 
dissertation is therefore more than performing a structural-functional assessment of the 
Parliament, it is a wider consideration of potential for enlightened human action.   
 
Secondly, Geuss (1999: 2) argues that a critical theory must contain some ‘cognitive 
content’ inasmuch as theory represents ‘forms of knowledge’. This is the essential legacy 
of social constructionism in critical theory’s approach to interpreting the social world. A 
critical theory understands that society, at its most basic level, is an expression of its own 
evolution. As Held (1980: 182) explains, ‘every thought, idea and particular is 
interwoven with the whole societal life process’.  This manifests in this dissertation as a 
continued emphasis on self-reflection and an acknowledgement of the researcher as an 
active agent in the generation of knowledge.  In particular, a technique of organising and 
conducting interviews was devised which maintained a reflexive approach to gathering 
information from interviews with actors possessing high levels of knowledge and 
involvement in the European Parliament. More detail on these methods is given towards 
the end of this chapter. 
 
Thirdly, Geuss (1999: 2) argues that critical theories should ‘differ epistemologically in 
essential ways from theories in the natural sciences’.  Unlike theories which claim 
objectivity as a method and inalienable ‘truths’ as outcomes, critical theories ‘reject the 
veneration of the finite … as far as they pretend to be independent ultimates’ 
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(Horkheimer, 1946: 182). As such, Geuss (1999: 2) affirms that ‘critical theories are 
reflective’, designed to embrace the constructed nature of social reality and adjust their 
positions accordingly. This does not mean that critical theory succumbs to the 
‘contradiction between relativism and dogmatism’ in refuting objective truth, but that any 
truth is acknowledged as historically relative, yet no less true for being so (1999: 2).  
 
Immanent criticism understands knowledge as a social construction, and research as the 
process of exploring the meanings that derive from this. As this chapter has argued, the 
role of researchers is one of active involvement. Researchers engage in translating social 
meanings and processes in order to create a particular image of the world. For this reason, 
it is important to examine the manner in which information in research is gathered and 
the purposes for which this information is then used. 
 
The research in this dissertation uses a wide range of different material in order to make 
the arguments of the thesis. The first two chapters on democracy and governance largely 
comprise a theoretical exploration that uses a range of historical and academic accounts 
to construct an image of each concept. This type of theoretical analysis is useful insofar 
as it allows different perspectives to contribute to an analysis. However, this does mean 
that the chapters are subject to the range of interpretations contained within these 
different materials, and because of this neither chapter is a simple recounting of those 
arguments. In both cases, the chapters synthesise a wider argument from the material they 
use; in the case of democracy three principles for analyzing its application, and in the 
case of governance, three distinct ontological models.  
 
The three-stage immanent criticism in the latter part of the dissertation incorporates a 
wide range of material in its arguments. Here, it was important to employ more first-hand 
material in order to construct a set of interpretations on the Parliament’s functions that 
concentrate on the arguments of the thesis. This clear focus on the European Parliament 
means that this analysis is free to deal specifically with democracy and governance in a 
real-world context, contributing a unique insight into the workings of the Parliament. As 
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such, this approach forms what Stake (2000: 437) defines as an ‘instrumental case study’, 
that is, ‘a particular case chosen both for particular and general interest’. 
 
The information for the immanent criticism came from several sources. As well as an 
extensive array of academic accounts, it employed two primary sources of data. The first 
of these comprises a range of documentary evidence that come directly from European 
governance bodies, including the Parliament and Commission. These bodies routinely 
make available a range of treaties and accompanying documents, along with press 
releases, and other historical accounts. These documents are an important source of 
information, representing an account of the roles and functions of European bodies from 
their own perspective. In arguing a position of social constructionism, Horkheimer (1935, 
cited in Held, 1980: 182) asserts that truth retains its historical value, and any ‘later 
correction does not mean that an earlier truth was an earlier untruth’. He goes on state 
that, while a critical theory: 
 
…does not presume that the process of critique and determination will end 
with its own standpoint, it in no way gives up the conviction that its 
knowledge – in the total context to which its concepts and judgments refer 
– is valid not only for individuals or groups, but simply valid, i.e. that 
opposed theories are false. 
(Horkheimer, 1935, cited Held, 1980: 182) 
 
For Held (1980: 183), this conceptualisation of truth as relative relies on a relationship 
between concept and object in which they are ‘interdependent but irreducible aspects of 
the societal process’. Horkheimer (1946: 171) supports this, arguing that concepts 
‘become inadequate, empty, false, when they are abstracted from the process through 
which they have been obtained’. Consequently, in order to understand the nature of 
democracy and governance in the European Parliament it is essential to conceptualise it 
as part of a social whole, in which its functions are inseparable from wider social 
processes. 
 
Geuss’ (1999: 2) three criteria for using critical theory provide a foundation for social 
research based in critical theory, and an important basis for this research. They apply a 
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socially constructionist epistemology to the structures of social life in order to orientate 
action whilst at the same time, emphasis the role of the researcher as part of the same 
structures and processes which construct the world in which they live. As such, Guess’s 
three criteria (1999: 1-2) are a useful guide for employing critical theory, describing the 
important aspects contained in an approach based on this philosophy. Despite this, they 
do not constitute a specific method for exploration. For this it is necessary to look more 
directly at the work of individual members of the Frankfurt School.  
 
Although many of those in the Frankfurt School who worked on critical theory were 
sceptical about the structures of the modern world, the early work of Max Horkheimer 
stands out as an approach for critically exploring the physical structures of the social 
world. Horkheimer (1941: 122) sought a real-world application of critical theory that 
could relate ‘social institutions and activities to the values they themselves set forth as 
their standards and ideals’. The resulting method came to be known as immanent 
criticism (Held, 1980: 183), insofar as it deals with the object in question in reference to 
the ability of its own structures to provide an enlightened structure for human action.  
Applied in this work to a study of democracy and governance in the European 
Parliament, this means contrasting the ways in which it fulfils its aims and objectives 
against the potential of these functions. 
 
Horkheimer was not the only member of the Frankfurt school to describe an immanent 
method, and Adorno (1973: 323) in particular applied the concept to philosophy in an 
attempt to establish a ‘critical social consciousness’. This approach arose from what 
Adorno perceived to be the failures of a bourgeois philosophy ‘to provide an adequate 
account of the relation between subject and object’ (Held, 1980: 2001). Consequently, it 
was predominately concerned with deconstructing the philosophical problems that 
Adorno felt blighted a modern, capitalist society. 
 
In contrast to Adorno, Horkheimer exercises immanent criticism as a structural tool by 
applying it to ‘the social functions of systems of thought’ (Held, 1980: 201). For 
Horkheimer (1992: 200), as with Adorno, there are serious conflicts in bourgeois 
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ideology, and Horkheimer views these conflicts extending to the structures of bourgeois 
society which may claim to be functioning in the interests of all but are, in fact, either 
‘founded directly on oppression, or been the blind outcome of conflicting forces’. 
Horkheimer argues that an immanent method must apply to the social world in a tangible 
way. A method such as immanent criticism does not take place ‘in a purely intellectual 
world, but coincides with the struggle for certain real ways of life’ (Horkheimer, 1992: 
245). Immanent criticism therefore seeks to explore the contradictions of modern society, 
particularly the ways in which social institutions reflect the historical inequalities of a 
capitalist system.  
 
Immanent criticism challenges the functions of social objects to acertain if they do in fact 
provide a means of more enlightened action. In the words of Horkheimer (1946: 182), it 
‘confronts the existent, in its historical context, with the claim of its conceptual principles 
in order to criticize the relation between the two and thus transcend it’.  This approach 
bears some similarity to Bhaskar’s (2011: 114) argument that critique must be ‘internal 
to (and conditioned by) its objects’ in order for it to have a functional, epistemic 
meaning. Horkheimer however, extends this approach, using it as a functional method to 
critically examine the structures that arise with and help to define societies. Immanent 
criticism contrasts the actuality of a social structure against a wider conception of its 
place in human history. It allows the researcher to embrace the dialectic of the object as 
‘a unity of opposites that contains within itself contradictions’ (Held, 1980: 185), and 
through examination of these contractions work towards transcending them.  
 
Immanent criticism’s focus on the functional nature of social objects makes it uniquely 
suitable to applying a critical method to the European Parliament. It offers a practical 
way to assess the functions of an important and influential social structure. By contrasting 
the Parliament’s actual role with its own claims for its purpose, immanent criticism 
emphasises the contradictions and inequalities that exist within its functions. An 
examination of these contradictions also generatess insights into a wider understanding of 
the structures engendered by a modern, capitalist system. This process of critique is not to 
be confused with simple scepticism, although scepticism should play a large part. Rather, 
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immanent criticism seeks to assess a system as part of its wider ability to provide 
enlightened human action. As Horkheimer (1992: 229) puts it, ‘every part of the theory 
presupposes the critique of the existing order and the struggle against it’. 
 
The adoption of immanent criticism has shaped this dissertation’s exploration into the 
nature of democracy and governance in the European Parliament. Basing itself in Geuss’ 
(1999: 2) three criteria for a critical theory, the dissertation explores the European 
Parliament as a body derived from historical meanings and relationships, and embraces 
its role as an important agent of contemporary social and political structure. Through a 
focus on the Parliament’s ability to function as a democratic governance structure, 
immanent criticism allows this research to move beyond simple observation and 
comment to orientate action.    
 
 
2.4 Immanent criticism of the European Parliament 
 
As application of critical theory, immanent criticism is particularly suited to this 
exploration of democracy and governance in the European parliament. Its focus on the 
contradictions in the physical structures of the social world means that it is a practical 
way to assess the Parliament and integrates wider ideas of potentiality that run through 
critical theory. Writing on the nature of immanent criticism, Held (1980: 184) describes it 
as an application to researching social objects and structures which: 
…starts with the conceptual principles and standards of an object, 
and unfolds their implications and consequences. Then it re-
examines and reassesses the object (the objects function, for 
instance) in light of these implications and consequences. 
 
In some ways the process of critique involved in immanent criticism is conceptually 
similar to Weber’s (1963: 416) approach of ‘ideal-typical concept-construction’. Both 
concepts emerged to some degree from a Hegelian-Kantian philosophical tradition that 
seeks enlightened forms of social structure, and both involve contrasting existing systems 
against their potential. There are however, some significant differences between the two 
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approaches, the largest of which rests in what the ideal constitutes as an evaluative 
concept.  
 
For Weber (1963), the ideal was a concept constructed from a rational functional 
assessment of any given structure’s objectives. Thus, an ideal type is a reproduction of 
the most rational parts of a given system, compiled as a model and used as an exemplar. 
These models could then provide a template against which one could contrast actual 
systems, Lachman (1971: 26) describing them as ‘essentially a measuring rod’. Ideal 
types do not necessarily need to be achievable, positive, or correct, but are internally 
logical constructs for evaluating a system.  As with immanent criticism, Weberian ideal 
type is therefore particularly useful for examining the bodies and structures that regulate 
our social lives. 
 
Unlike Weberian ideal type, immanent criticism understands the ideal not as a rational-
functional or purely logical construct, but as a potentiality more in line with the Hegelian 
aspects of Kant’s philosophy and Marx’s later adaptations of this. The evaluation of a 
social object is not as Weber considered it, based on its adherence to a rationalised 
model, but is as Horkheimer (1992: 245) argues, the ideal is ‘concerned with men and all 
their potentialities’, having only ‘the happiness of all individuals as its goal (1992: 248). 
Therefore, a critique of the European Parliament in the immanent mode would posess as 
its ultimate aim the Parliament’s role as a potential vehicle for human action.  
  
There is another, more specific criticism of the rationalisation that is instrumental in 
Weber’s ideal type. Although many of the early members of the Frankfurt School shared 
a broad agreement with Weber on the emergence of instrumental reason as the increasing 
means by which human articulated actions, Weber’s idea that this was inevitable was 
highly criticised. Marcuse (1964: 215, cited in Held, 1980: 66) was particularly critical of 
what he felt was the teleological nature of Weber’s rationalisation, describing it as a 
‘concept of fate’ which ‘generalizes the blindness of a society which reproduces itself 
behind the back of individuals, of a society in which the law of domination appears as 
objective technological law’. For Marcuse, Weberian rationalisation that was typified in 
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ideal type was symptomatic of a decline in critical reason and the erosion of thought by 
the ‘bracketing of human beings within commodity production [and] the fall of the 
technological veil’ (Marcuse, 1941, cited Held, 1980: 67). 
 
Marcuse termed the decline in critical reason technological rationalism, Horkheimer 
called it instrumental reason, and in both cases, it was symptomatic of a manifestation of 
capitalist modes of economic and cultural production in the everyday lives of individuals. 
They argued that capitalism’s dominance taints rationality, reducing it to ‘a set of truth 
values which hold good for the functioning of the apparatus – and for that alone’ 
(Marcuse, 1968: 422, cited Held, 1980: 67). As Horkheimer and Adorno (2002: 121) put 
it, the rationale of capitalism was ‘the rationale of domination itself’.  
 
In order to challenge the dominance capitalist modes of production exert on the structures 
of our social world, critical theory and immanent criticism emphasize the historical 
dimension of critique as a tool for understanding and then overcoming the inequalities 
which are built into social systems. For Horkheimer (1941: 122), immanent criticism is 
bound up in a critique of the historical and ideological structures in which society is built, 
these structures all too often being a reflection of the ‘ambivalent relation between 
prevailing values and the social context forces’. Immanent criticism of the European 
Parliament is therefore part of a process that actively questions ‘the absolute claims of 
prevailing ideology and of the brash claims of reality’ (Horkheimer, 1946: 183).  In other 
words, the Parliament needs to be conceived of as a product of a particular ideological 
system rather than a body arriving to function unconstrained and uninfluenced by 
external forces.   
 
The focus of immanent criticism is not just on the object in question, in this case the 
European Parliament, but its historical emphasis places that object in matrix of social 
meaning and formation in order to envisage the object moving beyond its present 
conditions. Immanent criticism is an exploration of past influence, present function, and 
future potential. These elements, the historical, functional, and potential, are essential in 
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the immanent process as they remove research from the purely subjective and 
introspective and give it both context and real world function.   
The three elements of immanent criticism translate in this exploration of democracy and 
governance in the European Parliament as three-stage process of critique. Firstly, the 
dissertation contains an historical critique that explores the history of the Parliament’s 
role within the European Union. Secondly, it explores the actuality of the Parliament, 
examining the ways in which it fulfils its mandate. Finally, it embraces the aspect of 
transformative knowledge by exploring the potential of the Parliament to provide a 
vehicle for social organisation and offering a range of suggests for ways to work towards 
this potential. 
 
As well as the three-stage process implemented in this dissertation, immanent criticism 
requires that social objects are explored as part of ‘the web of relationships within the 
social totality’ (Horkheimer, 1946: 211). Consequently, prior to the immanent criticism 
proper the dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the concepts behind both 
democracy and global governance in order to place them in a context through which the 
subsequent analysis is able to take place. As well as forming a basis for immanent 
criticism, this analysis also allows an application of this thesis’ claims beyond the 
European Parliament, making it relevant to other institutions that seek to function in a 
democratic way on the global stage. This process is set out in more detail in the following 
sections. 
 
2.4.1 Chapters 3 and 4: The theory of democracy and global governance 
Horkheimer (1992: 225) argues that a ‘critical theory of society also begins with abstract 
determinations’. In this instance, he is referring to an understanding of the material nature 
of a capitalist economy, but more generally this argument encompasses the idea that in 
order to be critical, there must first be an ‘outline of the mechanism’ you are critiquing 
(1992: 225). Chapters 3 and 4 provide part of this outline with an analysis of democracy 
and global governance respectively, assembling a theoretical basis for the three-stage 
immanent criticism of the European Parliament.  
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Chapter 3 deals specifically with the theory of democracy. Using an historical analysis of 
democratic systems and a range of academic and theoretical arguments, the chapter 
argues that democracy is temporally and culturally bound, both conceptually and in terms 
of its applications as a system of governance. Therefore, in order to analyse democracy’s 
different applications the chapter constructs a set of three principles as a way of 
evaluating the nature of democracy exhibited in a system. These principles form an 
important tool for the subsequent analysis of the European Parliament in the dissertation. 
 
As with chapter 3, chapter 4 provides a basis for the subsequent three-stage immanent 
criticism of the European Parliament by constructing a set of three different theoretical 
models of global governance. These models each cover a particular ontological 
perspective on the nature of global political structure and the relationships this entails. 
Using a range of different theorists, each model presents a general position that argues for 
a particular type of global order. A long with the analysis of democracy in Chapter 3, 
these models of global governance contribute a range of concepts and tools which are 
used in the subsequent analysis of the European Parliament. They also develop a wider 
background to the arguments of in this work, placing the Parliament in a global context. 
 
2.4.2 Chapter 5: Immanent criticism, Stage 1, A critical history  
 
For immanent criticism, it is only through an appreciation of ‘the importance of historical 
circumstances’ that we can fully understand a social object in its contemporary position 
(Horkheimer, 1992: 195). Consequently, understanding the functions of the Parliament is 
a process inseparable from its historical development. Chapter 5 conducts this historical 
exploration of the Parliament’s growth within the European Union, evaluating how the 
forces acting on it has shaped its development and its changing role in the European 
Union. 
 
The chapter makes use of a wide range of official documents from the European Union 
and Parliament as well as a number of accounts from academics and historians in order to 
set out the development of Parliament since the Second World War.  The aim of the 
chapter is to place the Parliament in an historical perspective through which the later 
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stages of immanent criticism then interpret its present and future functions. This first 
stage of immanent criticism is more than an historical appraisal; it does not just plot the 
course of events, but is a developmental history of the Parliament that provides a guide 
for understanding its cotemporary role.  
 
 
2.4.3 Chapter 6: Immanent criticism, Stage 2, A critical examination  
 
Chapter 6 is the second part of the three-stage immanent criticism, examining what 
Horkheimer (1941: 122) refers to as ‘the actual rift between the social reality and the 
values it posits’. This chapter is primarily concerned with a critical analysis of the 
European Parliament in terms of its present democratic and governance functions. To do 
this, the chapter construct a model of the European Parliament that focuses on its 
functions at a local, regional, and global level.  
 
As well as using the material from chapters 3 and 4 on the nature of democracy and 
global governance, much of the information for this stage of immanent criticism comes 
from a range of interviews conducted for this dissertation. These interviews involved 
individuals with strong connections to the Parliament, and provide an important source of 
first-hand information on the ways in which the Parliament functions. The first of these 
interview groups comprises MEPs who are, or were at the time of interview, members of 
the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, the body of the Parliament that deals 
specifically with issues of democracy and governance.  The second set of interviews 
comprise three leading academics who are each involved in theorising areas around 
national and European policy, democracy, and global governance. The third body of 
interviews involves what are termed here ‘involved practitioners’, those with practical 
experience of working for the Parliament in specific functions, or that have played 
primary roles in large European centrally funded projects. Together, these interviews 
provide a broad spectrum of opinion on the Parliament and contribute toward a unique 
insight into its democratic and governance functions. There is more detail on the 
interview process later in this chapter. 
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This second stage of immanent criticism also deals with contains the first claim of the 
thesis, arguing that by combining accountability for both states and for citizens, the 
European Parliament represents a new type of democratic governance structure that 
functions above the level of the state. The argument in this chapter informs the 
subsequent chapter’s analysis on ways to improve democracy and accountability in the 
Parliament.   
 
2.4.4 Chapter 7: Immanent criticism stage 3, an exploration of potential  
 
Chapter 7 is the final part of the three-stage immanent criticism, and it emphasizes the 
importance that critical theory and immanent criticism place on the transformative 
element to research. This chapter initially critiques the Parliament as a social structure 
‘not geared to the life of the whole community … [but] … geared to the power-backed 
claims of individuals’ (1992: 213). It then moves beyond this critique to explore the 
potential of the Parliament to provide democratic governance for the European Union.  
 
The arguments of this chapter build on the analysis from the stages of immanent 
criticism, as well as drawing on material from the interviews conducted for this work and 
the earlier chapters on the theory of democracy and global governance. It also takes 
material from two important reports commissioned by the Parliament, which supply a 
range of suggestions for ways to improve democracy in Europe. The chapter culminates a 
range of practical suggestions for ways to improve democracy and governance in the 
functions of the Parliament. These practical suggestions for ways in which the Parliament 
could better achieve its potential are presented as a set of suggestions, some dealing with 
practical elements of the Parliament’s day to day workings and others focused on wider 
questions over the Parliament’s role within the European Union and a global political 
economy as a whole. In making these claims, the chapter presents the case that that there 
is greater potential in the European Parliament than is currently evident. 
 
2.4.5 Chapter 8: a summary of the thesis and its approach. 
The dissertation concludes with a chapter that summarises the two claims of the thesis, 
presenting evidence that the Parliament represents a new form of democratic structure 
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and that it contains greater potential in its functions then is presently evident. It argues 
that the discussion on democracy and global governance affords this thesis context 
beyond its immediate focus on the European Parliament, and that much of the evidence 
here is relevant to other global institutions, particularly bodies such as the African Union. 
The chapter also discuses elements of the dissertation with continued relevance outside of 
this study outside of its central claims.   It concludes with an evaluation of study as a 
whole, suggesting ways to continue the study’s exploration of democracy and governance 
at a global level. 
 
 
2.5 Conducting the research for immanent criticism 
 
Extensive use was made of these sources, particularly in the first stage of immanent 
criticism that provides a critical history of the Parliament’s formation. 
 
Using documentary evidence from a critical perspective requires an understanding of 
them as part of a wider social and political context. Hodder (2000: 703) talks of 
documentary evidence as ‘mute evidence’, and argues that it is essential to understand it 
as a ‘form of artefact produced under certain material conditions … embedded within 
social and ideological systems’ (2000: 704). Consequently, it is important to regard any 
information contained within the document in this analysis as a subjective account, 
translated twice: one at its inception, and again in its reading. As Hodder states (2000: 
704), ‘meaning does not reside in text but in the writing and reading of it’. This does not 
discount these texts as inherently flawed and therefore meaningless, but requires careful 
evaluation of their content that considers their subjective perpective. One way of 
managing the subjectivity of documentary accounts is to use a variety of different sources 
to construct an argument. Accordingly, where this dissertation makes use of documentary 
evidence from the Parliament or other similar bodies, accounts from other sources are 
included to provide a contrasting perspective, particular those from academic accounts 
which approach the area with a different focus. 
 
 31 
The second source of primary information in this immanent criticism comes from a range 
of interviews conducted specifically for this research. As this chapter outlined, the 
interviews are in three sets of three, each with a specific focus on the European 
Parliament and its functions. The interview sets each comprised individuals with 
extensive experience of working in or for the Parliament or those that are involved in 
examining areas of governance and democracy relating to structure such as the EU. 
 
The first set of interviews was with three MEPs, at the time all members of the highly 
influential Committee on Constitutional Affairs that deals with issues of democracy and 
accountability in the Parliament. This committee was instrumental in producing the 
opposed European Constitution as well as its replacement, the Lisbon Treaty.  The 
interviewees with MEPs provide a unique insight into the functions and future direction 
of the Parliament, and their important role in the Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
meant they are ideally placed to discuss issues relating to this study. There was 
consideration taken to achieving a fair balance across political parties, and although all 
three were UK based MEPs, each represents one of the three main UK political parties. 
 
The second set of interviews comprises a group of three leading academics who are 
involved in researching issues of democracy and governance in bodies such as the 
European Parliament and Union.  Chosen to provide an external perspective to the 
operations and nature of the European Parliament, these interviews covered a wide range 
issues related to the Parliament’s functions. They were also an important contribution to 
the wider discussion on considerations of democracy and governance above the level of 
the state.     
 
The third set of interviews is with the ‘involved practitioner’ group. Individuals here 
possess extensive practical knowledge of working within or for the Parliament at a level 
other than an elected member. Two of those in this set previously ran several European 
funded projects, and the interviews provide an important insight into the application of 
European policy at a local level that discusses the role the Parliament and MEPs play in 
member states. The third member of this interview set is the Head of the Secretariat for 
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the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, effectively the most senior civil servant in that 
department and a person of great influence in the working of the committee. This 
interview gave a valuable perspective of the Parliament from a non-partisan perspective. 
Figure 1, following, provides more detail on the interviewees, as well as the signifiers 
applied when quoting from their interviews later in the dissertation.  
Figure 1: Interviewee breakdown 
Interview set M: Members of the European Parliament 
Signifier Brief Details 
MEP1 
Labour MEP - 
Member and one time vice Chair Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
MEP2 
Conservative MEP 
Member Committee on Constitutional Affairs at time of interview 
MEP3 
Liberal Democrat MEP 
Member Committee on Constitutional Affairs  
Interview set Ac: Specialist Academics  
Ac1 
Professor of Social Policy at a UK University 
Worked / published extensively on the applications of social policy across Europe. 
Ac2 
Professor of  Sociology at large UK university 
Published extensively on globalisation and civil society 
Ac3 
Professor of Politics at Universities in the UK and Germany 
Founder member, Centre for the Study of Democracy ,  
Served as a Fellow of the Institute for Public Policy Research  
Interview set C: Involved Practitioners 
IP1 
Head of Secretariat of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
Member, group of professors Institute for European, knowledge acquisition 
IP2 
Former Head of the (UK) Centre for Local Policy Studies 
Worked on a large number of EU funded projects and has extensive knowledge of the funding 
and knowledge transfer process within EU bodies. 
IP3 
Director of Countryside and Community Research Institute  
Professor  Faculty of the Built Environment, based in a large UK University. Former member of 
Prime Minster's Development group review of rural planning, housing, and economy.  
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In all cases, interviewees signed a consent form agreeing to the interview and use of the 
transcripts for academic purposes (a template of this is available in Appendix 1). Each 
interviewee had an information sheet outlining the research and contact details should 
they wish to discuss or withdraw from the study at any time. Examples of both forms are 
in Appendices 1 and 2, respectively. In total, the nine interviews provided just over 450 
minutes of material, 390 recorded minutes, and a 60 minute interview that was written 
and then countersigned by the interviewee due to problems with the recording equipment.  
 
2.5.1 Maintaining reflexivity in the interviews 
A large part of critical theory and immanent criticism’s approach involves an 
understanding of social knowledge as a product of historical flows of power and 
meaning.  Social knowledge is part of a process of interpretation, as Habermas (1990: 
152) argues, it is one in which ‘the interpreter is a moment in the same context of 
tradition as his [sic] object’. For this reason, it is important to understand the role that 
‘self’ plays in any piece of research, translating meanings and presenting evidence to 
create a particular representation. 
 
Achieving an appreciation of self in research required that reflexivity became a central 
aspect of this immanent criticism. A need to retain awareness of myself as both social-
construct as well as social-interpreter meant that it was important to accept that my own 
interpretations would change as my knowledge developed. This was particularly true of 
the interviews, where I was talking to individuals with high levels of knowledge and 
experience.  Gillingham (2005: 55) terms these ‘elite interviews’, where interviewees are 
individuals especially knowledgeable or in positions of power. Consequently, the 
interviewer is likely to enter the interviews with less knowledge on the specific area of 
the interview. Although from a critical perspective there are concerns with using a term 
such as ‘elite’ that arguably reinforces unequal power relationships, the label is 
nevertheless an accurate reflection of the highly specific and targeted interviews 
conducted for this dissertation.  
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There were a variety of methods adopted in order to minimise some of issues of control 
and knowledge within the elite interviews undertaken for this dissertation. Having three 
sets of interviews means that no one group dominated the knowledge, and staggering the 
time between these interviews meant that there was a chance for my own knowledge to 
grow in a balanced way rather that be dominated by one set of perspectives. The 
interviews took place in a variety of locations that meant that any environmental issues 
on either my part or that of the interviewees were minimised.  For example, the 
interviews with MEPs took place at the European Parliament building in Brussels, the 
London Office of the Conservative European Parliament and a regional constituency 
office. Other interviews were held at the offices of interviewees or, in several cases, more 
informal public locations albeit away from other members of the public. 
 
The most important measure taken to help control the interviews was the adoption of a 
form of interviewing similar to Douglas’s (1985) idea of ‘creative interviewing’. This 
approach is situational, being reflexive in style and technique, allowing changes in 
understandings and approaches to reflect in the questions asked. The need for a form of 
reflexive interview was born largely out of the problems that arose in the initial 
construction of interview questions. A preliminary set of interview questions along with 
brief justifications of the questions (a copy of which is in Appendix 2) were sent for 
review to a number of academics chosen for their experience in issues of interviewing or 
the European Parliament. Unfortunately, this method proved to be unsuccessful due to a 
limited set of responses from those who received the initial interview questions.  This 
method also did not sufficiently address the problems of conducting elite interviews, 
where there is a high possibility of new issues or knowledge emerging in the interview 
process that could usefully inform the questions put to other interviewees. 
 
As a response to the problems of conducting elite interviews, the research devised a new 
form of reflexive interview structure. This includes fixed topic areas, within which 
specific questions are adapted to reflect changes in the interviewer’s knowledge. The 
method embraces the fact that in elite interviews there is a high chance that the 
interviewer may encounter ‘new’ knowledge and that each interview is likely to change 
 35 
the interviewer’s understanding or perception of the subject. By allowing this changing 
knowledge to reflexively impact on the questions that are being asked, the method of 
interviewing maintains a high level of focus across the interviews. 
 
The structure of a reflexive interviewing process is in two parts: initially, it uses a fixed 
set of interview topics that provide continuity throughout the interviews and enable them 
to target specific issues or areas that are important to the overall focus of the research. 
Within these fixed topics, groups of questions are adapted reflexively depending on the 
ways in which the interview’s knowledge develops.  As well as allowing the questions to 
maintain a high level of focus within the set topics, it also means that each topic can 
contain a variety of questions that may be more or less suitable for different interviewee’s 
areas of experience. The two-tiered process encompasses two of the key aspects of a 
critical theory: it provides a structure that allows the interviews to maintain focus and 
hence enable critique, whist at the same time embracing the reflexivity that is part of 
social constructionism where knowledge is a social product and subject to continual 
change. 
 
Figure 2 on the following page gives a guide to the process of reflexive intervening in 
this dissertation. It illustrates how fixed topic areas offer an overall structure to the 
interviews, and how within this structure questions are reflexively adapted on the basis of 
a changing personal knowledge and to help focus on the specific experiences of 
individual interviewees. This figure describes two interviews conducted for this 
dissertation, one with an academic and one with an involved practitioner. Although this 
figure does not show all questions from each interview, those chosen give a good 
indication of how the reflexive process works between different interview groups. 
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Figure 2: Reflexive interviewing model for Interviews MEP1 and IP2 
Static topics Reflexive Questions (simplified for this table) 
Interview Ac2 (Academic) Interview IP2 (Involved Practitioner) 
Topic 1: 
The EP’s functions  
at a national level 
What role do you see the EP playing in 
domestic social and economic policy 
making? 
 
What do you feel is the strategy of the 
European Parliament in terms of national 
politics – what function do you feel it is 
trying to fulfil? 
How influential do you feel the EP is in domestic 
social and policy? 
 
What function do you feel the EP is trying to fill in 
for its composite national states? 
 
What role do you see the EP playing in its 
composite states? 
Topic 2: 
The EP’s functions  
at a regional level 
What role do you see the European 
parliament playing on a regional level? Is 
it a genuine attempt at regionalisation or 
is it an exercise in standardisation?  
 
What do you think the Agenda is for the 
EU and EP? 
 
Do you feel there are any ways in which 
the internal procedures/functions of the 
EP and EU governance structure could be 
made more democratic or more open?  
 
You were involved in a project that dealt with 
other EU nations – what was the influence and 
input of the EU/EP in this project? 
 
Do you think the EU/EP Is it an attempt at a 
democratic government for Europe, is it 
collectivism, is it a strengthening of 
neoliberalism? 
 
Do you feel there are any ways in which the 
internal procedures/functions of the EP and EU 
governance structure could be made more 
democratic or more open?  
Topic 3: 
The EP’s functions  
at a global level 
How do you see the EP interacting in a 
global environment dominated by big 
non-democratic financial and economic 
bodies?  
 
Are there tensions between the EU’s 
economic neoliberalism and the EP’s 
social agenda? 
 
What role can the EP play in a world 
dominated by financial and corporate 
entities? 
 
How do you see the EP interacting with 
other large global states? 
 
Globally, what role do you see the EP 
playing now and in the future? 
How have you seen the role of the EP develop 
since you have been involved with it? 
 
Are there tensions between the EU’s economic 
neoliberalism and the EP’s social agenda? 
 
What role can the EP play in a world dominated 
by financial and corporate entities? 
 
Globally, what role do you see the EP playing 
now and in the future? 
 
In the case of the reflexive interviewing method here, the static topic areas reflect a focus 
on three specific levels of interaction within the functions of the European Parliament. By 
guiding questions to a local, regional, and global level of interaction, the topic areas 
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allowed the interviews to focus specifically on each interviewee’s areas of expertise 
without loosing the overall focus on the European Parliament.   
 
Figure 2 describes the questions for two interviews, one with an academic and one with 
an ‘involved practitioner’. The interviews with MEPs, were based on a slightly different 
set of question topics that reflected the particular type of specialised knowledge they had. 
These topics were also a product of the analysis of democracy and governance in chapters 
3 and 4. A copy of the reflexive process for the MEP interviews, including the questions 
asked and the changes made between interviews, are available at the end of this work in 
Appendix 3. 
 
Reflexive interviewing is a method devised here in order to relate specifically to the 
requirements of an immanent criticism built on social constructionism. Based in social 
constructionism, the value of reflexive interviewing extends beyond this specific study to 
cover other situations in which interviewers find themselves in a position where it is 
likely they may encounter significant ‘new’ information. It embraces the idea of a 
constantly evolving knowledge of the social world; and in doing so maintains particular 
relevance to Gillingham’s (2005: 55) concept of ‘elite interviews’.  
 
As part of the overall research process employed in this dissertation, reflexive 
interviewing helped the interviews to produce a range of highly specific responses in key 
areas of the research, whilst contributing to a more general focus on the functions of the 
European Parliament. Its inclusion helped to describe the ongoing importance that a 
socially constructionist epistemology plays in interpreting the world around us. 
 
 
 5.6 Methodology: a summary 
 
This chapter has set out the methodological process through which this exploration of 
democracy and governance in the European Parliament takes place.  This process is 
important, as it emphasises the underlying assumptions and interpretations that inform the 
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conclusions of this dissertation.  The three-stage immanent criticism also informs the 
structure of the analysis, constructing the European Parliament as an historical social 
object, as a functioning body, and as a potentiality for providing democratic governance. 
It also defines the presentation of the two central claims of the thesis: that the Parliament 
is a new form of democratic governance structure; and that the Parliament is capable of 
greater democratic governance than presently evident. 
 
The next two chapters represent the initial stage of criticism, providing an examination of 
democracy that culminates in a set of three principles, and then three ontological models 
of global governance that describes how different interpretations of global structure 
suppose different roles for bodies such as the European Parliament. Together, these two 
chapters form a basis for the immanent criticism in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
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Chapter 3: 
The theory of democracy 
________________________________________________________________________ 
3.1 Introduction: democracy and the European Parliament 
3.2 Democracy: Zeitgeist and material 
3.3 Democracy: development and applications 
3.3.1 Democracy: an historical foundation 
3.3.2 From Greece to Rome and beyond 
3.3.3 A Protective state Vs the individual. 
3.3.4 From Republicanism to Liberalism and the modern state 
3.3.5 Democracy:  Key applications in the 21
st
 century 
3.3.6 Democracy: going global  
3.4 Democracy: the key principles 
 3.4.1 The principle of legitimacy 
3.4.2 The principle of representation 
3.4.3 The principle of accountability 
3.5 Democracy and the European Parliament: a summary 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction: democracy and the European Parliament 
 
This chapter examines the ways in which it is possible to evaluate the democratic 
functions of a system of governance such as the European Parliament. Along with the 
following chapter that focuses on the nature of global governance, it forms a basis for the 
immanent criticism of the European Parliament in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.   
 
Many prominent social and political theorists have discussed at length the nature of 
democracy. Schumpeter’s (1976) classic work on capitalism, socialism, and democracy 
examined the ways in which democracy could contribute to a rejection of capitalism in 
favour of more socialist political and economic world structures. Here, Schumpeter 
adopts an approach that treats democracy as a material and finite system, setting out an 
‘economic definition of democracy, conceived as an institutional arrangement like the 
market’ (1976: xi). In a similar vein, Lijphart (1999ix) conducted a comparative study of 
twenty-one democracies between 1949 and 1980, concluding that the ‘institutional 
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characteristics [of democracies] form two distinct clusters’. Habermas (1996: 21) also 
sought to construct three normative models in order to ‘sketch a proceduralist view of 
democracy’. These approaches each attempted to provide structural assessments of 
democracy applicable as templates through which to examine other systems.  
 
Others such as Held (2003) sought to move beyond structural assessments of democracy 
in order to take a more inclusive view of a system that was continually changing.  Held 
(2003: xi) produced a range of democratic models which sought common themes from a 
‘history of democracy marked by conflicting interpretations…and inconsistent accounts 
of the key terms of democracy’.  As with Held, authors such as Dahl (2000), Shaw 
(2002), Arblaster (2002), Smith (2007) and Keane (2009) sought to conceive democracy 
as a changing system of governance in an increasingly global world.  
 
The problem with defining democracy, as Dahl (2000: 3) argues, is that it has ‘meant 
different things to different people at different times’. Democracy is a subjective concept, 
applied in a variety of ways through a variety of systems for at least 2500 years. For Dahl 
(2000:32), this means we are constrained to interpret democracy and democratic systems 
based on ‘our beliefs about causal conceptions, limits and possibilities in the actual world 
around us’.  
 
As with Dahl, Keane (2009: xv) argues that democracy’s lack of universal definition is an 
integral part of an evolving history in which ‘values and institutions are never set in 
stone; even the meaning of democracy changes through time’. For Keane (2009: xiii) 
‘often hotly disputed meanings’ construct democracy as a ‘time-bound’ (2009: 842) and 
difficult concept to evaluate. This does not mean that it is impossible to assess the 
applications of democracy in a governance structure, but that democracy’s important 
place in modern societies means simple definitions and procedural accounts are 
inadequate. Consequently, the following section of this chapter explores democracy as 
both a structural system of governance as well as an ideological aspect of many societies. 
This dual role democracy plays in many modern states provides an important way to 
understand its central role in shaping modern political and social culture. 
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3.2 Democracy: Zeitgeist and Material. 
 
Democracy is an important characteristic of Western state governance.  The democratic 
state is often a focal point for an expression of Western social and political ideals; as 
Held (2003: 1) argues, ‘democracy appears to legitimate modern political life’. Yet, 
democracy as a functioning system of representative governance does not contain a 
definitive form or a universally established basis. Its application varies between states, 
and its role in the instruments of government is often subject to radical differences.  
 
On a basic level, democracy entails the will of the people transposed to some degree onto 
the laws and structures that govern social life. For Keane (2009: xv), democracy can be 
seen as a system in which ‘the people or their representatives lawfully govern 
themselves’. Yet beyond this basic position, there is little in common between 
democracy’s applications in different systems. For example, the process of representation 
in direct participatory democracies where all citizens are involved in the decision-making 
process is very different from democracy in indirect systems where representative rule 
means decisions are made via proxy.  
 
Describing the origins and futures of democracy, Keane (2009: xiv) argues that ‘every 
turn of phrase, every custom and every institution of democracy as we know it is time-
bound’. This lack of common application extends not just to democracy as a structural 
system, but also to its role as a cultural artefact. Democracy plays an important role in 
defining ideological aspects of cultures and civilisations, and this is particularly evident 
in the forms of democracy often referred to as ‘Western’, ‘capitalist’ or ‘liberal’ 
democracy. These forms of democracy have increasingly been a uniting force for states 
that have in the past, differed politically and culturally. For those states which claim to 
‘be democratic’, the ideology of democracy provides collective meaning through political 
and cultural ethnocentrism.  Democracy identifies a common thread between states and 
individuals, and constructs the non-democratic other as ideologically and culturally 
different. 
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For the ‘democratic West’, this other has taken different forms in recent decades. For 
example, the Second World War was partially a war of Democracy against Fascism; each 
side portrayed the other as immoral and inferior. According to Held (2002: 57-8), the 
victory of the democratic Allies lead to a strengthening of democracy in the victorious 
states, which were ‘stimulated by processes of mass mobilisation’, while in contrast the 
Axis states become ‘democracies by defeat or imposition’.  
 
Following on from the Second World War, the Cold War witnessed a new ideological 
conflict in which democracy became a political and social rallying point. Western, 
capitalist states presented their versions of liberal democracy as ‘choice’ and ‘freedom’ in 
stark contrast to Communisms’ absence of choice. In Western Europe, liberal democracy 
found support through the Marshall Plan, which pumped billions of US dollars into 
rebuilding European industry as a counter to rising communism. Keane (2009: 711) 
argues that in many cases this attempt to weaken communism ‘put the democratisation of 
industry on the political agenda’. At the same time in the UK, the establishing of a 
welfare state democratised healthcare and benefits for citizens who had sacrificed much 
in the fight against Fascism. 
 
On the other side of the iron curtain, the Soviet states portrayed themselves as a 
replacement to old style European empires, as Smith (2007: 8) argues, claiming to be 
‘egalitarian, Libertarian and democratic’ whilst at the same time exercising power 
through ‘absolutism or top-down assertiveness’. Although in reality the Cold War was as 
much about the division of global power and resources as it was about ideology, 
democracy provided a useful vehicle for both sides to justify why they were ideologically 
superior. Democracy, particularly in the West, was the collective characteristic that 
unified states and citizens. 
 
The revolutions across Europe that signified the end of the Cold War meant many states 
rejected various applications of soviet communism, and embraced the liberal democracy 
of the ‘Western’ world. For some such as Fukuyama (1992) this end to ideological 
contest was tantamount to an ‘end of history’: liberal, capitalist democracy emerged from 
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the Cold War as a system of governance supported by the remaining major global 
powers. Institutions of such as the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organisation 
became powerful fronts for the economic and social structures of neoliberalism, and an 
ideology of global, liberal capitalist democracy. This corresponding increase in Liberal 
Democracies post-Cold War is illustrated in Figure 3, following. 
 
Figure 3: Number of liberal democracies compared to World Bank 
membership 
 Number of Liberal 
Democracies 
World Bank Group 
Membership 
1975 35 (of 147) 
(23.8%) 
 
448 
1995 78 (of 164) 
(47.6%) 
 
631 
 
 
% increase 
 
50% 
 
41% 
Sources: Held, 2001: 47, World Bank 2011a and 2011b 
 
Although the table makes it clear that there was a dramatic post-Cold War increase in 
liberal democracies, the nature of ongoing conflict in the modern world shows 
Fukuyama’s (1992) claims to be overstated. The ‘triumph of the west over all political 
and economic alternatives’ (Smith, 2007: 256) has in recent times become a complex 
ideological clash between Western liberal democracies and other systems that do not 
embrace this mix of neoliberal capitalism and democratic ideology.   
 
Huntington (1996) made a case for ongoing ideological conflict not long after Fukuyama 
had made his claims.  The ‘clash of civilisations’ predicted by Huntington (1996) draws 
heavily on the language and ideology of a world established in distinct parts. This 
reductive approach seems at odds with a global world that boasts increasingly large flows 
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of cultural and ideological information and in which ‘civilisations’, such as they are, no 
longer conform solely to territorial boundaries. Although the world is still divided in 
economic and structural means, Castells (1998: 74) argues that individuals are 
increasingly free to participate in what he terms a ‘network society’. In an information 
age, it is ‘networks of production, power, and experience, which construct a culture of 
virtuality in the global flows that transcend time and space’ (1998: 350). 
 
The rise of a network society does not mean that conflicts with ideological elements 
cease to occur. Indeed, at the turn of the 21
st
 century, Shaw (2002: 169-70) argued that 
new global conflicts were likely to be ‘about the shape of civil society and the 
state…about the future shape of states’, a position certainly born out by recent global 
events.  The US led invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq and, more latterly, Libya all 
incorporated the rhetoric of democracy as part of their justification. Revolutions of 
varying success across North Africa and the Middle East were in part about a desire for 
more democratic forms of governance. Similarly, a growing number of states oppose the 
dominance of liberal democracy’s focus on capitalist social and economic structures, 
objecting to its pervasiveness in national and historic cultures.  
 
In all of these cases, conflict that uses democracy as an ideological or structural element 
does not represent Huntingdon’s (1996) ‘clash of civilisations’, but a continual search by 
people for a better way to structure their social and political lives. A more descriptive 
concept for this process might be Weltanschauungen War, which derives from the 
German term for world-view and the philosophy of Mannheim (1993). This concept 
refers to a process in which individuals and collectives participate in an ongoing clash of 
worldviews, facilitated by the flows of knowledge in an information age. As both an 
ideological concept and as a structural system, democracy functions as a powerful force 
for mobilising opinion and action as well as a guide for reform.   
 
As an important characteristic of Weltanschauungen and as a structural system of 
governance, democracy plays two important roles. On the one hand, it helps to define 
defining particular modes of social and cultural production dominant in many liberal-
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democratic societies. On the other hand, democracy provides a guide for types of political 
and bureaucratic structures that enfranchise a section of the population. This division 
between zeitgeist and material function means that it is impossible to understand 
democracy outside of its social and cultural contexts.  
 
The complex cultural influences on democracy mean that there is no single, dominant 
definition of what it constitutes ideologically or structurally. Its long and varied history 
means that any definition has little validity beyond its own systems of reference. Indeed, 
Horkheimer (1946: 167) argues that an attempt to define any concept is to construct an 
‘essentiality for the object … designed merely to be distinguishing tokens for an external 
reflection’.  
 
In seeking to avoid the essentialism of definitions, this chapter understands democracy as 
a series of principles, applied in different ways across different systems. Held (2003) took 
a similar approach when constructing a number of historical models of democracy in 
order to explore the nature of that system and its applications. These models, he argues, 
are ‘complex networks of concepts and generalisations about aspects of the political 
realm and its key conditions of entrenchment, including economic and social conditions’ 
(2003: 7). Although this approach is congruent with this dissertation’s understanding of 
the complex and interconnected nature of democracy, the application of models is not 
suited to exploring a system of governance such as that in the European Parliament, 
which this work argues differs in some radical ways from previous systems. Applying 
predefined models runs the risk of prejudicing the research by defining the Parliament in 
traditional terms, and this is in contrast to critical theory’s emphasis on moving beyond 
the presumptions of traditional interpretations to explore the nature of social objects.  
 
As an alternative to traditional models of democracy, this dissertation devised a set of 
three key principles that focus on specific ways in which democracy is applied. The three 
key principles stem from the analysis in this dissertation, and embrace the idea of 
democracy as a historically fluid concept, with a variety of culturally and temporally 
bound meanings. They are not a set of definitive tenets, as constructing such is simply be 
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establishing ‘one norm among the others’ (Keane, 2009: 843). In this approach, there is 
no value placed on each principle and they do not represent predefined applications. 
Rather, the principles are a guide for focusing on specific areas of democracy and the 
ways in which a democratic system functions.  
 
The first principle of democracy is legitimacy, which Caporaso (2003: 365) describes as 
‘a highly general characteristic of democratic governance that cuts across various other 
indicators of democracy’. Legitimacy is a general concept that sums up a range of 
different ideas on the way in which a system maintains its right to rule. To be legitimate, 
a governance structure must enjoy both support and recognition as this is how ‘those 
subject to a governance process accept it as properly authoritative’ (Keohane and Nye, 
2003:386).  
 
The second principle of democracy is representation, and it refers to the remit of the state 
and the role it plays in managing the lives of its citizens.  Describing the concepts of 
modern democracies, Birch (1993: 78) talks of the important role representation plays ‘in 
maintaining the system as well as … in securing a degree of popular control over 
government’. Consequently, understanding the ways in which a system represents those it 
governs offers an important avenue into the wider democratic functions of that system.  
 
The final key principle is accountability. Accountability examines the ways in which a 
system interacts with those for which it holds responsibility. Held (2002: 27) uses the 
term ‘relevant community’ to describe whom a state encompasses. The concept has a 
wider basis than the idea of citizenship, and it refers to all those with a stake in a 
governance body. This is particularly relevant to institutions such as the European Union 
that are accountable not just to their citizens, but also to other organisations. The EU, for 
example, represents the will of both states and of citizens, a role that creates a significant 
impact on its governance structure. 
 
By examining the ways in which a structure such as the European Parliament applies 
democracy in these key areas, it is possible to understand the wider nature of its 
 47 
democratic structures as well as then being able to go on and suggest specific ways in 
which their democracy may develop.  The following section sets out the rationale behind 
each of the three principles of democracy. It uses an historical analysis of different 
democratic systems and applications of democracy to examine how elements of these 
principles are evident. It then goes on to discuss the indicators the key principles might 
display in a democratic system, as well as how to apply these to an exploration of the 
European Parliament. 
 
 
3.3 Democracy: Development and Applications 
 
Held (2002: 7) states that the ‘development of democracy encompasses a long and much-
contested history’. A good example of this is evident in contrasts between the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America, states with historical ties and ones where 
democracy plays an important ideological and structural role in defining the nature of 
political life.  The USA is a constitutional republic, with a bicameral system in which 
each chamber comprises fully elected representatives. It is also a federal state, with 
discrete jurisdictional areas exercising legislative power. Contrast this with the United 
Kingdom, where individuals are at once subjects of the crown as well as both citizens of 
the UK and the European Union. There is a sovereign monarch, albeit in a largely 
ceremonial role, a partially elected upper House of Lords partially able to veto 
legislation, and an elected House of Commons with the majority of power.  There is also 
a legislative body in the European Union, where an elected Parliament and a Council of 
Ministers comprising representatives of member states jointly draft legislation that a 
Commission enacts. Both systems argue they are democratic, and both often assign 
democracy as a defining aspect of their legitimate right to rule.  
 
This short example of two systems illustrates the variety in modern-day democratic 
structures. This variety also extends to historical applications, and as Dahl (2000: 9) 
argues, ‘it would be a mistake to assume that democracy was just invented once and for 
all, as, for example, the steam engine was invented’. The following historical analysis of 
 48 
democracy centres on some of the key different applications throughout its history. At 
each important historical juncture, there is a brief evaluation of aspects of the three key 
principles, and the chapter concludes with a more in-depth discussion of their place in 
democracy’s history and the role they play in this immanent criticism of the European 
Parliament.  
 
3.3.1 Democracy: an historical foundation 
All forms of governance are systems of rule that entail control by a group, and evidence 
exists of collective or consensus rule far back into human history.  Some of the oldest 
documented evidence of collective rule in the democratic tradition is from the self-
governing 'sabhas' villages of India and Pakistan around 1200BC (Nehru, 1964: 288).  
From these grew the ‘Panchayat’ system (1964: 288) in which villages exercise executive 
and judicial powers individually and collectively, a system still in use in some areas 
today. 
 
As a specific form of rule, democracy commonly attributes to the early Greek city-states, 
with the Greek word demokratia translating literally into “rule by the people”. There is 
however, a certain amount of evidence to suggest that these systems derived, or at least 
were heavily influenced by, other earlier structures. Plutarch (1989) in Life of Lycurgus 
talks about a Spartan Probouleutic council existing around 600 BC, which met at regular 
intervals some hundred years before such meetings were a common part of the Greek 
tradition. More latterly, Bernal (1987) argues that Phoenician influence in the Greek 
alphabet and military could well extend to political structures, influencing early self-
regulating city-states.  
 
Despite some disagreement on the exact beginnings of the democratic tradition, the 
Greek city-states of the 5
th
 century BC provide a well-documented place to begin 
exploring the development of Western democracy. These city-states emerged from a 
feudal system of ‘residential nodes of concentration for farmers and landowners’ 
(Anderson, 1974: 29) to become economic and cultural centres, which shouldered 
responsibility for local defence and economics. Gradually, these nodes of economic and 
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cultural concentration began to form the basis of the autonomous city-states that 
followed, the most notable of which were Athens and Chios (Held, 2003: 13-14). 
 
Central to these emerging city-states were new ways of demarcating populations, and 
issues of identity and solidarity paved the way for the concept of the citizen as an 
individual with rights and responsibilities towards the common good of their state. This 
construct of the individual as an agent of the collective was captured in a funeral speech 
attributed to Pericles, Athenian citizen, politician and military leader (although more 
likely composed some time after his death by Thucydides).  In this speech, there is a 
veneration of the integral relationship between the act of governance and the citizen:  
 
Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of 
a minority but of the whole people. 
… 
We give our obedience to those whom we put in position of authority, and 
we obey the laws themselves, especially those which are for the protection 
of the oppressed, and the unwritten laws which it is an acknowledged shame 
to break. 
… 
Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in their 
affairs of the state as well: even those who are mostly occupied with their 
own business are extremely well-informed on general politics – this is a 
peculiarity of ours: we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics 
is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at 
all.  
(Thucydides, 1972: 145-147) 
 
The speech clarifies a citizen’s duty to commit to a principle of civic virtue, in which the 
private sphere of the individual was secondary to the public sphere of the state. This was 
the case to such a degree that the individual’s role within the state ultimately became his 
causa causans, the most immediate influence on his life. 
 
Aristotle, although not wholly in agreement with the democratic system, stresses the 
reciprocal relationship between state and individual that permeated political philosophy at 
the time: 
 
 50 
For though admittedly the good is the same for city as for an individual, still 
the good of the city is apparently a greater and more complete good to acquire 
and preserve. For while it is satisfactory to acquire and preserve the good even 
for an individual, it is finer and more divine to acquire and preserve it for a 
people and for cities.  
(Aristotle, 1990: 217) 
 
Involvement in political life was not just the duty of the citizen, but also a central feature 
of a system in which participation was the irrevocable association of political ‘public’ 
and individual ‘private’ spheres. The state and citizen defined each other in their mutual 
reference, and legitimated the authority exercised by one on behalf of the other.   
 
The idea of an intrinsically linked demos and polis meant the governed themselves as 
governors. Citizens comprising uniformly free men and predominantly those from within 
the confines of the city-state could ‘express and transform their understanding of the 
good through political action’ (Farrar, 1992: 38). Representation through direct 
participation was enshrined in city-states by the principle of isegoria, an equal right to 
speak, which allowed the citizen to realize his own material powers and work toward the 
telos, the common good of the state. 
 
Aristotle (1981: 362), writing in the first half of the 3
rd
 Century BC, outlines some of the 
‘features of democracy’ in these early Greek systems: 
 
(a) Elections to office by all from among all. (b) Rule of all over each and of 
each by turns over all. (c) Offices filled by lot, either all or at any rate those 
not calling for experience or skill. (d) No tenure of office dependent on the 
possession of a property qualification, or only on the lowest possible. (e) 
The same man not to hold the same office twice, or only rarely, or only a 
few apart from those connected with warfare. (f) Short terms for all offices 
or for as many as possible. (g) all to sit on juries, chosen from all and 
adjudicating on all or most matters, i.e. the most important and supreme, 
such as those affecting constitution, scrutinies, and contracts between 
individuals. (h) The assembly as the sovereign authority in everything, or at 
least the most important matters, officials having no sovereign power over 
any, or over as few as possible [...] (j) as birth, wealth, and education are the 
defining marks of oligarchy, so their opposites, low birth, low incomes and 
mechanical occupations, are regarded as typical of democracy. (k) No 
official has perpetual tenure, and if any such office remains in being after an 
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early change, it is shorn of its power and its holders selected by lot from 
among picked candidates.  
(Aristotle, 1981: 362-4) 
 
Aristotle presents a range of criteria that define this early application of democracy, 
setting out a variety of ways to maintain the perceived equality of the system. The legacy 
of these ideas is evident in many modern systems, for example: the choice of officials by 
election; limits to periods in positions of power; trial by jury; and full franchise for 
citizens, albeit within a very limited set of criteria in Aristotle’s case. 
 
In these early systems, there was an expectation that those who qualified for citizenry 
would be available to participate in the process of government. For Cicero (1929: 124), 
the citizenry of the time comprised ‘not every group of men, associated in any manner, 
but is the coming together of a considerable number of men who are united by a common 
agreement about law and rights and by the desire to participate in mutual advantages’. 
Those few who qualified as citizens ruled over the rest of society as, in the words of Held 
(2003: 24), a ‘tyranny of citizens’. 
 
For early Greek democracies, the state took on the normative functions of collective 
governance, at once both the immediate collective will and the prospective continuation 
of its citizenry. Whilst the state could, and did, exist outside of an individual citizen’s 
immediate participation, a citizen could not exist outside of the state’s ability to define 
them as such. Citizenship was essentially membership of the privileged class who were 
able to exercise control over their own political destiny. 
 
These Greek systems provide a template for many subsequent democratic systems, 
genrating accountability, representation, and legitimacy in governance through 
participation in the life of the state. The state gained legitimacy through the direct 
participation of citizens. Although those who were not citizens had little recourse to 
accountability, those that were represented had accountability assured through the option 
of direct representation in personal involvement.  
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3.3.2 From Greece to Rome and beyond 
From the 5
th
 century BC onwards, the advent of  Roman rule over much of Europe and 
North Africa meant the Greek tradition was adapted for the new Republic. Civic 
responsibility and the role of the state were enshrined in the pseudo-democratic systems 
of early Rome in which representation of citizens and subjects came through a variety of 
bodies.  A senate of aristocrats made the majority of decisions on behalf of the empire, 
informed by citizens through concilia of collective groups and comitia of individuals. 
This was complemented by the Plebeian Council representing those who were not part of 
the exclusive citizenry or Rome. This system of multilayered representation effectively 
governed the republic until around the first century AD, when autocratic control through 
the senate and the role of Emperor brought about the imperial phase of Roman history 
where citizen representation in the decision-making process was largely removed. 
 
This imperial state remained for some 500 years until the division of the empire resulted 
in power relocated to the Byzantine Empire based in Constantinople, which became 
increasingly theocratic. The idea of an active citizenry participating in the functions of 
the state and political destiny gave way to a culture based on religious rule, with the 
rationale of political action in the polis replaced by a theological scripture. The view of 
the good of the polis as the ‘greater and more complete good to acquire and preserve’ 
(Aristotle, 1990: 217) was supplanted by the idea that it was to God’s will that one should 
submit, the exact nature of which was subject to the interpretations and translations of 
various religious bodies. Nevertheless, the idea of individual rights remained evident in 
some teachings of early Christianity. For example, St Augustine’s (2003) The City of God 
emphasised equality, even if it focused more on the spiritual rather than the temporal 
aspects of an individual’s life.  
 
In Europe, the theocratic focus remained dominant until the Middle Ages when early 
Medieval Europe experienced the emergence of social and political structures that sought 
to deal with various papal and imperial claims to control. Typified in the northern Italian 
city-states of Florence, Siena and Venice, these first post-classic challenges to the 
established rule reintroduced the idea of self-government and self-determination.  Keane 
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(2009: xviii) argues that this was the beginning of a second, new phase in democratic 
thinking which culminated in the emergence of modern, representative democracy. 
 
In the 13
th
 century, the political philosophy of Plato, Cicero and most notably Aristotle 
was rediscovered and translated for European audiences. As the Renaissance gathered 
pace, post-plague Europe experienced a philosophical reinvention in which thinkers such 
as Brunetto Latini (d.1294), Ptolomy of Lucca (d.1327) and Marsilius of Padua (d.1342) 
began to give accounts of the importance of elective governments that incorporated 
concepts such as self-determination and political freedom. In Defensor Pacis, Marsilius 
(1324 [1996]) challenges the supreme right of the church by dividing the realm of 
governance into two distinct branches. The ecumenical ‘Christian legislator’ would deal 
with religious aspects pertaining to the governance of the soul, whilst a human legislator 
was left to govern ‘the people as a community and as individuals’. Marsilius sought to 
reintroduce an Aristotelian idea of a civic community capable of self-governance: 
 
The legislator or the effective cause of the law is the people, the whole body 
of the citizens, or the majority of that body, expressing its will and choice in a 
general meeting of the citizens, and commanding or deciding that certain 
things shall be done or left undone, under threat of temporal penalty or 
punishment. 
(Marsilius, 1324 [1996])  
 
For Marsilius, participation in representative governance was the key to liberty, and 
constitutional frameworks in which leading social forces took charge of their own 
political destinies became more popular.  The freedom of the citizen ‘from the arbitrary 
power of tyrants’ was adjudged to rely upon his (and it was predominantly male) own 
and collective abilities to ‘run their common affairs by participating in government’ 
(Canovan, 1987: 434).  
 
Despite a long absence of democratic ideals in the Western world, the rediscovery of 
many classical works served to place concepts of legitimacy, representation, and 
accountability back onto the governance agenda.  Although still dominant in many 
places, there were increasing challenges to autocratic and theocratic forms of governance 
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that involved ideas of democratic legitimacy extending from accountability and 
representation. These important principles went on to inform the ways in which 
democracy continued to develop in Europe. 
 
3.3.3 A Protective state Vs the individual. 
At the turn of the 16
th
 century, Niccolò Machiavelli made a connection between 
participatory politics in elective government and civic welfare and success. Writing at a 
time in which competition and war divided Europe, and particularly his native Italy, 
Machiavelli (1983: 275) argued it was only when a state was able to enjoy liberty that it 
could increase in ‘domination or wealth’.  
 
For Machiavelli political participation was essential for liberty, and it was civic 
involvement that could achieve conditions of self-rule and independence. However, this 
could only happen if the ‘generality of men as self seeking, lazy, suspicious and 
incapable of doing anything good unless constrained by necessity’ could be overcome 
(Held, 2003: 51). Machiavelli built upon the historical example of the Roman Republic’s 
combination of representative bodies and strong authoritarian rule to argue for civic 
involvement enforced through a strong state and law. It was a form of protective 
republicanism that combined the principles of self-rule and authoritarianism in order to 
maintain an idea of a good state as ‘first and foremost the secure and stable state’ (Held, 
2003: 54). 
 
For Machiavelli, unlike Plato and Marsilius, politics was not the implementation of an 
ideological principle, but a mechanism to create order and the ‘chief constitutive element 
of society’ (Held, 2003: 51). Although his form of protective republicanism still limited 
the polis to males of ‘unambiguous local descent’ (2003: 54) and excluded “dependants” 
such as women and slaves. It did however include non-aristocrats within the local area 
and in doing so widened representation and laid the foundation for the modern 
participatory system of governance that were to follow.    
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau rearticulated Machiavelli’s vision of participatory politics in the 
mid 18th century. Described by Pocock (1975: 504) as the ‘Machiavelli of the eighteenth 
century’, Rousseau stressed the importance of the individual’s civic obligations and 
duties as central to individual and collective freedoms. For Rousseau, liberty was closely 
associated with civic involvement and the collective regulation of state functions; it was 
not just the duty of the citizen to become involved in the collective process of 
government, but an important way of maintaining personal and collective freedoms. 
Unlike Machiavelli, Rousseau believed that the right to sovereignty originated with the 
people, and the state was the ultimate expression of the people. In cases where the 
representative elements of governance fell short of this standard, he was highly critical, in 
one instance saying of the English:   
 
The English people believes itself to be free; it is gravely mistaken; it is free 
only during the election of its members of parliament; as soon as the members 
are elected, the people is enslaved; it is nothing. 
(Rousseau, 1968: 141) 
 
Rousseau (1968: 60-1) felt that liberty could only be achieved through the free and 
constant exercise of the citizen’s involvement, binding the state by ‘the supreme direction 
of the general will’.  Structurally, this meant the creation of a political system that clearly 
demarcated the legislative and executive functions. The legislative would be the sole 
proviso of the citizens whereas the executive functions remained in the realm of a 
government or a prince operating as a bureaucratic body, providing logistical support and 
enforcing laws. However, this advisory body should never exceed ‘the instructions of the 
general will’ (Rousseau, 1968: 148).  
 
Rousseau provided a viable alternative to the despotic regimes of the time and 
contributed to the political landscape at the beginning of the French Revolution. His ideas 
were a forerunner of many modern systems in which majority rule within collective 
decision-making forms the basis for democratic governance. 
 
 56 
Despite these republican systems moving towards a wider base for enfranchised citizens, 
there were continued restrictions on who constituted the polis, and women in particular 
still excluded from their own representation in political life. Writing in the latter half of 
the 18
th
 century, Mary Wollstonecraft challenged many of the ideals and values that were 
placing women outside of the political community. In her seminal work Vindication of 
the Rights of Women (1982), Wollstonecraft built upon the premise of an integral 
relationship between liberty and equality, as discussed by those such as Rousseau. 
Supported in part through the works of John Locke (2005), Wollstonecraft highlighted 
the association between social and political processes and individual freedoms, arguing 
that the restricted role of women in civic life curtailed their ability to participate in the 
political process. It was an argument for enfranchisement that emphasized the role of the 
citizen whilst at the same time extending that definition to encompass a much wider 
demographic.  
 
In the five or six hundred years of major developments in republican thinking, the notion 
of civic life as the base for a free political community served to provide a new balance in 
the relationship between the individual and their governing body. Central to these 
developments in democracy was a changing idea of what constituted political liberty. The 
legitimacy of a state was a function of its representation, and those to whom it was 
accountable. Those represented by the state could directly influence the structures that 
governed their lives, and growing notions of equality between the sexes, and to some 
extent between socio-economic classes, widened ideas of to whom it was that a state had 
responsibility. 
 
3.3.4 From Republicanism to Liberalism and the modern state 
Despite the focus from many social commentators on the nature of political structures, 
the ideology of participatory, representative democracy remained largely conceptual. In 
contrast, the social and economic changes that took place around the time of the 
Enlightenment in Europe served to redefine the role of the state as an economic 
protectorate. Where republicanism provided the philosophy behind modern democratic 
states, liberalism defined the shape of the modern state.  
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Growing out of the social, geographical and political upheaval of the early industrial 
revolution, liberalism sought to restrict ecumenical and despotic monarchies and assert 
individual choice by ‘freeing the polity from religious control and freeing civil society 
[…] from political interference’ (Held, 2003: 74). Among liberalism’s early proponents 
in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, Thomas Hobbes (1968 [1651]) and John Locke (2005 
[1689]) applied the concepts of reason, freedom and tolerance to potential structures for a 
more representative state. They argued for individuals as free and equal agents with 
inalienable rights that the state had a duty to protect, whist at the same time refrain from 
becoming overly interfering. They argued that such a constitutional state would allow for 
the pursuit of individual religious belief, the ownership of private property, and a 
competitive market system. From these basic principles emerged the two different 
concepts of protective and developmental democracy, debates on the nature of which 
continue to characterise much of modern democratic theory.  
 
The early proponents of liberalism sought to establish the form that a representational 
system of governance should take, as well as the ways to sustain such a system. Unlike 
republicanism’s focus on the citizen as a bearer of inalienable rights, liberalism 
emphasises the state as the mechanism though which a citizen’s rights come into 
existence. Building upon the ideas set out by Hobbes in Leviathan (1968 [1651]), 
proponents of a protective form of liberal democracy maintained that it was only through 
a strong state apparatus that freedom and human potential could be realised. The state for 
Hobbes, as with Machiavelli, should focus human activity towards the best ends and 
protect individuals from their inherently self-serving and destructive nature. 
 
For Locke (2005 [1689]) and other theorists of the time such as Madison (1966 [1788]), it 
was not credible to expect individuals to place their trust in a sovereign state that was 
present in all spheres of life. Rather, they argued that the state should exercise sanctioned 
power only in certain spheres of life. Advancing this position, Bentham (1998 [1776]) 
argued that political power could reside within the government only to the extent that 
there was accountability of those that governed. This concept was argued by Madison 
(1966 [1788]: 21) in support of the US constitution, who claimed this form of political 
 58 
representation would only work through the transfer of government to ‘a small number of 
citizens, elected by the rest’. 
 
Rather than an all-encompassing direct representation, liberal democracy applies the idea 
of accountability through proxy, where the few governors represented the many 
governed. The individual is then free to make his or her own decisions based upon the 
rationale of economic competition. Under this laissez-faire form of minimal government, 
the state should only intervene in the life of the person where behaviour of an individual 
or group threatened the security of the market system, the method by which the rules of 
civil society were to be ‘governed’.  
 
Whilst developmental democracy holds many of the ideals of a protective state, its main 
proponents argued that the democratic process was more than just a necessity of a state’s 
maintenance. J.S. Mill (1982: 72) in particular claimed that the democratic tradition was 
not only a mechanism to safeguard society but, along with a laissez-faire economic 
structure, allowed the individual the freedom to pursue their ‘our own good in our own 
ways’. The role of the state was to be minimal, and ‘the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others’ (Mill, 1982: 68). 
 
Representation in a developmental democracy was exercised ‘through deputies, 
periodically elected by themselves the ultimate controlling power’ (Mill, 1951: 228), and 
increased legitimacy derives from extended franchise. J. S. Mill (1951) extolled the ideas 
of suffrage to encompass women, and to a certain extent, the working classes. For J. S. 
Mill (1997:1), inequalities were acting as fundamental ‘hindrances to human 
improvement’, and it was in liberty of thought and action that independence may be 
fostered and autonomous judgement reached. 
 
Both the protective and developmental models contain the idea of a free society, albeit 
one with some limitations on enfranchisement, in which individuals are able to pursue 
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their own ends. Legitimacy and accountability expand through increased representation 
and a neutral state functions as a safeguard.  
 
In the 19
th
 century, Marx and Engels (2004) disputed the idea of a neutral liberal state, 
arguing that such was contradictory to the nature of the market system that underpinned it 
and stratified individuals along economic and social lines. Such a society could not 
provide equality, as those who had greater access to the laissez-faire market structures 
had greater influence on the political and social systems of the state. Effectively such a 
system allowed those with power and wealth to ‘rule without directly governing’ (Held, 
2003: 136). For Marx and Engels, the liberal democratic state intended to protect the 
individual had failed the masses, as it could not represent the individual or even the 
collective aims against the power of a market system.  
 
During the 20
th
 century, Europe was engulfed in a series of conflicts. The First and 
Second World Wars and the Cold War, found at different times imperialism, fascism, 
communism, and liberal democracy vying for military, economic, and cultural 
domination. At the end of this period of conflict liberal democracy emerged as the 
dominant ideological and structural governance system, and Fukuyama’s (1992) 
consequent claims that we had reached the ‘end of history’ appeared to be true, if only for 
a decade or so.  Liberal democracy and its global institutions formed a philosophical and 
structural template for most modern Western systems, and principles of capitalist 
democracy that emphasised limited state involvement and market economics became the 
dominant mechanism for global political structures. 
 
Horkheimer (1992) argues that that the classic liberal model has broken down. The 
inevitable dominance of power interests in liberal capitalism mean that individuals are no 
longer the driving force behind liberal economics, but states and the power-back claims 
of individuals have come to dominate the system. ‘Supply and demand’ Horkheimer 
(1992: 290) claims, ‘are no longer regulated by social need but by reasons of state’. 
 
 60 
The post-Cold War period of relative stability and lassiez-faire economics in the West, 
cemented liberal, capitalist democracy as the dominant political ideology. The state, 
operating as a regulatory organism, played the role of intermediary between the market 
and the citizen, ensuring that capitalism and democracy coexisted, at least on paper. 
Championed by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, liberal democracy stood 
relatively unopposed in a form broadly similar to the ideas of Hobbes and Locke, in 
which a protective state provides a structure to which the citizen subscribes through 
electoral participation.  Capitalism, which was largely although not wholly unopposed, 
became integrated into the modern democratic state to such a degree that it was difficult 
to separate the two concepts; thus, we now talk about neo-liberal or capitalist democracy 
and intrinsically connect the two ideologies. 
 
3.3.5 Democracy:  Key applications in the 21
st
 century 
The dominance of liberal democracy means that its particular form of state/market 
regulation has been highly influential in shaping the nature of national and international 
structures. According to Hindess (2000), part of the effect of this has been an emphasis 
on the functional nature of democracy rather than the ideological aspects brought to the 
fore during the conflicts of the 20
th
 Century. Referring back to Schumpeter’s (1976) 
classic analysis of democracy and capitalism, Hindess (2000: 38) argues that a ‘realist’ 
interpretation of democracy reverts to an understanding of democracy as ‘the systems of 
government … in place in the major Western societies rather than to an abstract ideal 
against which those systems could be measured’. Despite the emphasis on democracy’s 
structural functions, Hindess (2000: 38) states that it is still possible to take a more 
‘radical democratic’ position that provides an interpretation based on wider social 
considerations.  
 
For Crouch (2004), democracy exhibits a dual nature, being both a structural system as 
well as an ideological concept. This dual means that ‘the early twenty-first century sees 
democracy at a highly paradoxical moment’, and liberal democracy in particular is facing 
a series of challenges to its dominant global position (2004: 1). New forms of 
governance, such as the mix of statism, communism, capitalism, and democracy in 
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China, constitute one example of alternative sources of power in the global political 
environment.  The power that China increasingly exercises in the international market is 
illustrated in its role as the largest holder of US government debt, ‘more than $1 trillion 
in Treasury debt as of March [2011]’ (Reuters, 2011). 
 
Other challenges to the pervasive role market economics plays in regulating political and 
social life is evident in the recent recession in the US and Europe. Debates on the ways in 
which to restructure unbalanced budgets and fiscal plans have shaped European and US 
politics since 2009. In Europe, the Eurozone is experiencing problems managing 17 
different economies, with Ireland, Portugal, and Greece requiring large loans of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and IMF. In these countries as well as other European 
states there were angry clashes in response to cuts in public spending. In the US, political 
deadlock on the nature of fiscal policy continues to threaten spending on many social 
projects. 
 
The re-intensification of religious ideology in political and social thought also presents a 
challenge to liberal democracy in the modern world. The perceived rise of Islamic 
ideology is also a focal point for clashes between perceived Western and Islamic ways of 
life. For example, the War on Terror waged by the USA and its allies was at the time 
referred to as a war for democracy, with President George Bush Jr. talking of America’s 
‘efforts to help the Iraqi people build a lasting democracy in the heart of the Middle East’ 
(Bush, 2005). In the same speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, President 
Bush described in detail the ideological and structural roles that democracy could play in 
Iraq: 
 
By helping Iraqis to build a democracy, we will win over those who 
doubted they had a place in a new Iraq, and undermine the terrorists and 
Saddamists. By helping Iraqis to build a democracy, we will gain an ally 
in the war on terror. By helping Iraqis build a democracy, we will inspire 
reformers across the Middle East. And by helping Iraqis build a 
democracy, we will bring hope to a troubled region, and this will make the 
American people more secure. 
(Bush, 2005) 
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Western, democratic ideology was at the forefront of justifications for military action. In 
2003, Tony Blair used a Commons speech to open the debate on the Iraq crisis, arguing 
that the threats Britain faced were from those who ‘detest the freedom, democracy and 
tolerance that are the hallmarks of our way of life’ (Blair, 2003). The subsequent invasion 
and occupation of Iraq resulted in between 100,000-110,000 documented civilian deaths 
(Iraq body count, 2011) and led Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa (2003) to 
accuse the invading nations of  bringing ‘democracy ... to Iraq on a B52 or on the back of 
a tank’.  
 
At the same time as democracy was being been pushed as part of a western ideology of 
freedom, there is occurring a crisis of confidence within many of the established and 
influential democratic states. In the USA a number of highly questionable election results 
found George Bush Jr. elected to office twice.  In Italy, despite his attempts to enact laws 
protecting him from litigation, Silvio Berlusconi faces trial on a number of charges 
including tax fraud, false accounting and soliciting prostitution with a minor (Guardian, 
2011). Similarly, in ‘newly democratised’ states such as Afghanistan and Iraq, allegations 
of voting irregularities marred elections and the democratic process, despite the practising 
of democratic ideals being a central argument for the invasion and occupation of those 
countries. 
 
Keohane and Nye (2003: 390) ague that in many states, democracy is ‘traded off against 
other values’.  This leads to a situation of a diminishing of the structural and functional 
elements of democracy whilst its ideological structures are emphasised. In public, 
democracy is extolled as a defining virtue of civilised life, whereas in private, 
governments reduce democratic controls that hinder particular programmes. For example, 
in the USA the 2001 Patriot Act, and in the UK the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
both included clauses that allowed supra-juridical detention of individuals. In the case of 
the UK, this meant ‘any obligations that the Secretary of State or (as the case may be) the 
court considers necessary’ (OPSI, 2005: 1, c.3).  
 
 63 
There are other examples of downgrading democratic functions in order to suit a state’s 
requirements. Amongst recent cases was the dropping of corruption charges relating to a 
£43bn arms deal between BAE and Saudi Arabia by the former British Attorney General 
Lord Goldsmith (BBC, 2008). Eventually BAE were found guilty of lesser charges 
relating to deals in Saudi Arabia, as well as Tanzania, the Czech Republic, South Africa 
and Hungary (BBC, 2010). Following Keohane and Nye’s (2003) argument, these 
examples show how structural elements of democracy are sometimes secondary to its 
ideological role. States advance democracy as a justification for actions, whilst at the 
same time reducing some of the structural elements of their democratic system. 
 
Crouch (2004), argues that the result of democracy’s dual and conflicted nature in many 
modern systems is a crisis in confidence for democracy. The modern liberal democratic 
tradition stresses electoral, rather than direct participation as the main aspect of achieving 
accountability and legitimacy. After the election of a government, citizens experience 
very little recourse until the next round of elections, and even then, they face a carefully 
constructed media portrayal of politics and politicians, much as in Rousseau’s (1968: 
141) criticism of the English system. 
 
Crouch (2004: 4) argues that in modern liberal-democracies, the diminishing role of 
public electoral and political debate means elections are tightly controlled, media driven 
spectacles. In these spectacles of democracy, the active citizen plays little part in the 
overall process. This process was also identified by McLuhan and Fiore (2001: 22) who 
claimed that the media provide ‘packages of passive entertainment’, which reduces 
traditional politics to offering ‘yesterday’s answers to today’s questions’.  
 
In this view of democracy as a managed spectacle, public interest is created or sustained 
by a combination of media and what is sometimes called political ‘spin’. A buffer zone of 
media agencies separates the public from politics, and the reality of political action is 
translated through a series of filters that produce carefully constructed information. 
Lippmann (1921) referred to this process almost a century ago as the ‘manufacture of 
consent’, an idea that was developed by Herman and Chomsky (1994: xii) who describe a 
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media orientated ‘guided market system’, controlled by political and corporate actors 
who ultimately ‘serve the ends of a dominant elite’ (1994: 1) 
 
Hindess (2000: 34) views the modern democratic system as comprising ‘at least three 
levels of political activity: the political activity of the people themselves, that of elected 
representatives and professional politicians, and the work of the administrative machinery 
of the state’. What Crouch (2004), McLuhan (2001) and Chomsky (1999) identify is an 
overemphasis on the second and third levels of this system, and a de-emphasis on the role 
of the individual in democratic processes. The result, according to Crouch (2004, 3), is a 
‘satisfaction with the un-ambitious democratic expectations of liberal democracy [which] 
produces complacency’. The citizen is marginalised and disenfranchised by a system that 
is unrepresentative of their wishes and ultimately, contains little democratic legitimacy.  
 
Horkheimer and Adorno (2002: 128) argue that modern society is suffering from the 
‘universal imposition of [a] stylized mode’, influenced by a false logic of capitalist 
production. Although in this instance referring to a culture industry that reified all aspects 
of social life for consumption, it is an argument that extends to a global political 
environment, in which liberal capitalist democracy becomes a stylised ideological 
construct rather than a functional system of governance. The dominance of capitalism in 
shaping global economic and social systems results in it becoming a defining factor in the 
lives of a large portion of the world’s population.   
 
Crouch (2004: 6) argues that the crisis in modern democracy means that there is 
disenfranchisement in many modern democratic systems, and that consequently ‘politics 
and government are increasingly slipping back into the control of elites’. In public, there 
is an overemphasis on personality and superficiality; politicians engage in crowd-pleasing 
and engineering public opinion rather than engaging in serious political debate. The result 
is a voter who has ‘been reduced to the role of manipulated, passive, rare participant’ 
(2004: 20-21). At the same time, a political class of often privately educated politicians 
makes a great attempt to appeal as ‘normal citizens’ to court votes against a growing 
 65 
apathy born out of declining confidence and participation in both state and civil 
organisations.  
 
For Horkheimer and Adorno (2002: 133-4), the decline of an individual’s ability to affect 
their political and social lives is a process in which the citizen becomes immersed in a 
manufactured world, where ‘the deceived masses are today captivated by the myth…they 
insist on the very ideology which enslaves them’. Supporting this position, Caporaso 
(2003:367) argues that ‘in an age of mass politics, nearly all policy is made by elites. 
Democracy may be “for” the people but it is not generally “by” the people’.  
 
The idea of a transforming democracy is taken up be Keane (2009: 689) who argues that 
‘democracy is no longer a way of simply handling the power of elected governments by 
electoral, parliamentary and constitutional means, and no longer a matter confined to 
territorial states’. For Keane (2009), democracy in a modern, global world functions in 
ways unlike man classical and contemporary state-based systems. Increasingly, 
accountability and legitimacy occur in public spheres and through non-state mechanisms, 
and the resulting system of ‘monitory democracy’, as he terms it (2008; 2009), produces 
an expansion of democracy’s functions into new forms.  
 
Examples of monitory democracy are evident in a variety of modern mechanisms, many 
of which also relate to the increasing role that communications and network technologies 
play in modern life. The role that modern media such as Twitter plays in helping to 
disseminate information and organise action was evident in the recent revolutions in 
North Africa and the Middle East (Guardian, 2011). Whilst it may be wrong to call these 
technologies instrumental in those processes, the ability to communicate without state 
intervention undeniably helps coordinate action outside of official spheres of influence. 
The rise in epistemic groups means that people increasingly place allegiance outside of 
the traditional state. Pressure groups such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International voice 
the concerns of their members across national and international issues, and may influence 
the policies of states and corporations. 
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Keane’s (2009) monitory democracy is also evident in the rise of organisations or 
services designed specifically to monitor the ways in which states work. Launched in 
2009, the BBC’s ‘Democracy live’ service allows users to view and comment on ‘live 
and on demand video coverage of the UK's national political institutions and the 
European Parliament’ (BBC, 2009). Other television services show live coverage of 
national and regional parliamentary sessions, and whilst many of these are run by state 
services such as the BBC (2011) or the European Parliament (EuroparlTV, 2011), they 
still provide high levels of access to the functions of governance. 
 
For Keane (2009: 690), monitory democracy represents a shift in the locations of power, 
which increasingly lie ‘beneath and beyond the institutions of territorial states’. 
Consequently, Keane (2009: 690) argues that the ‘rules for representation, democratic 
accountability and public participation are applied to a much wider range of settings than 
ever before’.  
 
Despite differences between the arguments of Horkheimer and Adorno (2002), and those 
of Keane (2009), both positions agree that democracy is subject to change in a 
globalising world. Whether the role of democracy in public life is diminishing as elites 
control more of its functions, or if the systems of democracy are shifting to new forms 
typified in monitory democracy, there is a move away from traditional state-based 
systems. In both cases, the key to understanding what is happening is in the ways that 
legitimacy, accountability, and representation occur. However, traditional representations 
of these ideas need to expand to encompass the mechanisms of a changing and 
interconnected global world.  
 
Crouch (2004: 6) argues that changes to the nature of governance represent a bridge 
between ‘democracy and non-democracy’. He calls the resulting system ‘post-
democracy’, a symbolic move beyond traditional understandings of democratic structures 
towards more flexible political representation and ‘creative citizenship’ (2004: 15).  
Whether or not the European Parliament represents such a post-democratic system of 
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governance depends on interpretations of legitimacy, accountability, and representation, 
in its structures. 
 
3.3.6 Democracy: going global  
Hall and Biersteker (2002: 3) argue that traditional notions of legitimate political 
authority derived from ‘conceptions of the state and of the domain of international 
politics [in which] states are both the source of, and the exclusive location of legitimate, 
public authority’. However as this chapter has argued, ideas of the state as the 
fundamental unit of international governance were brought into question in the latter part 
of the Twentieth-Century.  
 
The changing nature of democracy and governance projects a multitude of driving forces, 
but amongst the most important is the increasingly influential role played by global 
economic multi- and trans-national organisations. Although there is nothing new in 
economic institutions operating on international levels, organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank have become the locus of discourse and 
policy for the internationalisation of economies. Largely unchallenged in the international 
arena, organisations such as the IMF and WB are, according to Hall and Biersteker 
(2002: 6), ‘implicitly legitimated as authoritative’ as they function in the capitalist 
rationale that dominates the global financial and political environment. 
 
These institutions function under a mandate of economic stabilisation, and in particular 
the role of the IMF is evident in the recent global economic turmoil in which the 
organisation ‘committed more than $280 billion to countries hit by the crisis—including 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Romania, and Ukraine’ (IMF, 2011a). Zürn (2005: 149) 
however, argues that bodies such as the IMF fulfil a role that now transcends economics, 
to involve itself in the discourses and actualities of governance and political authority in a 
way ‘far more intrusive than conventional international institutions’.  
 
In part, the process by which the institutions of global capitalism increased their influence 
can be dated the end of the ideological conflict of the Cold War. Although Fukuyama’s 
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(1992) claim for the ‘end of history’ with the victory of capitalist ideology was overly 
reductionist (as this chapter has already argued), within its oversimplification there lies a 
truth on the rise of a global liberal-democratic system. Although the fall of communism 
did not mean the west would embrace neo-liberalism en masse, it did mean that neo-
liberalism was essentially free to become the modus operandi of a dominant, Western 
form of geopolitical action. History was not ‘over’ but had temporarily reduced options 
as neoliberalism became a monopoly ideology. 
  
The international institutions of Western liberal democracy as set out in the Bretton 
Woods agreement were able to emerge from the Cold War as both well established and 
relatively unopposed in the international arena. asserting themselves as the dominant sites 
of global regulation in the 1980’s and 1990’s, organisations such as the IMF and World 
Bank influenced states through the mechanism of free markets and structural adjustment 
programmes in which aid was given in return for fiscal restructuring. The IMF defines 
this process of conditionality as such: 
 
When a country borrows from the IMF, its government agrees to adjust its 
economic policies to overcome the problems that led it to seek financial 
aid from the international community. These loan conditions also serve to 
ensure that the country will be able to repay the Fund so that the resources 
can be made available to other members in need.  
(IMF, 2011b) 
 
Loan conditionality continues today and is evident in the initial restructuring required of 
Greece by the IMF in order to receive the initial €30 billion three-year loan as part of the 
joint EU-IMF rescue package, although the IMF argues that the load won’t be ‘a return to 
the more traditional IMF “austerity” measures of the past’ (IMF, 2001c). Although the 
membership of many global financial regulatory bodies is taken from their member 
states, there is no direct representation for citizens, and Zürn (2005: 136) argues this 
makes these organisations ‘at best, only accountable to a fraction of the people affected 
by their activities’. Because of this, Robert Dahl in particular states that such 
‘international organizations are not likely to be democratic’ (1999:32). 
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The lassiez-faire ideology and the beginnings or wide spread deregulation by the Reagan 
and Thatcher administrations of the 1980s further advanced the cause of liberal 
democracy. Crouch (2004: 29) argues the resulting marginalisation of the state as an 
effective regulatory body meant ‘large corporations have frequently outgrown the 
governance capacity of individual nation states’, as was evident in the role of banking 
and financial trading institutions in the global financial crash in 2008/9.  
 
Despite the problems brought about by the migration of economics into the global sphere, 
Kahler and Lake (2003) argue that it has hastened the speed of political 
internationalisation.  They talk about a process in which a ‘mobilization of new political 
actors’ created new forms of governance and regulation bodies and changing patterns of 
political authority (2003: 424). Increasingly, governance falls outside of the remit of the 
state, and into the hands of a range of bodies that are now influential in lives of 
individuals. 
 
Writing at the start of the 21
st
 Century, Shaw (2002: 265) predicted three developments, 
each of which has occurred to some degree:  
 
‘first, in the early twenty first century people will be struggling for 
democratic liberties across the non-Western world…Second, the old 
international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely 
internal to states no longer carries conviction…Third, global state 
formation is a fact’ 
 
In the first instance, the political and social upheavals in North Africa and the Middle 
East are part of a popular demand for greater democratic accountability.  Secondly, it is 
right to say that the nation state is now less influential in a global financial market. The 
recent economic crash has shown the limits of states in controlling global markets, and 
deregulation begun in the 1980s has served to shift some power away from citizens and 
state politics toward economic elites. In the third case, whilst a global state has not yet 
emerged, the role that bodies such as the European Union and its Parliament play in 
international politics is increasing. Although the European constitution did not happen, a 
series of treaties in the EU and EP made great strides towards increasing power and 
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influence politically and economically.  Recent and ongoing troubles with the Euro might 
affect this process, likely by either increasing centralised control of monetary union or by 
threatening the European Project through collapse of the 17-member Eurozone. 
 
The concept of a developing global state is important for understanding what is 
happening to democracy as a system of governance, and many of the debates on these 
consequences relate to the role bodies such as the European Union and its Parliament 
exercise in transposing the democracy of member states onto a regional or global 
structure.  For Strange (1996: 197), political authority in the European Union and 
Parliament has not replaced the authority of the national states that comprise it, although 
they do represent a ‘diffusion of authority’. She argues that by producing another layer of 
bureaucratic dependency, organisations such as the EU and EP reduce the effectiveness 
of organised political action, particularly in its role as a counterpoint to the pervasive 
influence of neoliberal market economics (1996: 5). The result for democracy, according 
to Strange (1996: 197), is that ‘the casting of a vote from time to time becomes a merely 
symbolic act’. 
 
For others such as Kahler and Lake (2003), the transference of power to the EU and EP is 
a transmission onto a supranational body of the same kinds of authority which states 
traditionally exercise. The European Parliament as a regional governance body is 
effectively fulfilling some of the same roles of a traditional state.  They argue that ‘if one 
considers the EU as a parliamentary state, it appears that the traditional institutions of 
democracy are simply being rebuilt at the supranational level. If so, applying the 
standards and practises of democratic accountability to the EU may be appropriate’ 
(2003: 432). 
 
In contrast to Kahler and Lake, Caporaso (2003: 361) claims that ‘democratic politics is 
not transposed to international organisations. Instead, states bargain in these organisations 
through agents who are carefully instructed by principles in the constituent states’. In 
essence, this position claims that democratic politics is confined to the national level, and 
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global or regional bodies are just bargaining platforms for states and established 
governments.   
 
In each of the positions portrayed here, the nature of democratic governance relies on the 
ways in which that system in implemented. Again, the role of legitimacy, accountability, 
and representation show what kind of governance structure results from the transference 
of power away from the state. However, judging the role of democracy in governance 
institutions such as the European Parliament is a complicated task, and depends upon 
individual interpretations of how legitimacy, accountability, and representation are 
applied. For Keohane and Nye (2003: 411), the way in which ‘we evaluate international-
governance processes depends both on their accomplishments and on the extent to which 
their procedures approximate ideas of democratic accountability.’  
 
The following section of this chapter attends more specifically to issues of legitimacy, 
accountability, and representation, describing how they might help to evaluate the nature 
of democracy in the European Parliament.   
 
 
3.4 Democracy: three Key Principles 
 
Democracy’s 2500-year history means there is no single structural or ideological 
description to act as a template against which to compare the European Parliament. 
Rather as Keane (2009: xiv) argues, it is a ‘time-bound’ concept defined through human 
action. The solution in this dissertation is to use a set of three principles of democracy 
that target an exploration of its application in key areas.  These principles are not a 
definitive set of criteria, but a guide to specific areas in which an examination of 
democracy’s functions can inform on the overall nature of a democratic governance 
structure. As the principles are not bound in the traditional expressions of state 
governance, they provide a particularly useful way to assess a new form of democratic 
structure such as the European Parliament. The following sections explore in more detail 
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each of the three principles, showing ways to apply them for a structure such as the 
European Parliament.  
 
3.4.1 The principle of legitimacy 
The first of the three principles this dissertation is legitimacy. Legitimacy is a complex 
concept that covers ideas on the rights of a state or governance body to make decisions 
for its populations.  Held (2003: 291) argues that democracy and politics are closely 
associated, as ‘democracy bestows an aura of legitimacy on modern political life’. 
However, he goes on to say that ‘under what conditions political regimes may reasonably 
be considered legitimate and when one can claim the mantle of democracy remain 
unclear.’ Whilst legitimacy is an essential part of democracy, achieving that legitimacy is 
a process that involves a range of different acts. 
 
Held (2002: 162) makes a distinction between two types of legitimacy: ‘legitimacy as a 
belief in existing law and political institutions, and legitimacy as ‘rightness’ or 
‘correctness’ – the worthiness of a political order to be recognised because it is the order 
people would accept under ideal deliberative conditions.’ Held’s (2002: 162) description 
of both a functional and a ‘correct’ democracy corresponds to this chapter’s argument of 
democracy’s dual nature as both structural and ideological. Although democracy exists 
physically in the institutions of governance, how those institutions apply their particular 
type of democracy largely dictates the extent to which citizens accept this as a rightful 
system of rule. 
 
Habermas (1996: 23) also offered three models of democracy, and through these 
emphasised what he regarded as the ‘original meaning of democracy’ which was the 
‘institutionalisation of a public use of reason jointly exercised by autonomous citizens’. 
Whilst the idea of applying an original meaning of democracy to systems outside of its 
constraining cultural and temporal applications is questionable, an approach to 
democracy that emphasises legitimacy through participation is useful. Although there are 
a great many applications of democracy across its long history, it does contain as a 
running theme a particular version of the state-citizen relationship that involves 
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interaction between citizens and decision-making processes. Through examining these 
physical or structural relationships, we can understand how a particular application of 
democracy legitimates its authority.   
 
One of the ways to evaluate structural legitimacy is by examining how a right to rule is 
manifest in a system. Held (2002: 231) argues that ‘if the initial inauguration of a 
democratic international order is to be legitimate, it must be based on consent’, although 
as this chapter describes, the nature of that consent varies. For example, in the Greek city-
states, the state and citizen defined each other through a mutual relationship that 
legitimated each part. On the other hand, indirect democracies such as the republican and 
liberal traditions use proxy representation to legitimate governance. In each case, the 
democratic systems legitimated their authority with a relationship between the state and 
the individual.  
 
Outlining his models of democracy, Habermas (1996) identifies different types of 
structural legitimation in representative democracies. In a liberal system, he argues that 
authority and the exercising of political will are legitimated in the process of election, as 
well as in a continual process in which  ‘the government must justify the use of power to 
the public’ (1996: 28). In contrast to this, a republican views authority as an intrinsic 
element of the state and one part of legitimation. Legitimacy and the right to pursue 
certain aspects of power are ‘bound to a self-governing political community’ in which 
tradition means they are ‘programically committed to carry out certain policies (1996: 
28).  
 
In both of Habermas’s (1996) cases, the citizen gives over some portion of control to a 
state, which retains the right to exercise legitimate authority. In both cases there is also 
some guidance on the ways to achieve ongoing legitimacy, either through continued 
justification of power or through an assumed role that governors take on as part of a 
traditional role for state. The concept of legitimacy therefore covers a right to rule, both 
in the initial selection of those that rule and in the ongoing ways that those rulers justify 
their authority. 
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There is not just an influence on democratic legitimacy from political structures, but 
democracies ideological role also helps to define its applications in different societies. 
Shaw’s (2002) strikingly accurate predictions on the role democracy may play in a 
changing global environment emphasise how democracy is finding a re-emphasis as an 
ideological tool. The increasing pace of global interactions and the transmission of 
authority into the international area serve to reignite debates on the important role of 
democracy in modern society. This is emphasised in the recent economic troubles in 
much of the world, which highlight the limited power of states, democratic or otherwise, 
to influence global financial markets. In Europe, there is an association between 
democracy’s ideological importance and the role of the European Parliament in the EU; 
and in North Africa and the Middle East, there is a renewed focus on democratic 
governance as an ideological aspect of the state.  Consequently, any assessment of 
democratic legitimacy needs to incorporate an ideological element that appreciates the 
role this plays in maintaining democratic governance. 
 
In assessing the nature of legitimacy, particularly in the European Parliament, the role 
that democracy plays in both the structures and the ideologies of governance bodies is an 
important indicator for its present and potential role.  As well as evaluating the physical 
elements of a democratic system, exploring the ways in which democracy is important to 
the overall purpose of a governance body is important for showing how far democracy 
extends, and the areas in which it may be improved.   
 
3.4.2  The principle of representation 
The second key principle of democracy is representation. The nature of representation in 
democratic bodies is crucial for understanding the relationship between citizens and state. 
Held (2003: 108) believes that representation, along with freedoms of speech and 
assembly, forms a central aspect of democratic systems, arguing that ‘a representative 
system … provides the mechanisms whereby central powers can be watched and 
controlled’.  
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The nature of representation defines a large part of a democratic system, for example in 
ancient Greece, representation for citizens was immediate through the inseparable bond 
that justified mutual existence. In more recent systems such as the European Union, the 
Parliament acts as a representative body of a pan-European citizenship which it directly 
represents in the decision-making process. In both cases, the nature of citizens’ 
representation can tell us for whom a system functions, as well as how well the system 
performs those functions. 
 
Representation is in two parts, each of which contains an important aspect of democratic 
function. The first part involves the scope of the state, and it who actually represents. The 
second part involves the remit of democracy, and the ways representation occurs with a 
governance structure. Representation is therefore both the extent of the state as well as 
the ways in which democratic representation contributes to the decision-making 
processes.   
 
In the first instance, the scope of a state is an important part of understanding the extent 
of a governance structure’s influence. Held’s (2002: 27) concept of a ‘relevant 
community’ helps to define who or what it is that a state or governance structure is 
involved with representing. This is a useful term in the context of this dissertation, as the 
idea of a relevant community conveys two important elements of representation. On the 
one hand, it involves those that enjoy a say in influencing the state, a group most 
commonly known as citizens; on the other hand, concepts of relevant community may 
encompass those over which a governance structure can legally exercise authority, 
including citizens and non-citizens alike. 
 
On a basic level, a relevant community comprises those with a right to enjoy input into a 
governance structure. This group, commonly referred to as ‘citizens’, often excludes 
certain people, women for example historically lacked the right to vote or participate 
directly in the mechanisms of state. In the same way, those who are economically less 
successful often exert less influence over the structures of state power, particularly 
outside of elections. In many cases however, groups other than citizens form part of a 
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‘relevant community’ and can influence states. For example, this dissertation argues that 
organisations such as the IMF and WB exercise influence over states, placing them in a 
wider definition of ‘relevant community’. 
 
The other element of a ‘relevant community’ refers to those over which a governance 
structure is free to exercise legitimate authority. This group is always much greater than 
those that comprise the citizenry, and includes those deemed unsuitable to participate 
directly in government or in electing a proxy. Commonly this includes those within the 
boundaries of a governance structure but deemed to be too young or old, guilty of 
committing certain crime, or those deemed not to be full citizens by dint of birth, 
location, or, historically, gender. Despite exclusion from certain levels of participation, 
these groups still form part of the relevant community as they are subject to the authority 
of the governance structure. 
 
The concept of a relevant community is a useful way to examine the first part of 
representation as it refers to the reciprocal relationships between governed and governors 
within a democratic system. It directs us to who is able to exercise democratic authority 
in a state or governance body, as well as whom a state can then proceed to exercise its 
authority over.   
 
 
As well as the scope of the state, the nature of representation also involves the remit of 
democracy within a governance structure. The extent to which democratic representation 
influences decision making is an important part of understanding the role of democracy. 
One way to evaluate the remit of democratic representation is by examining how it 
occurs. For some states, the participation of citizens is limited to periodic elections; a 
system which Rousseau (1968: 141) was highly critical of in the case of British 
democracy. The frequency of elections in a participatory system, the methods for electing 
representatives, and the length of time people may stay in power are all useful indicators 
of the role of representation in a democratic system. For example, where there are 
periodic elections but little further role for citizens, there is only a limited window for 
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representation. On the other hand, there are greater levels of representative governance in 
a system where elections are more regular or one that involves citizens more frequently in 
the processes of the state in other ways, for example by encouraging in civil society 
organisations. 
 
The effectiveness of representation is also evident in the ways in which governance 
bodies incorporate it into the decision-making process. For example, systems with two 
elected bodies, such as the USA, tender a greater chance for representation than those 
with bodies comprising hereditary peers, such as the UK. In reality however, there is a 
wide range of other factors that may influence the outcomes of representation, although 
the greater the avenues for representation, the more likely it is that citizens may enjoy an 
opportunity to influence the decision-making process. 
 
Issues on the nature of representation have come to the fore with the burgeoning 
internationalisation of authority.  Although all democratic states show some form of 
representative structure in place, these structures have increasingly been vying for control 
with other, non-elected bodies. This chapter applies the arguments of Crouch (2004), and 
Keohane and Nye (2003) to show how the growing power of international markets and 
the globalisation of some aspects of state authority mean that decisions are increasingly 
removed from the democratic sphere of influence. Held (2003: 333) supports this 
position, claiming that ‘distrust and scepticism … are expressed about existing 
institutional arrangements, including the effectiveness of liberal representative 
democracy’ 
 
The problem of incorporating democratic methods of representation into governance 
structures that operate above the level of the state was also identified by Nanz and Steffek 
(2005: 192), who claim that ‘international governance is remote from citizens, its 
procedures are opaque, and it is dominated by diplomats, bureaucratic and functional 
specialists’ (Nanz and Steffek, 2005: 192). However, this dissertation argues that the 
growth of bodies such as the European Parliament is an attempt to incorporate democratic 
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representation in international decision-making structures, although it also suggests there 
are significant ways to improve this process. 
 
Representation in this dissertation describes both the scope of a governance structure as 
well as their remit. Through the concept of a ‘relevant community’, the nature of these 
features along with their impact on the democratic structures of governance may become 
clear. As with legitimacy and accountability, representation is a key element for 
exploring the nature of democracy and governance in the European Parliament. 
 
3.4.3 The principle of accountability 
The third key principle of democracy is accountability. Connected to both representation 
and legitimacy, the levels of accountability in a democratic system may show how a 
population and its governance body interact. For Held and Koenig-Archibugi (2005: 3), 
‘accountability refers to the fact that decision makers do not enjoy unlimited autonomy 
but have to justify their actions vis-à-vis affected parties, that is, stakeholders’. 
Participation and legitimacy in a democratic system require the governed to possess a 
genuine mechanism to hold decision makers accountable. This mechanism reinforces the 
association between the population and the decision-making processes, and helps stall a 
democratic system from becoming autocratic. 
 
This dissertation applies two main approaches to assessing the nature of accountability. 
Firstly, it uses accountability to refer to the specific ways in which systems provide 
citizens with a method of maintaining influence over elected members and therefore the 
decision-making process. Secondly, it uses accountability to show the level of integration  
of citizen-involvement into decision-making.  
 
One way of understanding the sources of accountability in a democratic system is to 
examine the structures in place to maintain it. Held and Koenig-Archibugi, (2005: 3) 
argue that ‘effective accountability requires mechanisms for steady and reliable 
information and communication between decision-makers and stakeholders as well as 
mechanisms for imposing penalties’. Mechanisms for accountability are as diverse as the 
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different systems that employ them, but in modern democratic systems, it is common for 
accountability to revolve around the relationship between elected officials and those they 
represent. The most obvious way this occurs is through the election process, although 
outside of elections governance structures also incorporate a variety of different tools to 
help maintain accountability. For example, transparency in the decision-making process 
allows citizens to appreciate the role their elected officials are performing; similarly, 
clear communication might help to maintain the connection between citizens and state. 
 
For Kahler (2005), an increasingly global political environment means that there are 
problems with traditional methods of accountability. He argues that in a modern world, 
‘electoral institutions are only one part of the institutional panoply of modern democracy’ 
(Kahler, 2005: 9). Although citizens retain a route to accountability in the traditional 
methods provided by states, the role of economic multilaterals such as the IMF and 
World Bank means that elements of governance increasingly take place outside of 
accountable structures. The blending of different forms of authority in a global world 
means that there are some severe challenges to the role citizens play in governing their 
own lives. Although the rise of bodies such as the European Parliament help to 
internationalise accountability, the shift of authority to structures outside of the state 
represents a serious threat to democratic governance. Assessing the part that 
accountability plays in governance above the level of the state is essential for 
understanding both the role of the European Parliament and for addressing wider 
questions on the shape of global governance.  
 
The second element of accountability builds on the idea of mechanisms for maintaining 
accountability by exploring the ways in which these mechanisms integrate into the 
overall decision-making processes. In historic democratic systems, this was a less 
complicated aspect, as there were fewer conflicting sources of authority acting upon the 
state. However, in a global world, the number of different sources of power and authority 
imply that accountable systems of democratic governance vie with other forces for 
influence on the decision-making process. For Kahler (2005: 11), global pressures on 
governance mean there is a ‘barrier to accountability as systems of multilayered 
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governance in which specialised organisations at different levels circumvent national 
governments’. This is not to say that democratic accountability no longer plays a role in 
governance, but it is only one part of a complex process of power. 
 
Held and Koenig-Archibugi (2005: 3) argue ‘there is no reason to assume that democratic 
forms of accountability will necessarily prevail over non-democratic ones’, and that other 
forms of accountability may provide a vehicle for public opinion. This position supports 
Keane’s (2009: 583) idea of ‘monitory democracy’ in which increasing new forms of 
collective organisation provide structures for democratic action outside of traditional 
avenues. In a world in which democratic accountability is declining as other forces 
influence decision-making, Keane’s (2009) idea is that similarly non-democratic forms of 
accountability function alongside traditional forms. This creates the benefit of allowing 
accountability to extend beyond the reach of democratic structures to affect all parts of an 
increasingly diffuse decision-making process. 
 
Held (2000: 303) argues that accountability operate through a wide range of mechanisms, 
and that ‘lobbyists, activists, independent writers and professional journalists…all 
contribute to maintaining the accountability of government’. This being the case, part of 
the process of accountability in democratic structures relies on the degree of transparency 
and communication at the point of governance. Despite increasingly diverse forms of 
authority, accountability still relies to a large extent on how much information a 
governance body willingly gives to its citizens. Other sources such as civil society bodies 
and pressure groups might complement this process, adding to the overall ability for 
citizens to understand and then act when needed, to the decisions made on their behalf. 
Accountability then ultimately relies on the willingness of political bodies to reflect the 
will of citizens, and the mechanisms in place to ensure that this happens.  
 
Through an appreciation of the ways accountability occurs and the role that accountable 
structures play in the decision-making process, it is possible to understand the ongoing 
role of citizens in the governance structures that shape their lives. When applied to the 
European Parliament later in this dissertation, accountability assess the role democracy 
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plays alongside other forms of authority, in particular how it is mixed with the will of 
member states in decision making.  
 
 
3.5 Democracy and the European Parliament: a summary 
 
Democracy’s long and varied history means that any single definition or model is 
unsuitable as a method for analysing a contemporary structure. Consequently, using a set 
of three key principles to explore how democracy functions in a system of governance is 
an approach that provides this dissertation with a very useful tool for exploring the 
European Parliament. The flexibility of these principles means that they are not tied to 
any one interpretation of what democracy is, and can therefore be applied to any structure 
that claims democracy as a structural or ideological tool. This is particularly important 
when considering that the European Parliament is unlike many other democratic 
structures, insofar as it functions at a regional-global level rather than as a single state or 
body. Figure 4 (following) discusses these principles along with some specific aspects of 
each and their possible identifiers within a governance structure.  
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Figure 4: Three principles of democracy 
 
Principle Aspects Possible identifiers 
 
 
Legitimacy 
 
 
Physical and structural legitimacy 
 How is legitimacy initially achieved? 
 How is legitimacy an ongoing process in the 
structures and functions of a system. 
 
Ideological legitimacy 
 What is the ideological and cultural importance of 
democratic beliefs in the governance structure. 
 
 
 
Representation 
 
 
 
The scope of the ‘relevant community’ 
 Who contributes to a governance structure. 
 Who the governance structure can exercise 
authority over. 
 
The remit of democracy for the ‘relevant 
community’ 
 How representation occurs 
 How far representation  influences the decision 
making process. 
 
 
Accountability 
 
 
How systems are accountable 
 
 Sources of accountability 
 Structures of accountability 
 
How democratic accountability  is 
integrated in the decision- making process 
 How accountable the decision making process is. 
 Levels of transparency and communication. 
 
The three key principles are by no means a definitive list of the relationships and 
functions that may occur in a democratic system. Rather, as this chapter argued, they 
offer a guide to the areas in which democratic functions may be seen to work in any 
given system. The principles therefore also direct any suggestions for improving 
democracy in a system to these specific areas. 
 
The following chapter examines the nature of global governance, which is the second 
aspect of the European Parliament under investigation in this dissertation. The chapter 
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sets out three different ontological models of global political structure, which are used 
later to support the three-stage immanent criticism of the Parliament. These three models 
also help to place the Parliament in wider global context, examine the role that regional-
political bodies may play in different conceptions of world order. 
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Chapter 4 
The theory of Global Governance: Conceptions of the World Order 
________________________________________________________________________ 
4.1 Introduction: Global Governance and the European Parliament 
4.2 The emergence of modern global governance 
4.3 Three ontological models of global governance 
 4.3.1 Neorealism: International Relations and the extended state in the 21
st
 century. 
 4.2.2 Model 2. Capitalist hegemony: neoliberal global economics as the new imperialism 
 4.2.3 Model 3: Concentric Governance: The Globalisation of Statehood  
4.4. Summary: using different models of global governance with immanent criticism 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
 
4.1 Introduction: global governance and the European Parliament 
 
This dissertation applies a three-stage immanent criticism to explore how democracy and 
governance function at a regional level, in the structures of the European Parliament. 
Derived from the work of Max Horkheimer, the immanent criticism considers the 
Parliament in its historic, functional, and potential modes. As part of the process, this 
chapter and the one preceding it construct a theoretical foundation of the concepts of 
democracy and global governance that provides a basis for the subsequent critique of the 
Parliament. Chapter 3 argued that democracy’s long and varied history means there is no 
definitive structure, and consequently traditional methods of evaluating democratic 
systems are unlikely to provide a full account of its functions. As a response, the chapter 
set out the key principles of legitimacy, accountability, and representation, as a way to 
guide an exploration of a democracy in a governance structure.  
 
This chapter is the second part of the theoretical background to the immanent criticism. It 
examines the nature of global governance and the role that regional bodies such as the 
Parliament play in global structures. Initially, it builds upon some of the arguments on the 
globalisation of political authority that the previous chapter began to explore. In this case 
however, it focuses specifically on the ways in which sources of power and influence 
affect different perceptions of global political structure. The chapter presents three 
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different ontological models of global and regional governance, each of which represents 
a particular perspective on the relationships in an internationalised political environment. 
In each case, the models look specifically at the role a regional body such as the 
European Parliament might play. This provides an important set of conceptual 
relationships and processes for the subsequent immanent criticism in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
 
4.2 The emergence of modern global governance 
 
As a concept, global governance is inherently subjective. Different interpretations of 
global processes such as the role that ideologies and states play in regulating international 
exchange, lead to different outcomes in terms of the nature and functions of global 
agencies.  Cox (2002: 26) in his analysis on the political economy of an increasingly 
plural world, argues that there is always a subjective element in the relationship ‘between 
the analyst and the object of analysis’. Consequently, individual and collective 
worldviews provide different conceptions of social and political structures and the 
functions they perform.  
 
Cox (2002: 26) argues that ‘history shapes the consciousness and perceptions of the 
analyst; and the analyst’s mind shapes its mode of apprehending the movement of 
history’. In other words, different historical interpretations form varying ontological 
positions on the shape and function of global governance. Because of this, it is impossible 
to produce a single model of global governance accepted by all. The solution this chapter 
takes to the problem of conceptualising global governance is to construct a set of three 
different models, each of which integrates a range of arguments to illustrate different 
ontological perspectives on global political structures. These models ultimately show 
how global forces act on governance bodies, providing a theoretical basis to the analysis 
of the nature and scope of governance structures, typified in this dissertation by the 
European Parliament.  
 
The initial sections of the chapter provide a basis for the three models by setting out 
arguments on the ways power transfers into the global sphere. The subsequent models 
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then contribute a range of different ontological views on how this globalised power is 
manifest and managed, paying specific attention to the role that regional bodies such as 
the Parliament do play or could play in the future for each case. 
 
Interconnections between different communities are nothing new. Historical narratives 
show patterns of civilizational development that invariably involve trade, conflict, and 
expansion. Military and economic empires have for thousands of years, spread goods, 
ideas, and authority across the world. For many social and political scientists however, 
the modern world offers something different in terms of these flows of culture and power. 
The nature, pace, and scope of global interconnections in contemporary society represent 
a process of global interconnection that distinctly differs from pervious historical forms. 
 
Smith (2007: 3) argues that although the processes of interconnection may have a long 
history, globalisation as a concept did not really emerge until the early 1980’s, and it was 
not until the mid 1990’s that it became part of a ‘core vocabulary’. Matthews (1997) 
presents contemporary globalisation as a ‘power shift’ that is redefining the modern age, 
and Friedman (1999: 7-8) describes modern globalisation as ‘a new international system 
[with] its own unique logic, rules, pressures and incentives’.  
 
In attempting to synthesise the different arguments on global change, Shaw (2002) 
conceptualised transformation in the modern world based in three camps. Firstly, a 
position of post-modern perception that describes a fragmentation and ‘dissolution of 
previously fixed relations, institutions and traditions’ (2002: 7). Secondly, a post-Cold 
War argument in which change occurs as part of a transition from a state-based system to 
forms of ‘newly legitimate international institutions’ (2002: 7). Finally, a theory of 
globalisation understands contemporary change as ‘the relentless aspect of a single 
process – or a closely related set of processes – through which the market system 
colonises new social space’ (2002: 7). In all three cases, the processes of change 
represent a phase of human social development whereby social structures are organised 
differently from the systems and structures that preceded them.  
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For Held and McGrew et al (2001), there are several ways to distinguish contemporary 
systems of global structures from historical forms. In the first instance, global 
transformation is evident along spatio-temporal dimensions including the extensity, 
intensity, velocity, and impact of global interconnections (2001: 17). Understanding the 
ways in which different parts of the world connect with others, they argue, can illustrate 
the processes occurring.  
 
In the second instance, Held and McGrew et al (2001: 21) argue that global 
transformation may be evaluated through ‘modes of interaction’, which include ‘the 
infrastructure present … the levels of institutionalisation of global networks and the 
exercise of power … the pattern of global stratification [and] the dominant modes of 
global interaction’. It is not just the speed and amount of interconnections that illustrate 
the nature of a global system, but the relationships that occur and the structures that 
facilitate these relationships help us to understand the processes that are occurring. 
 
These two criteria, Held and McGrew et al (2001: 17) argue, can help to evaluate the 
nature of globalisation and avoid what they say is a ‘tendency to presume either that 
globalisation is fundamentally new, or that there is nothing novel about contemporary 
levels of global economic and social interconnectedness’. Although there is contestation 
between different interpretations of globalisations processes, Held and McGrew et al 
(2001) are right to argue that global change is not a fundamentally new process, but as 
the latest point in a continuum of human development. In other words, the process of 
change is not new, but ways in which that change occurs and its outcomes may be.  
 
Modern global interconnections are therefore part of the long history of human 
interaction as well as representing a significant shift in the ways those patterns of 
interaction occur. Held and McGrew et al (2001: 21) support this by arguing that the 
driving force for increased interconnection are divided between two distinct explanations: 
‘those which identify a single or primary imperative, such as capitalism or technological 
change; and those which explain globalisation as the product of a combination of factors, 
including technological change, market forces, ideology and political decisions’. In both 
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instances, increased interconnections and interdependencies are part of a process that 
influences contemporary institutions and the lives of individuals. 
 
Although there are a variety of positions on when modern globalisation began, the 
exploration of the European Parliament in this dissertation focuses on the ways in which 
authority is transferred from primarily state-based organisations to the international 
sphere. As the previous chapter argued, in recent years the role of democratic states 
became diminished as increasing amounts of this authority moves to international 
organisations.  Consequently, much of the focus on global development here concentrates 
on transformations since the Second World War as this period incorporates the 
beginnings of those bodies that eventually became the European Union and Parliament. 
 
In 1944, the Allies predicting victory in the Second World War established the Bretton 
Woods System (BWS) as part of a process designed to regulate monetary relationships 
between states. As its main institutions, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
aimed to ‘ensure that domestic economic objectives were not subordinate to global 
financial disciplines’ (Held and McGrew et al, 2001: 200). Replacing the Gold Standard 
as the primary method of regulating international economic exchange, the Bretton Woods 
System used the US dollar as an international currency. The aim was to provide capital 
controls and regulate exchange rates in order to establish control over global markets.  
For rich states, this meant the ability to control macroeconomic policy, and for poorer 
states, this meant operating in a market almost entirely run and regulated by and for the 
interests of the rich, s states. 
 
Held and McGrew et al (2001: 201) argue that the modern market system was largely 
facilitated by a series of events in the 1960’s and 1970’s that led to an increasing role for 
private equity and finance in the global market. Firstly, the Bretton Woods System 
became increasingly unsustainable as greater amounts of capital flows occurred outside 
of government and state control. States were increasingly unable to maintain economic 
autonomy in a globalising market where the growth of multinational corporations meant 
that big business could operate outside of many state’s influence. 
 89 
Secondly, the rise of a Eurocurrency market in the 1960s included the internationalisation 
of currency exchange. The US dollar was significantly weakened as multinational 
corporations, many originally based in the USA, increasingly sought to place their funds 
outsides of capital controls. This had a dramatic effect on the BWS, which used a dollar 
pinned to gold as its economic standard, and when in 1971 President Nixon stopped the 
dollar being freely convertible to gold in order to bolster the flagging US currency, the 
underpinning stability that the BWS offered exchange rates was removed (Held and 
McGrew et al, 2001: 202). Consequently, as there was no longer a fixed standard on 
exchange rates, the global economy became largely unregulated, with only the processes 
of supply and demand influencing transnational exchange.  
 
The final phase in this initial transmission of power from states to international markets 
came with the quadrupling of oil prices by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). This had the effect of shifting a great deal of wealth from Western 
manufacturing countries to oil-exporting countries, who subsequently invested much of 
this in the international money markets. This provided international banks, who were 
becoming increasingly influential in national economies and global structures alike,  with 
‘almost $50 billion to recycle through the world economy during 1974-6, and large sums 
thereafter into the early 1980’s’ (Held and McGrew et al, 2001: 202). 
 
The emphasis on further deregulation and on liberalised methods of social and economic 
structure was integral to the administrations of Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980s. On 
both sides of the Atlantic, there was a reduction in the state’s role in controlling markets, 
which was matched by an increased emphasis on private investment and business in 
managing services and resources. During this period, the UK sold a number of 
nationalised services and industries, and the US experienced large reductions in 
government spending and a subsequent increased reliance on the private sector. At the 
same time as the deregulation of business and industry, global technological 
developments made it was increasingly easy to transfer information and services. The 
speed of new information technologies led McLuhan (2002: 4) to claim in the mid 1960s 
that ‘as electronically contracted, the globe is no more than a village’, an argument that 
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helped to shape a generation of thinking on the nature and role of technology in modern 
life. 
 
Castells (1998: 336) argues that in the period between the late 1960’s and mid 1970’s a 
new world took shape in three interdependent processes: ‘the information technology 
revolution; the economic crisis of both capitalism and statism, and their subsequent 
restructuring; and the blooming of cultural social movements’. For Castells (1998: 336), 
the result was the rise of a ‘network society’ in which the world was heavily influenced 
by global interdependencies and the transfer of increasing amounts of information. The 
continued rise of internet based forms of communications technology reinforces the 
important role that such technologies play in structuring social life.  
 
Despite the focus on cultural aspects of globalisation, economic and political processes 
continued to influence the world at a macro level. The end of the Cold War at the start of 
the 1990s removed the main ideological challenge to capitalist global market economics.  
Although other challenges would arise, the period immediately after the Cold War meant 
the dominance of a market system supported by the IMF and World Bank, now freed 
from the constraints of the BWS. As the previous chapter argued, these institutions 
became closely associated with forwarding an agenda based on an ideology of 
neoliberalism and advanced global capitalism, in which the market is the dominant form 
of exchange.  
 
As this dissertation has already argued, Fukuyama (1992) rightly came under a great deal 
of criticism for the reductionist nature of his assessment of global political landscapes 
and assertions of the ‘end of history’. Nevertheless, the concept that Western liberal or 
neo-liberal democracy had become the dominant global ideology was essentially correct. 
Although the fall of communism did not mean that politically the world would embrace 
neo-liberalism en masse, it had the consequence of effectively freeing that ideological 
approach to become the modus operandi of Western geopolitical action. 
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The onset of the twenty-first century found the global dominance of a neoliberal ideology 
based on capitalist methods of economic and social structure. This ideology provides a 
system that largely defines global financial and political institutions, and in order to 
function on a global stage states must incorporate this ideology wholly or in part. Despite 
this dominance, neo-liberalism was not, as Fukuyama (1992) claimed, the only system of 
state regulation.  The People’s Republic of China, growing in influence especially since 
the recession in 2008/9, applies a combination of statist centralisation and capitalist 
wealth generation. Similarly, alternative ideologies based on a range of perceived 
religious or cultural fundamentals inform political and legislative structures in other 
states around the world.  
 
The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York brought into stark 
contrast the dominance of neoliberal regulation and liberalised states. These attacks 
demonstrated, live on television, that there were those who fundamentally disagreed with 
the nature of a neoliberal world order, and felt they were in direct conflict with the states 
that were instrumental in supporting the agenda of this nascent world order. The 
subsequent bombings of public transport in London and Madrid re-emphasised the 
arguments on the shape of national and global order that had been largely ignored since 
the Cold War. This is not Huntington’s (1996) oversimplified ‘clash of civilisations’, but 
what this dissertation terms Weltanschauungen War, conflicts based on wider concepts of 
worldview, not on ideas of nationality or political ideology.  
 
The recent global recession, which is still affecting many Western states, is another 
challenge to the dominance of global neoliberalism. The bailout of banks and financial 
institutions, particularly in Europe and the USA, led many to question the influence 
which unregulated economics plays in maintaining states. Part of the pattern of this 
recession is the transference of some economic power away from Western countries to 
economies that are continuing to grow, most notably China and India. Figure 5 
(following) shows the effect the recession had in 2008/9 on the GDP of two ‘developing’ 
economies compared to three more ‘developed’ nations. 
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Figure 5: Comparative GDP growth  
(Annual % at market prices based on constant local currency) 
country Growth by Year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
China 12.7 14.2 9.6 9.1 
India 9.3 9.8 4.9 9.1 
  
UK 2.9 2.6 0.5 -4.9 
US 2.7 1.9 0.0. -2.6 
Germany 3.4 2.7 1.0 -4.7 
Source: World Bank Group (2011c)  
 
Although the USA is still the world’s largest economy by GDP, China’s economy nearly 
doubled to around 5tnUS$ in the period between 2006-2009, making it larger than either 
the UK’s or Germany’s (World Bank Group, 2001d). As the previous chapter pointed 
out, China is also the largest single holder of US treasury debt (Reuters, 2011) which 
currently stands at 14.3tn US$ (US Treasury, 2011), giving it a significant level of 
influence over the US economy. 
 
Although it is difficult to predict future global patterns, it is possible that we are at the 
beginning of a transition in economic power similar to the one that occurred with the 
OPEC revaluation in the 1970s, which resulted in the demise of the BWS and a radical 
shift in the nature of a global economy. The changing emphasis is evident in the recent 
trade delegations to and from China to the USA and many European countries, which 
sought a range of financial and trade agreements (BBC, 2011a). Similarly, the 
Eurozone’s problems with debt in member countries such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
led to mass protest at so-called ‘austerity measures’, leading to questions over the future 
of the single currency.  
 
Although it is far too soon to predict the end of US and European dominance, it is clear 
that processes of global transformation are ongoing. Globalisation is not a finished 
process but part of a continuum in which ideological, economic, political, and 
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technological development structure the nature of interaction. As Held and McGrew 
(2001) argue, integration of world economies and structures is part of a long process in 
which there is a disagreement on the nature of the forces shaping action and the likely 
outcome of global structures.  
 
Interpreting global governance is a complicated task, both because of the multiple factors 
influencing it, as well as the disputed nature of the processes and meanings that occur. 
For Cox (2002: 132), all understandings of global governance presuppose ‘a certain basic 
structure consisting of the significant kinds of entities involved and the form of 
significant relationships among them’. In other words, different ontological perceptions 
of global processes construct different understandings of the global political environment. 
Because of this, it is impossible to describe a single model of global functions that covers 
the range of diverse processes and interpretations. Instead, this chapter constructs three 
different models, each of which demonstrates a particular perspective on the processes 
and functions of a global political economy. Each model also deals specifically with the 
role that the European Union and its Parliament may have in that particular conception of 
global functions. 
 
 
4.3 Three ontological models of global governance. 
 
The models constructed for this work each comprise a collection of related theories and 
perspectives that focus on the functions and structures of global governance and 
specifically on how the European Parliament and Union function according to that 
particular worldview. These unique models build upon the basic analysis of global 
transformation provided in this chapter, although they do differ on the degree to which 
they believe this history influences the global political environment.  
 
The following models explore several specific areas of global processes. Firstly, they 
cover different interpretations on the role of the market, and in particular neoliberalism, 
in order to illustrate how political and social action is shaped. Secondly, they examine the 
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role states play in a global world and how this can be an indicator of changing sources 
and sites of authority. Thirdly, they consider a range of other forces that act on a global 
political environment, particularly ideological influence and technological development, 
in order to show how these aspects influence the structures and functions of global 
governance.  
 
4.3.1 Model 1. Neorealism: International Relations and the extended state in the 21
st
 
century.  
The first of the three models considers global governance primarily in terms of the 
changing functions of states. Deriving from the disciplines of International Relations (IR) 
and International Political Economy (IPE), the neorealist assumptions that comprise this 
position take a functional view of global processes as ‘anchored firmly in modernity’s 
grasp’ (Payne and Samhat, 2004: 13). Although this position does not deny that there is a 
large degree of economic, political, and cultural globalisation, it contends that global 
processes are part of organised systems of state interaction in which authority on a global 
scale is the same as that on a national scale, only writ large. 
 
In the neorealist understanding, a ‘fluid and volatile’ international economy means there 
are ‘growing limits to purely state-centric politics’ (Held: 2000: 396). This does not mean 
however, that the state is losing control but that macroeconomic policies increasingly 
need to take into account the role of other states and of a global economy with 
unpredictable and far-reaching effects.  For Payne and Samhat (2004: 34), this position is 
one that views the global environment as inherently unstable, in which ‘states seeking to 
survive in an anarchic international system are not engaged in a fundamental reordering 
of global relations. Rather, they merely engage in the instrumental use of an institutional 
form’. There is not a fundamental decline of the state, but a reshaping of the ways in 
which states operate to incorporate a global level of interaction. 
 
In a global world, an internationalised state becomes part of a political system 
characterised by increasingly dense and overlapping spheres of interaction. For Payne 
and Samhat (2004: 139), ‘the states-system is experiencing a reconfiguration’ and 
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although the exact nature of that reconfiguration remains contested, on a basic level it 
entails a process in which the base-unit of representative systems shifts from the citizen 
to the state. Figure 6 (following) explores how the internationalisation of statehood forces 
states to function on a global level.   
 
 
 
Messner and Nuscheler (2002: 143) argue that this extended state will ‘remain the main 
actor in international politics’, although according to Held (2000: 199), the power it 
exercises is ‘frequently embedded in, and articulated with, other domains of political 
authority – regional, international and transnational’. 
 
Demos: 
Representative electorate 
International political 
environment: 
International  relations and 
interstate affairs 
State: 
Legitimate governance 
structure 
Figure 6: The shift of political ‘base units’ 
Author, 2011 
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Traditional state system The extended-state system 
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Other sources of authority that the state needs to manage come from a variety of areas. 
For example: transnational interests in the form of business and capital markets; global 
organisations including the IMF and World Bank; regional bodies that deal with 
collective political or trade issues, such as the EU or the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA); and traditional sources such as other states and internal political influences. 
Despite this, the state articulates the wishes and desires of these bodies. Figure 7 
(following) shows these influences on the state, which remains the focal point of political 
communities despite no longer being the sole location of political authority. 
 
 
 
Although other sources of authority exert some influence on nation states, it is at the 
national level where this influence is ultimately articulated.  At times however, the inter-
reliant nature of a global world means that states occasionally divest some legislative 
powers to other bodies, such as the European Parliament. In this instance states may 
Nation-state 
Local politics 
International organisations 
Economic and structural semi-
political agencies 
(IMF, WB, OECD) 
Transnational influences 
Business and culture industries 
and “global” governance 
agencies 
(UN) 
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Figure 7: The internationalised nation state 
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temporarily lose ‘that measure of their external sovereignty that is needed collectively to 
process problems resulting from interdependence’, although they ultimately retain overall 
‘domestic monopoly on power’ (Messner and Nuscheler, 2002: 142). 
 
Kahler and Lake (3003: 412) argue that, although the globalisation of politics serves to 
internationalise many issues, this has ‘not yet produced a fundamental change in the 
political structure of authority’. In this position, while some issues may require collective 
bargaining or action, there is ‘no obvious trend towards decentralisation of national 
authority’ (2003: 413). Others, such as Mattli (2003: 201) agree that, despite growing 
market-driven standardisation stemming from the international political and economic 
community, this standardisation and the ‘standards-development organizations’ that 
orchestrate it only attain legitimacy through acquiescence of states.  
 
The resulting governance structures amount to a system of international cooperation that 
takes the form of what Messner and Nuscheler (2002: 136) call ‘horizontal self-control’. 
This is a system of interaction in which states participate as actors in a global political 
arena with no overall controlling body or regulatory authority. Regional bodies such as 
the European Union, African Union and the North American Free Trade Arrangement, as 
well as international organisations such as the OECD, WB and IMF may form regional 
“blocks”, but these are extensions of states and functionally restricted. Figure 8 
(following) describes this idea of horizontal self-control, emphasising how coordination 
between states and “blocs” becomes the base of a global political structure. 
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Horizontal self-control is a more globalised interpretation of the basic neorealist 
interpretation. In this interpretation the extended state is at the centre of a new 
regionalised ‘multipolar world’ (Messner and Nuscheler, 2002: 134) in which there is no 
single dominant source of authority but interconnecting sources of influence and control.  
Individual states more or less retain control over their own sovereignty, and regional 
bodies such as the EU or IMF complement this by helping to manage a complex global 
environment. These collective bodies do this by performing regulatory roles in regional 
economics and politics, or by giving member states the chance to exercise collective 
power in areas such as trade bargaining.  Although states divest some portion of influence 
Figure 8: Horizontal self-control 
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or control to regional bodies, these bodies augment the role of the state without 
supplanting it.   
 
The structure of regional bodies reflects their purpose, with power only divested from the 
state in specific areas. For example, in the European Union states have allowed it to 
function in a range of economic and legislative areas, designed to integrate the region 
economically. On the other hand, the African Union chooses a greater focus on collective 
stability through military intervention and less focus on collective economic policy. In 
both cases, as the needs of states change this may bring about corresponding changes in 
the nature of the collective structure; however the collective organisation responds to the 
needs of states rather than driving the agenda itself. 
 
In horizontal self-control, a regional body such as the European Union provides a 
collective voice in certain areas where member states feel that joint action may be of 
benefit, for example in the setting of trade tariffs. These bodies may also regulate some 
aspects of the relationships between member states, for example, the EU sets labour laws 
for member countries.  Where bodies such as the European Parliament allow some form 
of democratic interaction, this does not entail a discrete political community but an 
extension of the states involved. Figure 9 (following) uses the example of the EU to show 
the ways in which regional bodies function as a source of internal regulation as well as 
collective bargaining on the international stage. 
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Keohane (2003: 339) argues that this model of internalised statehood envisages a 
‘partially globalised world’ in which power is yet to be fully divested from traditional 
sources. Regional bodies play a migratory role, offering a collective decision-making 
process for states with similar needs in a changing geopolitical environment. However, 
these states remain ‘the most powerful actors in world politics’ and remain in political 
ideology as the most desirable unit of political structure (Keohane, 2003: 120). Because 
of this, the nature of democracy and sites of democratic accountability are broadly 
unchanged. Politically, the state remains predominantly territorially bound and national 
governments are the primary methods through which the decision-making processes 
operate. There is some degree of internationalisation, particularly in terms of regional 
bodies; however where democratic forms are transposed onto these bodies, such as within 
the European Parliament, this is simply another way in which a state represents itself at a 
regional or international level.  
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An example of rationalised international action exercised through a collective body is the 
recent military action in Libya. As a collective response to a perceived danger, member 
states petitioned the UN to allow the exercising of military force in order to help resolve 
the situation in the country.  With the passing of resolution 1973 (2011), several countries 
committed to military action, organised as part of a UN mandate that allowed ‘all 
necessary measure to protect civilians’ (UN, 2011). Those states involved, but mainly 
France and the UK, undertook military action as part of the UN, whilst retaining control 
of their aircraft and bearing the cost of the action themselves. In this instance, member 
states authorized the UN to broker a decision on military action, essentially allowing that 
organisation to produce collective foreign policy in one select area. Individual states still 
voiced agreement or concerns over the decision, but acquiesced to military action within 
the confines of the resolution. 
 
Messner and Nuscheler’s (2002: 136) approach to  the idea of an extended state is an 
updated and adapted version of the neorealist stance that owes much of its interpretation 
to the disciplines of International Relations and International Political Economy. This 
approach takes the state as a base for describing global politics, and does not imagine 
much role for other bodies such as the EU or EP. For Payne and Samhat (2004), this 
neorealist stance has its uses as it sustains detailed examination into the functions of 
traditional institutions and the ways in which they deal with international issues. 
Nevertheless, they are critical of the approach which they argue ‘denote[s] exceptionally 
limited bounds of imagination’ (Payne and Samhat, 2004: 13). The reliance on 
interpretations founded primarily on traditional forms of governance such as the state, 
mean that its ‘theoretical apparatus … is constrained from accommodating fundamental 
change’ (2004: 13). 
 
As one of three models for explore different conceptions of global governance, the idea 
of an extended state reinforces the important and continued role of states in regulating 
international politics. Although with limited acknowledgement of other forces, 
particularly the role of corporate power and financial markets, the approach affords a 
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major assessment of traditional interpretations of authority. The next two models are 
more radical in their interpretation of global governance, with accounts that underline 
factors other than the state and structures that differ from traditional models.  
 
4.3.2 Model 2. Capitalist hegemony: neoliberal global economics as the new 
imperialism 
In contrast to the model of an internationalised state, a hegemonic approach focuses on 
the role of capitalist neoliberal ideology in forming global structures. The different 
approaches that make up this model rely heavily on a neoliberal institutionalist reading of 
globalisation that understands a capitalist ideology that is increasingly integrated into an 
increasingly wide range of political, economic, and social structures. 
 
Despite a wide range of different theories falling into this ontological position, all agree 
that the role nation-states play in governance is in decline, partly because of a global 
capitalist ideology becoming more dominant. Authors such as Strange (1996), Scholte 
(2000), Hardt and Negri (2001), and Callinicos (2003), argue that neoliberal ideologies 
are progressively shaping the structures and functions of states and international actors.  
 
The original liberal roots of the modern market system are set out in the works of Thomas 
Hobbes (1968 [1651]) and John Locke (2005 [1689]), who extol the virtues of a 
minimalist state and individual responsibility. Milton Friedman (1963) in the USA and 
Friedrich Hayek (2001) in the UK developed these ideas of a minimalist state to 
incorporate a laissez-faire approach to governance in which freedom through market-led 
choice increasingly became a guiding political ideology for successive regimes on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The result, according to Scholte (2000: 34) was a intensified support 
for a neoliberal ideology that believed ‘market forces will bring prosperity, liberty, 
democracy and peace to the whole of humankind’. 
 
In the hegemonic model of global governance, a dominant and pervasive neoliberal 
ideology erects a framework for global capitalism and a controlling mechanism in global 
politics. Callinicos (2003: 5) argues that normative institutions such as the IMF and 
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World Bank support this system, which now ‘embraces geopolitics as well as economics’ 
(Callinicos, 2003: 50). As a result, the structures of global governance prioritise laissez-
faire market economics over the individual rights of citizens or states. 
 
The neoliberalisation of centralised governance institutions means that participation in 
the international market is a central feature of many states and governance bodies. For 
example, in the European Union, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) requires member states 
to consider privatisation of state services. In other nations, organisations such as the IMF 
and World Bank apply structural adjustment and conditionality clauses as part of aid 
packages in order to force countries to open up internal markets to international business. 
For Chomsky (1999: 92-3) this process effectively creates neoliberalism as a global 
norm, and in the case of poorer countries it is forcing ‘social policy that is globalizing the 
structural model of the third world’ (Chomsky, 1999: 92-3).  
 
In the hegemonic model of global governance, neoliberalism is the dominant factor 
shaping global processes. Unlike the previous model in which the internationalised 
functions of states provided the main structure for a global environment, this model views 
a neoliberal ideology as the driving force for global integration. States are influenced by 
this ideology in a variety of ways. Larger states internalise neoliberalism to a greater 
degree than smaller states, its processes shaping institutions and functions. On the other 
hand, smaller less influential states or those that have not integrated a neoliberal ideology 
to the same extent, experience pressure to adopt neoliberalism from the international 
market, global institutions, and from larger states. The ways in which a dominant 
neoliberal ideology filters down to states is shown in Figure 10 (following), which 
supports the argument that states with different levels of influence experience the global 
market in different ways. 
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The election of former French Minister of Economic Affairs, Finances and Industry 
Christine Lagarde (IMF, 2011d) as head of the IMF indicates how larger states maintain 
control and influence over global bodies. The overall effect of this process is to reinforce 
a global economy divided along economic and ideological lines. 
 
Figure 10: Hegemonic global order.  
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Strange (1996) argues that as well as a structural element, a global neoliberal ideology 
contains normative functions that include the exercising of legitimate force. 
Organisations with a primarily military function, such as NATO, as well as those with 
some military elements such as the UN, possess the power to sanction the use of coercive 
force at an international level. Weighted voting systems in many of these organisations 
mean the economically most powerful and influential states hold effective control, and 
these bodies consequently reflect a neoliberal position. This also means that these 
neoliberal bodies reduce the support of large powerful states such as the USA, who have 
the ability to exercise coercive and political force on their behalf. For Callinicos (2003), 
the exercising of political and military might by the USA is instrumental in neoliberal 
dominance. He argues that ‘the worldwide triumph of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 
1990s was a consequence, not of the impersonal workings of market forces, but of a 
successful political intervention by the American state’ (2003: 58). 
 
Economist Thomas Friedman (2000) also believes that neoliberal dominance requires 
mechanisms for exercising coercive force.  As a proponent of neo-liberal style 
globalisation, Friedman (2000: 464) argues that ‘the hidden hand of the market will never 
work without a hidden fist…and the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon 
Valley’s technologies to flourish is called the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine 
Corps’. For Strange (1996: 162), the use of force on behalf of a neoliberal agenda has too 
often meant that ‘within the soft velvet glove of the worldly bureaucrats…can be felt the 
iron fist of American power – power exercised on behalf of the ruling elites of 
transnational capital’. 
 
Hardt and Negri (2001) agree that normative institutions of global governance sustain a 
pervasive neoliberal ideology; however, they also argue that the idea that only a few 
powerful states support this does not go far enough in assessing the extensive nature of 
global neoliberal dominance. A modern imperialism represented in US economic and 
military domination is a simplistic explanation of global capitalism’s power structure. 
Rather, they suggest that global capitalism is an empire that ‘establishes no territorial 
centre of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries and barriers’ (2001: xii). Control 
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on the global level lies in the hands of groups of elites, which shift as power and 
influence migrate between economies and regimes. Presently, the economic and military 
dominance of the USA means that it exerts the greatest influence on the global economy, 
however if the USA no longer held this dominant position, Hardt and Negri (2001) argue 
the controlling influences would shift to the new sites. 
 
For Hardt and Negri (2001), the supporting force behind global structures is fluid insofar 
as it does not originate from a single or static point but from whichever state is best suited 
to serve the needs of the global ideology. As a result, the structural configurations of 
global governance are not centralised, but expressed through ‘a series of national and 
supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule’ (2001: xii). Figure 11 
(following) describes the role a dominant state plays in exercising control on behalf of a 
global neoliberal ideology. It demonstrates how this control extends to individual states 
as well as to structural bodies such as the IMF. 
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In Hardt and Negri’s (2001) approach, a pervasive neoliberal ideology reinforces its 
influence through global structural institutions, and in doing so gains another source of 
political authority. Regulatory global institutions such as the IMF or World Bank perform 
a role complementary to the large neoliberal states such as the USA. These bodies ensure 
that there is a continued integration of neoliberal ideology in the structures of a global 
market, functioning as standardising bodies for national and global economies.  
 
Regional governance bodies such as the European Union play a similar role to global 
structural institutions in this model, acting as ‘ideological hubs’ with influence beyond 
that of many nation states. Unlike structural institutions however, regional governance 
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bodies may also wiled normative political authority that extends from their own 
legitimacy. Moravcsik (2005: 233) argues that these bodies adopt a ‘neo-liberal bias in 
the constitutional structure … and the rhetoric that surrounds it, which favours market 
liberalization’. Consequently, regional governance in institutions such as the EU provides 
political authority to neoliberalism, which bolsters the economic authority it achieves 
through institutional structures such as the IMF. In the case of the EU, the democratic 
input of the Parliament heightens this political legitimacy. Figure 12 (following) 
illustrates the role that regional bodies such as the European Union play in a hegemonic 
conception of global structure and underlines how these organisations reinforce 
neoliberalism to both member states and the wider global community.   
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In the hegemonic model, a neoliberal ideology serves multiple sites of political, 
economic, and structural authority. Powerful states engage in the use of coercive force to 
maintain global ideological order, whilst at the same time global structural bodies such as 
the IMF and World Bank maintain a global environment in which neoliberal structures of 
economic exchange are dominant. Finally, neoliberalism achieves global authority 
through regional governance bodies that function on behalf of member states, thereby 
adding another layer of political legitimacy to that ideology. 
 
Figure 13 (following) combines the three elements of coercive, economic, and political 
authority to show how neoliberalism maintains its global dominance.  
 
 
 
Figure 13: Multiple sites of global neoliberal authority.  
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The hegemonic approach focuses heavily on the ideological impetus for globalisation and 
the role of this ideology in the functions of powerful states and global institutions. Unlike 
the previous model in which states simply extend authority into the global area, a 
hegemonic neoliberal order suggests dramatic changes to the role of the nation state and 
the locations of political authority. Streeten (2001: 115-116) argues this point, claiming 
that ‘while global forces reduce the power of the people to influence policy 
democratically at the national level, at the global level, where the need is now greater, 
there are no democratic institutions at all that would enable people to control or even 
influence their destiny’.  
 
For Crouch (2004), the integration of a neoliberal ideology into almost all aspects of a 
global world means that the market acts as the primary mechanism of organising social 
action. The primacy of economics led to a reduction in the sovereignty of states, and 
political discourse is less about democracy and more about maintaining a state’s position 
in a global market. Crouch (2004: 104) argues that this disparity means that the 
‘fundamental cause of democratic decline in contemporary politics is the major 
imbalance now developing between the role of corporate interests and those of virtually 
all other groups’. 
 
The diminishing power of states and the reduction in forms of democratic opportunity at 
the state level is a symptom of a post-Keynesian politics characterised by growing 
physical and political distance between citizens and decision-making structures.  Crouch 
(2004: 4) argues that normative issues of governance occur ‘in private by interaction 
between elected government officials and elites that overwhelmingly represent business 
interests’. The result, according to Kaldor (2000: 560), is a situation in which ‘substantive 
democracy [is] eroded by the loss of autonomy of nation-states’.  
 
The hegemonic model conveys a more radical interpretation of global structures. Its 
overwhelmingly negative view of a global environment dominated by a neoliberal 
ideology emphasises market forces over all other forms of social and political structure. 
This economic impetus reaches states through physical, structural, and political forces, 
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resulting in a reduced role for democratic governance in the organisation of political and 
social life.  
 
4.3.3 Model 3. Concentric Governance: The Globalisation of Statehood  
The third model in this chapter to explore the nature of global governance utilises the 
concept of concentric governance. This approach takes aspects of the first two models to 
explain global processes as a ‘complex interdependence’ (Payne and Samhat, 2004: 34) 
between states, regional conglomerates, and international organisations. As with the 
capitalist hegemonic model, concentric governance views globalisation as an expression 
of a dominant neoliberal ideology, although it combines this with the neorealist model’s 
emphasis on state structures as important sources of authority. 
  
In this model, a group of global institutions operating in a common neoliberal ideology 
dominate an intricate matrix of global relationships. For Shaw (2002: 192) this structure 
represents ‘a unified centre of state power which generates a worldwide web of 
authoritative relations, backed up by a more or less common, world organization of 
political force’. While a neoliberal ideology is still the overriding element influencing 
global structures, states and state functions remain important mechanisms for organising 
social and political life. 
 
Shaw (2002) argues that the supranationalisation of politics results in contradictory 
effects on the nation state. On the one hand, a continued focus on the importance of 
political infrastructure in contemporary global political discourse reinforces the idea of 
the state as a universally accepted structure of governance. On the other hand, state 
functions are repeatedly brought into question by ‘the continuous emergence of new 
centres of would-be authoritative force’ (Shaw, 2002: 192).  The result of this is a ‘dual 
globalization of statehood’ (2002: 193) in which states are continually both reinforced 
and redefined.  
 
For Shaw (2002: 193), the dual process which states undergo results in a ‘complex 
globalisation of authority [which] involves the extension of globally legitimate 
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international institutions [and] the transformations of national forms of state’. In this 
process, Shaw (2002: 199) locates the emergence of what he terms a ‘global-Western 
state-conglomerate’. This conglomerate comprises those economic and militarily 
powerful Western states that have internalised a neoliberal ideology that fosters much 
global interaction.  
 
Collectively, the states and organisations that form the core of a global governance 
structure provide some of the normative functions of rule. Through their integration into 
the regulatory and structural bodies of global governance, states and bodies in the core re-
assert their influence through economic, political, and physical means. For example, 
Shaw (2002: 200) argues that these states exercise an ‘authoritative deployment of 
violence [which is] structurally reinforced by its increasing, if problematic integration 
with the legitimate and world authority-structure of the United Nations’.  
 
The model that results from Shaw’s (2002) arguments is effectively one of a core and 
periphery, in which a global-Western state-conglomerate dominates international 
structures and exercises wide-ranging influence over the ways in which global processes 
function. Surrounding the core of most influential states is a periphery of other states not 
as integrated or influential within the global neoliberal structure. As part of these 
periphery states Shaw (2002: 208) describes several different bodies, amongst them a 
type of ‘Quasi-imperial nation-state’ typified in Russia or China that closely corresponds 
to a ‘classic nineteenth- and early twentieth-century model’. These quasi-imperial states 
may wield large amounts of power and influence over other states, as is evident in both 
examples of China and Russia’s regional relationships, however they do not exercise the 
same levels of influence over the core functions as the global-Western state 
conglomerate. 
 
Shaw (2002: 211) adds another group to his periphery, ‘new, proto- and quasi-states’ 
which are not defined in terms of traditional manifestations of statehood, but wield 
authority in more dispersed structures or in ideological beliefs not specifically linked to 
statehood. Shaw (2002: 212) uses the break-up of the former Yugoslavia as an example 
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where concepts of nationality and authority cross national boundaries. Here, the 
composition of a unifying belief or a collective did not clearly map onto geographical 
boundaries. A more modern example is the role that religious ideology plays in forming 
collective identities and political will. For example, the rise of a traditionalist Islamic 
ideology in some parts of the world serves to unite different groups politically and 
culturally across territorial boundaries.  Another example is the isolationist stance of 
states such as North Korea. Here the state is in a slightly different position insofar as an 
ideological stance by the military leadership means that the global core states often 
exclude this country from functioning on a global stage. In both cases, Shaw (2002: 193) 
argues, these states define themselves in contrast to or ‘through conflict with this global 
state’.  
 
Shaw’s (2002) core-periphery approach helps to explain how ideological domination 
influences global political structures.  Figure 14 (following) represent this process by 
demonstrating how these different sources of power in a global world exist together but 
exercise diverse levels of influence. 
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The core-periphery approach means that different states experience global governance to 
different degrees. Those involved in the core form what is essentially a proto-global 
superstate and, according to Shaw (2002: 193), become ‘sufficiently internationalised 
within the dominant global state as to no longer constitute distinct states in any 
meaningful sense’. States on the periphery operate within the neoliberal economic 
Figure 14: Core-periphery model of global governance 
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structure, but without the same influence over the system as those heavily involved in its 
normative structures.  
 
Although the core-periphery model constitutes a valuable tool for examining some of the 
relationships of states on a global level, it may underestimate some of the more complex 
relationships. Countries such as Brazil, India, and China are increasingly influential on 
the world stage and whilst they do not exert as much influence as established powers, 
they are certainly more influential than many others are. Rather than being quasi-
imperial, these states comprise a semi-periphery to the primary grouping of influential 
states, operating within its ideological remit but outside of its structural core. They have 
internalised a neoliberal ideology but their immediate influence on its structures is 
limited; or, as Payne and Samhat (2004: 35-6) put it, ‘merely joining institutions is not 
the same as sharing the burdens of institutional goals’. 
 
Other groups of states reject some of the cultural elements associated with neoliberal 
capitalism. Factors such as a growing international division of labour, increasing global 
inequality and religious-cultural differences mean that some choose to distance 
themselves from neoliberalism’s invasive nature. Such states form international bonds 
based on social or cultural systems, outside of the neoliberal core of states and 
institutions. Such bonds are seminal in shaping the nature of global relationships, 
particularly in the ideological portrayal of democracy as a key feature of modern 
governance. 
 
Robert Cox (2002) argues that the standing of the nation state varies in the modern order 
when it comes to creating and maintaining a political identity. Adopting a position similar 
to Crouch’s (2004) idea of post-democracy in which political interaction is reduced, Cox 
(2002) believes that there is no uniform decline in political identity, but that the 
importance of the nation-state varies depending on how it is integrated into the global 
neoliberal order. An example this is the case of a powerful state such as China, where it is 
insufficient to understand its global role simply within a core-periphery model of 
interaction. Brown and Chun (2009: 18) argue that ‘the past decade has witnessed a 
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major and very significant increase in China’s engagement in Africa’.  Growing 
investment in infrastructure, natural resources, and trade in Africa, as well as its influence 
over states such as North Korea, mean that China' is the core of its own sphere of 
influence. Where it may once have been suitable to regard this as a function of quasi 
imperialism (Shaw, 2002: 208), China’ integrated role in the modern global economy 
means that it offers an alternative route to globalised trade and economics. As such, it 
forms an alternate core to the more established Global-Western state-conglomeration, 
with its own periphery’s economic and ideological commonalities. 
 
For Cox (2002: 88), as well as providing an ideological structure for the international 
order, neoliberalism creates fundamental social cleavages as it ‘accentuates polarisation 
between rich and poor in all parts of the world’. Rather than unite all states under a 
common ideology, the processes of political and economic globalisation serve to create 
alternative locations of power on a global scale where states’ ‘domestic structure [mean 
they] act differently in the international arena’ (Czempiel, 2000: 256). The more 
complicated relationships of this interpretation mean that multiple sites of authority 
overlap with one another, as states participate in distinct spheres at the same time. Figure 
14 (following) describes how a global economy that is still overwhelmingly dominated 
by a neoliberal ideology creates a complex periphery of allied states and competing 
ideological and economic structures. 
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Both the initial and the updated core-periphery models represent conceptions of global 
governance in which neoliberalism is the primary influence in global economic, political, 
and social structures. States however, maintain an important role, either for articulating 
Periphery: 
Other states and 
organisations that 
operate within the 
political remit of the 
neoliberal global state 
but have less influence 
in the structure and 
policies. 
Inner core / Proto-
superstate 
Most involved states 
and international 
institutions form global 
neoliberal state 
 
Source: Author (2011) 
Outer core: 
Powerful ‘quasi-imperial’ states that 
have not internalised a neoliberal 
ideology, but are still influential 
globally and have their own periphery 
of states. 
 
Outer-core 
Periphery 
States aligned to 
the outer core 
Ideological conglomerations: 
Groups of states that share a 
common ideology in contrast to 
neoliberalism and which provides 
some normative elements of 
political structure and law. 
Figure 15: Advanced core-periphery model 
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this influence in an individual capacity as part of global structural institutions such as the 
IMF, or through regional political bodies including as the EU.  
 
Keohane and Nye (2003: 409) posit that ‘a potentially debilitating problem for 
international governance is lack of legitimacy’. The internationalisation of governance 
demotes traditional forms of accountability based in states, as they are no longer 
sufficient for managing the wide range of influence on national political action. Although 
a neoliberal ideology frames most political action in this model, it still requires a 
perception of legitimacy in order to function, and the recent revolutions in North Africa 
show what might happen when a system loses legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. 
 
The structures of global governance achieve legitimacy in the core-periphery model 
through the states that participate in them. These states effectively ‘lend’ a portion of 
their legitimacy to global structures by their outright support or tacit approval of their 
actions. For example, the IMF is a supranational body with wide-ranging influence; 
however, as Figure 16 below shows, its leading members are all prominent politicians in 
European states. 
 
Figure 16: Heads of the IMF 
Name and length of directorship Role prior to IMF Directorship 
Christine Lagarde  
2011-present 
Minister for Economics, Finance and Industry, 
France 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn 
2007 to 2011 
Minister for Economics, Finance and Industry, 
France 
Rodrigo de Rato y Figaredo 
2004 to 2007 
Vice President for Economic Affairs and Minister 
of Economy for the Government, Spain 
Horst Köhler 
2000- 2004 
Deputy Minister of Finance, Germany 
Former President of the EBRD 
Michel Camdessus 
1987-2000 
Director of the Treasury, France 
Source: IMF (2011f) 
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As well as achieving legitimacy using established political structures, the legitimation of 
neoliberalism as the dominant ideology also occurs through the international market. 
When states acquiesce to the demands of banks and credit rating agencies for changes to 
national fiscal policy, they effectively establish these bodies as a suitable source of 
authority.  
 
The role of regional governance bodies in the core-periphery approach conforms to a 
similar pattern as world structures.  A periphery of less involved countries surrounds a 
central core of influential states that dictate the majority of global policy emanating from 
institutions under their control, such as the IMF or World Bank. These bodies may also 
achieve legitimation through the role states take within them.  
 
As well as institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, legitimate authority in the 
advanced core-periphery model may emanate from regional bodies such as the European 
Parliament. There are two ways to interpret this authority. On the one hand, the 
Parliament may be functioning as little more than a legitimation exercise, providing an 
impression of democratic governance whilst allowing the other parts of the EU to pursue 
a neoliberal agenda. On the other hand, the Parliament may represent a genuine source of 
democratic legitimacy, thereby providing a counter-weight to the neoliberal elements in 
the Union by emphasising democratic and social accountability rather than market-driven 
policy.   
 
An understanding of the role the European Parliament plays as a governance body 
depends on the interpretations adopted.  Regional bodies are either strong agents of a 
centralised global governance structure that give limited ‘opportunities for people to 
manage their own collective and individual affairs’ (Chomsky, 1999: 92), or they 
represents a genuine internationalisation of citizenship and an expansion of collective 
decision making and democracy into the international arena. The immanent criticism of 
the Parliament later in this dissertation deals with these possibilities in more detail. 
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Of the three models in this chapter, the core-periphery approach is a more balanced 
interpretation of global political structures. Although a neoliberal ideology still defines 
the global economy, this ideology is not the only source of organising at a global level. 
There are challenges to its domain from other methods of globalising authority, notably 
from what Shaw (2002: 208) describes as ‘Quasi-imperial nation-state’ and from other 
ideological sources that extend beyond territorial boundaries.  As well, there is the 
potential from regional bodies such as the European Union and its Parliament to function 
as alternative sources of ideological focus, which stress democracy rather than market 
economics. This flexibility means that the core-periphery model is a much better vehicle 
for interpreting the nature of the European Parliament’s role in the EU and its influence 
on wider global governance structures.  
 
4.4 Summary: using different models of global governance with immanent criticism 
 
The ontological models of global governance constructed by this chapter represent 
provide a set of conceptual frameworks for the analysis of the European Parliament. 
Whilst they do not cover all eventualities, they do show a range of interpretations that 
suggest the types of relationships that occur. Of the three models, the final core-periphery 
group is the most flexible approach for describing global and regional governance. It 
utilises elements of the neorealist model that set out how states function in a global 
economy, besides adopting the second model’s critique of a hegemonic neoliberal order. 
It arrives at a position that comprehends a world shaped by complex combinations of 
ideological and political forces in which often competing relationships create more space 
for different structures to emerge. 
 
The next chapter begins the detailed process of immanent criticism. The first stage in 
Chapter 5 sets out the Parliament’s historical foundations, proving a critical analysis of 
the forces that were influential in its formation and subsequent development. It critically 
examines the ways in which these forces restrict its present functions, allowing the 
subsequent stages of immanent criticism to explore these more closely and then to 
suggest strategies of development in democratic governance body. 
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Chapter 5: 
Immanent criticism Stage 1: A critical history of the EP  
________________________________________________________________________ 
5.1 Introduction: The first stage of immanent criticism 
5.2 Theories on European political development 
5.3 The development of the European Parliament 
5.4 The present structures of democracy and governance in the Union and Parliament 
5.5 Critical analysis: the development of governance and democracy in the European Parliament 
 5.5.1 Legitimacy 
 5.5.2 Representation 
 5.5.3 Accountability 
5.6 Summary: the first stage of immanent criticism 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction: The first stage of immanent criticism:  
 
This chapter is the first part of the three-stage immanent criticism of the European 
Parliament. This immanent criticism sets out in turn the Parliament’s functions as an 
historical, actual, and potential set of relationships and in doing so examines how 
democracy and governance are manifest in the Parliament’s structures.  
 
Horkheimer (1992: 211) argues that in order to understand a social object we must view 
it as ‘not only a logical process but a concrete historical one as well’. Consequently, the 
three-stage immanent criticism in this chapter critically explores the forces that shaped 
the Parliament’s growth within the EU. Constructing a critical history of the European 
Parliament is not a process of simply recounting historical “facts”, but an evaluation of 
the Parliament that takes into account the historical flows of power that were influential 
in its development. It is a search for what Horkheimer (1992: 200) terms ‘the historical 
character of the object perceived’.  
 
The chapter comprises three main parts. Firstly, it provides a basis for the critical 
discussion on the Parliament’s history by setting out several competing theories on 
European integration, each of which provides a particular account of the driving forces 
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behind the Parliament’s changing role. The chapter then gives an historical account of the 
Parliament’s development within the European Union. Using a wide range of 
contemporary documents, it describes the Parliament’s shift from an oversight body with 
little influence, to an important part of the EU’s decision-making structures. The final 
part of the analysis focuses on the development of democracy and governance in the 
Parliament. It critically reflects on how the forces influential throughout its history shape 
the Parliament’s present role within the European Union.  The chapter concludes with an 
overall assessment of the Parliament’s functions, which also begins to provide evidence 
for the first of the thesis’s claims, arguing that the European Parliament represents a new 
form of multi-state governance structure that combines the wishes of individual citizens 
with that of states. This summary also sets the scene for the second stage of immanent 
criticism in the following chapter.   
 
Although there are a great many political and historical accounts that examine the history 
of European politics, a critical history differs insofar as it seeks to provide an evaluation 
of the process involved in the Parliament’s development rather than just a descriptive 
retelling. The basis of a critical history lies in Horkheimer’s (1999: 207) argument that 
we should not accept as natural the world prescribed to us. Accepting these definitions as 
limits he argues, leads towards a conceptual separation of ‘individual and society’ that 
precludes an understanding of the structures and functions of the social world as a 
‘product of human work’.  Rather, we must view our world in a critical light with which 
we seek ‘a conspicuous opposition’ to accepted accounts (1992: 207). For Horkheimer 
(1992: 207), and for the history of the European Parliament in this chapter, this means 
adopting a ‘critical attitude’ that is ‘wholly distrustful of the rules of conduct with which 
society as presently constituted provides each of its members’.  
 
The information in this chapter comes from a variety of sources. One of the most 
important of these is a range of archived material from the central European governance 
bodies, inclosing the Parliament. Copies of treaties, meetings, and working groups 
provide direct evidence of the discussions that were taking place at the time, and give an 
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insight into the legislation produced. Going directly to these sources rather than relying 
on the account of others allows a process of critical evaluation that is unique to this work. 
 
As well as a range of first-hand documents available from the EU and EP, this chapter 
benefits from a number of texts on the EU and its Parliament which come from several of 
academic fields, including economics and political history. Accounts from McAllister 
(1997) and Dedman (2010) offer historical descriptions, and Dedman in particular uses a 
range of whistleblower exposé accounts, contemporary academic assessments, and a wide 
variety of newspaper and press reports from across the European political spectrum (see 
Dedman, 2010: ix-x). The chapter also makes use of Lipgens’ (1982) history of the 
European Union, as well as the work of Hix (1999) and Hix et al (2007), who write 
extensively on the political development of democracy and governance in the European 
Union.  These texts offer a varied set of interpretations, and the chapter uses these as part 
of an overall focus that remains directed towards the process of immanent criticism and  
sociological interpretations that ultimately associate social objects with the functions of 
individuals and societies.    
 
 
 5.2 Theories on European political development 
 
The history of European political development in this chapter charts the Parliament’s rise 
from a collection of oversight bodies to its present role as a key constituent of the 
European Union’s decision-making process. The section prefaces this history with a 
series of accounts that supply a useful range of concepts and principles for explaining the 
driving forces of European development.  
 
Dedman (2010: 8) describes three distinct schools of thought on the forces driving 
European integration. The first of these he terms an ‘orthodox explanation’ (2010: 8) 
which arises primarily from disciplines surrounding political science. This orthodox 
account views integration as an inevitable consequence of a post-war Europe in which the 
‘increased complexity of the post-1945 international order and the range and functions of 
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the modern nation state mean that countries are inexorably entwined in a network of 
functioning international bodies’ (Dedman, 2010: 8-9).   
 
In recent years, many globalisation theories have applied the concept of an increasingly 
complex and interrelated world to descriptions of political change. This position believes 
there is an erosion of the role for demarcated states in the face of global political and 
economic integration. Writers such as Ohame (1994: 19) talk of a ‘borderless world’ in 
which states face a range of challenges that are ‘eating them away’. Similarly, Strange 
(1996) describes the ‘retreat of the state’ in the face of globalising pressures. Hobsbawm 
(1994) as an historian describes this decline in state control in terms of increasingly 
dispersed sources of legitimate violence; or as sociologists Cohen and Kennedy (2007: 
135) call it, a ‘privatisation and democratization of the means of destruction’. In each 
case, changes in the ways states and societies interact reshape the nature of the social 
world.  
 
Dedman (2010: 9) argues that the orthodox discourses view integration driven by the 
pressures of global development as a ‘self sustaining process’, in which there in an 
‘inevitable tendency for further integration to occur’. From this position, European 
integration is unavoidable as states increasingly find that they must operate on an 
international level in order to maintain competitive influence on a global scale. The basis 
of these discourses is similar to the orthodox form of political science in the first model 
of governance in Chapter 4. This approach is a neorealist interpretation of a world 
comprising extended states, which views integration as a largely neutral process that is 
driven by economic, technological, and political development, as well as the necessity of 
states to occasionally aggregate power. Although there are other driving forces in this 
process, for example the threat of the Soviet Union as an accelerator of European 
integration, this model is a more traditional interpretation of market economics and state 
functions, which is a somewhat simplistic interpretation of complex global pressures.  
 
Dedman’s (2010: 8) second interpretation of European development applies the work of 
Lipgens (1996), who argues that a federalised Europe was an outcome of ‘inevitable and 
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logical post-war policy’ (cited in Dedman, 2010: 9). Lipgens (1982: 85) conducted a 
number of studies that focused on the nature of groups and organisations advocating a 
federalised Europe from the Second World War onwards. He concluded that ‘a 
combination of the inherent logic of a federal solution for Europe … [and] … the public 
support and promotion of federalism from politicians and intelligentsia’ led a strong drive 
towards the initiation of the European project with the treaties of Paris and Rome. 
 
Lipgens (1982: 85) argues that there were two main reasons why this groundswell of 
political and public opinion did not succeed in achieving its goal of a federalised 
European state. The first of these was an antipathy from the US and USSR, who were 
both averse towards the ideas of an integrated, stronger Europe. By the time the Cold 
War had swung American opinion in favour of a stronger more unified Europe, there was 
a new obstacle in many Western European governments’ reluctance to surrender national 
influence. Lipgens (1982: 120) argues that countries such as France, Britain, and 
Scandinavia, proved to be ‘bastions of stubborn nationalistic traditions and illusions 
which refused to face realistically such facts as the decline of Europe’.  
 
Despite the objections to federalisation from many states, Lipgens (1980: 12) argues that 
‘increasingly successful lobbying made a big contribution to the integration effort 
between 1950-54’. Pressure groups such as the Union Européene de Fédéralistes (UEF) 
played a vital part in the processes of European integration and Lipgens (1980: 12) states 
that ‘one cannot understand or describe the pre-history of the European movement or its 
beginnings without studying the activity of these groups’. As evidence of this, the 1952 
European Defence Community Treaty had a clause written into it that required the 
shaping of a European constitution as an: 
 
… organisation which will take the place of the present transitional 
organisation should be conceived so as to be capable of constituting one of 
the elements of an ultimate federal or confederation structure based upon 
the principle of separation of powers and including, particularly, a 
bicameral representative system. 
(US Senate, 1952) 
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Dedman (2010: 10) is critical of Lipgen’s (1982) assessment of the role that lobbying 
groups such as the UEF played in the integration process, pointing to the fact that the 
French national assembly ultimately rejected the constitution clause in the 1952 European 
Defence Community Treaty.  Indeed Lipgens (1982) himself goes on to state that the 
federalist movement and its associated organisation had little influence over the principal 
initial integration treaties of Rome in 1957. Dedman (2010: 11) concludes that whilst 
Lipgen’s (1982) theory of integration driven by  the pressure of a European Federalist 
movement may be interesting, it ‘inevitably ignore[s] all the evidence from national 
governments’ archives that reveal the internal debates over policy options and objectives 
[many of which] did not (rhetoric aside) include ‘federation’’.  
 
In place of both the traditional, political science approach to inevitable integration, and to 
Lipgen’s (1982) theory of Federalist movements, Dedman (2010: 11) describes what he 
calls the ‘Milward thesis’ which views the process of European integration through the 
lens of contemporary historical accounts. In large part, the Milward thesis grew from 
material released under the 30-year disclosure of information rule in the UK, which 
provided a range of government documents on the initial processes of post-war European 
integration.  These documents, along with accounts from other European states, produce 
an account based almost solely on what Milward (1984) and Dedman (2010: 11), both 
economic historians, describe as empirical evidence.  
 
Milward (1984) and Dedman (2010) disagree with positions that base their assumptions 
around inevitability of ‘the demise of the nation state and creation of a new supranational 
… or federal United states of Europe’ (Dedman, 2010:11). Rather, they argue that 
‘European integration only occurs when and only works when it is actually needed by the 
nation states’ (Dedman, 2010: 11). Supranational organisations support the apparatus and 
requirements of the state at a regional or international level, and states then use these 
organisations ‘for their own specific purposes’ rather than as ‘a step towards the 
submission and eclipse of the nation state within federal Europe’ (Dedman, 2010: 12). 
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The example of national interest as the driver for integration is also described by Lynch 
(1984: 242, cited in Dedman, 2010: 54), who argues that the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) was created under a ‘smoke screen of idealist European Rhetoric’ 
which was designed to disguise the fact that it was actually a highly politically motivated 
act. The establishing of a single market gave France access to the vast reserves of 
German coal, coke and steel that it had been paying vastly inflated prices for, some 46% 
higher than paid in Germany (Dedman, 2010: 54-55).  
 
As well as playing to the advantage of French post-war economic and physical 
reconstruction, the ECSC was also welcomed by the USA who were seeking assurances 
that the money paid to Europe though the Marshall Plan would go towards ‘creating a 
European Framework to contain Germany’ (Dedman, 2010: 54). Together, these factors 
lead Dedman (2010: 44) to argue that the process of establishing the ECSC was actually a 
‘French attempt to reshape Europe’s economic and political environment to suit the needs 
of the French domestic economy’. 
 
This approach bears similarity with the neorealist model of global governance, in 
particular with Messner and Nuscheler’s (2002: 136) form of ‘horizontal self control’ in 
which collective organisations such as the EU operated as extensions of states. These 
bodies legitimately increase states’ power on the international stage without removing 
any significant element of authority or, in Europe’s case moving towards federalism. 
Indeed, Milward (1984) and Dedman (2010: 12) argue that ‘far from advancing the cause 
of federation’ the process of integration actually ‘rescued the nation state’. 
 
Dedman (2010) gives the example of the Federal Republic of Germany to show how 
European integration did not lead to federalism but allowed the development of a new 
politically distinct entity. A process that began with the West German state regaining 
control of its steel and coal production under the ECSC eventually led to the Bonn 
Agreements of 1955 and the restoring of ‘full sovereignty … in foreign affairs and 
national defence’ (Dedman, 2010: 13). Dedman (2010: 13) claims that it was only the 
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European framework that allowed West Germany to emerge from its post-war political 
confinement and become a distinct state within the context of a new integrated Europe.   
 
For Dedman (2010: 12), ‘whether in the EEC [European Economic Community] of the 
1960s or European Union of the 1990’s, power remains with the nation states’. Despite 
this emphasis on the powerful role played by nation states, both Milward (1984) and 
Dedman (2010) also identify the state as having undergone some change through the 
various stages of European integration. The restructuring of Western Europe 
economically and structurally after the Second World War, they argue, ‘often required 
international solutions’ (Dedman, 2010: 12). The mutual dependence of Western 
European states meant that they were reliant upon an economic revival to drive national 
development at a sufficient pace. The development of the ECSC in 1951, the first real 
treaty to signify the modern phase of European integration, is an example of how a 
common market in coal and steel provided international structures for national 
development. 
 
Despite Dedman’s (2010) focus on the continued dominance of the state, the role of 
economic development and an increasingly global political arena must not be 
underestimated in European development. Dedman’s (2010) own analysis points to an 
economic imperative in early European integration spearheaded by a small number of 
states, particularly France. Consequently, a form of core-periphery model similar to 
Shaw’s (2002) approach believes strong states aggregate on issues of national interest, 
then either force or entice other states to join them.  
 
Kahler and Lake (2003: 435) claim that ‘most authors have taken Europe as an example 
of advanced Globalisation’ insofar as it represents an integrated poltical, economic and 
cultural exchange. For Held and McGrew et al (2001: 49), the processes of integration 
that are typified in Europe are part of a ‘fundamentally interconnected global order, 
marked by intense patterns of exchange as well as by clear patterns of power, hierarchy 
and unevenness’. As the advanced core-periphery model in Figure 16, Chapter 4 points 
out, ideological and physical control often functions as complex set of relationships 
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between different states and Kahler and Lake (2003: 435) argue that while states clearly 
maintain a significant element of control they ‘have clearly grown more porous over the 
last decades’. 
 
For McNamara (2003: 355), the driving force for European integration, particularly in 
terms of monetary union, is a complex process that is the result of both ‘the 
institutionalist logic of market integration’ as well as a ‘choice to build institutional 
capacity at an EU level’ (2003: 357). States, she argues, are compelled to act in order to 
maintain market position in the face of growing global competition. 
 
There is a contrary position to the statist model of Milward (1984) and Dedman (2010), 
or the globalising models of Held and McGrew et al (2001) and McNamara (2003), that 
views Europe and particularly the European Parliament as a genuine attempt to introduce 
democratic politics above the level of the nation state. Keane (2009: 825-6) talks of the 
European Parliament as ‘the world first ever example’ of a regional parliament, and cites 
it as an instance of what he calls a ‘monitory’ democratic system with the ability to offer 
a check to the wider neoliberal global market. Similarly, Smith (2007: 204) cites 
Todorov’s (2005: 51) hailing of a ‘tranquil power’ in the EU, which stands in defence of 
democracy and justice. He goes on to argue himself that ‘the European union has gone 
much further than the united states in envisaging and partly implementing decent 
democracy’ (Smith, 2007: 204).  
 
For Milward (1989) and Dedman (2010), the European Union is an extension of states, 
and for Held and McGrew et al (2001) it is a response to globalising pressures. However, 
in a broader reading, the EU and its Parliament also contain the potential to represent a 
significant move towards internationalising democracy.  If the role of the Parliament is 
effective enough in the structures of the EU, then it should provide a route for citizens to 
influence decision making above the level of nation states. It is the debate on the 
Parliament’s role that makes an historical analysis such an important part of immanent 
criticism.  The development of the Parliament and the ways in which its role is integrated 
into decision making indicate how far its processes allow genuine democracy at a 
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regional level. More than this, the ways in which authority is shared in the EU may shed 
light on the wider future of democracy in a global world, as Kahler and Lake (2003: 437) 
claim, it ‘will remain a bellwether in assessing the response of democratic electorates to 
expanded governance that does not immediately acquire the form of national 
parliamentary democracy’. 
 
 
5.3. The historical development of the European Parliament  
 
On the 1
st
 November 1993, the Treaty on European Union came into force, representing a 
significant step towards a European governance structure that began in 1951 with the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Dedman (2010: 7) argues that the 
development of a unified Europe was a markedly different process from that which 
formed organisations such as the OECD and NATO. For Dedman (2010: 7) the 
difference is between interdependence and integration. The former is a process 
associated with mutual need, in which states act together to find solutions to common 
problems, whilst the latter more accurately describes a process in which aspects of states 
governance are centrally controlled.    
 
In contrast to bodies such as the OECD and NATO that are characterised by collective 
action and integration of state needs, Dedman (2010) claims that the growth of the 
European Union and its Parliament represents a process of integration that deals with 
wider issues of governance. This process is distinct from the forms of interdependence 
that had previously characterised the relationships between states as it involved the 
‘creation of a supranational organisation … [where]  ... the member states transfer some 
policy decisions to a body of all member states’ (Dedman, 2010: 7).  
 
McAllister (1997) describes how it is possible to trace back the process of successful 
post-war European integration to the 1950s. He describes how Robert Schuman, the 
former French Prime Minister and then Foreign Minister, pushed for a collective 
European body to deal with the redevelopment of post-war Europe, announcing that ‘it is 
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no longer the time for vain words, but for a bold act – a constructive act’ (McAllister, 
1997: 11). The Schuman Declaration as it came to be known, was inaugurated in the 
1951 Treaty of Paris and created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a 
‘common market for coal, steel, coke, iron ore and scrap between France, German, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy’ (Dedman, 2010:51). Importantly for 
many members of the ECSC, it allowed access at a reduced price to the large deposits of 
coke and iron ore in Germany that were needed for reconstruction.  
 
The ECSC was not however the first attempt at federalising Europe. In 1949, the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) sought a move towards 
greater economic integration, its failure partially attributed to the 30% devaluation of the 
British Pound in the same year (McAllister, 1997, 11-12; Guardian, 1949). A year after 
the failure of the OEEC, the French rejected a Franco-German union suggested by the 
then German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. As well as these, there were also failures by a 
preliminary Council of Europe to act as a genuine collective body, or as McAllister 
(1997: 12) describes it, ‘the political germ of a European federation, with limited but real 
powers’. 
 
Although the process of economic and trade integration in Europe had a stuttering start, 
the progress of military cooperation had a more successful beginning. Many Western 
European nations were motivated into action by the advances of the Soviet Union, 
typified by the blockade of Berlin and the ‘Prague Coup’ which established communist 
control over then Czechoslovakia. These military and political advances from the Soviet 
Union effectively increased the pace of military cooperation and led to the establishing of 
several military pacts, most notably an agreement for ‘collective self defence’ in the 
Brussels pact of 1948,  which led to the subsequent establishing of NATO the year after 
(McAllister, 1997: 12). 
 
For a time, these cooperative military organisations were the most successful methods of 
collectivising action in Europe, but despite this, they fall firmly into Dedman’s (2010: 7) 
category of interdependence insofar as they represent intentions of support and assistance 
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rather than an integration of purpose. Although this military cooperation was a relatively 
successful example of joint decision making, it did not prejudice continued movement 
towards establishing governance bodies that stressed integration over interdependence.  
 
Another senior French politician, Jean Monnet the head of the French National Planning 
Commission, matched the emphasis on integration that Schuman took into developing the 
ECSC. Monnet fought for and eventually established a High Authority of the ECSC, an 
oversight body that made the ECSC the first successful ‘regulated market-sharing 
arrangement under supranational control’ (Dedman, 2010: 55). Along with the High 
Authority, the Treaty of Paris (1951) that established the European Coal and Steel 
Community also set up a Common Assembly, a collective body to help oversee the wider 
integration process and management of resources. This collective authority was a 
consultative body of 78 members drawn from the national parliaments of the six member-
states. Although it had an oversight role, there was little functional power; nevertheless, 
its inaugural meeting on 10
th
 September 1952 was effectively the beginnings of what 
became the European Parliament. 
 
The progress of integration in Europe that began with the Treaty of Paris and the ECSC 
in 1951 continued with the Treaties of Rome (1957a and 1957b), which established ‘a 
new legal system and framework to regulate both the institutions and members powers, 
rights and obligations’ (Dedman, 2010: 8). These two treaties created the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Community (Euratom), and were 
signed by the six countries of ‘little Europe’ that had been part of the original ECSC.  
 
The more important of the two treaties of Rome established the EEC as a ‘common 
market in manufactured goods with a common agricultural policy’ (Dedman, 2010: 82),  
whilst the Euratom Treaty set up a common market and equal access to stocks of fissile 
materials.  Despite the importance of these treaties, Dedman (2010: 82-3) argues that they 
were ‘mainly a statement of intent’ rather than a ‘detailed comprehensive blueprint’. 
They did however, set out plans for establishing a more comprehensive union based on 
economic and commercial expansion in Europe. 
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After the initial statement of members at the start of the Treaty Establishing the EEC 
(Treaty of Rome 1957a: 11) the first line of the treaty proper states its intention to ‘lay 
the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. Article 2 sets out 
in more detail the economic nature of this union, emphasising its focus on establishing a 
common market in the European Economic Community:  
 
The community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market 
and progressively approximating the economic principles of Member 
states, to promote throughout the community a harmonious development 
of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase 
in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer 
relations between the states belonging to it. 
(Treaty of Rome 1957a: 15) 
 
Although economics was the primary focus for integration in the Treaty of Rome, 
establishing the EEC was a significant development in the overall process of European 
integration. It formed a common set of rules for members, typified in the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), as well as reiterating an intention to establish a governing 
body to help oversee integration and functions, and a court of justice to settle disputes. 
The Treaty of Rome provided a legal mandate for these bodies, affording them political 
presence and the ability to ‘act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it’ (Treaty 
of Rome 1957a: 16). 
 
The decision-making processes of the newly established EEC relied upon a Commission 
that was ‘the central concept behind the integrated organisation’ (Dedman: 2010: 83). 
The Commission acted as both civil service and primary governance structure for the 
EEC, pursuing its interests and initiating policy. Policy debate took place through a 
Council of Ministers made up from members chosen by individual states, and who 
remained closely associated with those national parties.  Despite the continued influence 
from member states in the Council of Ministers and the Commission, these bodies 
‘constituted [a] supranational integrated element in the Rome Treaties’ and were regarded 
by many as the engine of the EEC and an ever closer union’ (Dedman, 2010: 84). The 
introduction of the Treaties of Rome in the 1950s also established an assembly that 
 134 
incorporated the 78 members of the already functioning Common Assembly of the ECSC 
along with delegates responsible for the EEC and Euratom. The resulting body had 142 
participants from member states, and although it only functioned as what Hix et al (2007: 
13) call a ‘purely consultative institution’, it had some power to act as a check and 
balance to the overall authority of the Commission. In its first meeting this body voted to 
change its name to the ‘European Parliament’ (Hix et al, 2007: 13).  
 
The period between the Treaties of Rome in 1957 and the first enlargement of the EEC in 
1973 caused a great deal of negotiation and disagreement on the direction that the new 
supranational organisation should take. In a series of summits, the most important of 
which was in Hague in December of 1969, the six member states set out their 
commitment to the common market. They established a 10-year plan that emphasised an 
ongoing commitment to European integration, thereby ‘paving the way for a United 
Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow’ (The Hague 
Summit, 1969: 12). 
 
As well as a commitment to strengthening the future of Europe, the Hague Summit also 
introduced plans for the introduction of a European Monetary Union (EMU) and the 
beginning of successful negotiations on membership for United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Denmark, and Norway. French President Charles de Gaulle had twice previously used his 
absolute veto to end these negotiations, but the eventual successful admission of more 
members in the EEC started a phase of expansion (McAllister, 1997: 51).  
 
Although the Hague Summit made some great strides towards European integration, it 
contained little reference to the European Parliament other than strengthening some of its 
budgetary powers and a commitment to study ‘the problem of direct elections’ (The 
Hague Summit, 1969: 15). The summit did however include statements made by the 
Heads of State or senior representatives from each of the EEC members, which were 
supportive of strengthening the Parliament. In the opening address to that portion of the 
Hague conference, P.J. S. de Jong, Prime Minister of the Netherlands and the 
representative of the Dutch government, stated that: 
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…‘substantial further integration is virtually out of the question unless it is 
brought under parliamentary control… [so that] … peoples, in their turn, 
to be able to influence integrated policy at European level through normal 
democratic procedures. 
(The Hague Summit, 1969:32-3) 
 
Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, was less specific on the 
democratic nature of the Parliament but supported a strengthening of its role as a 
budgetary check against the working of the Council and Commission, arguing that: 
 
…the powers of the European Parliament be broadened, particularly 
by giving it budgetary control. 
 (The Hague Summit, 1969: 40). 
  
Mariano Rumor, the Italian Prime Minister in his statement reflected what he felt were 
the growing voices in support of the Parliament and the growing movement for a 
strengthening of democracy within the new structures of European governance: 
 
…we cannot indeed remain unaware that in each of our countries 
increasingly authoritative and numerous voices call for the control of the 
Community, with all the resources which are or will be at its disposal by a 
Parliament elected by the people. 
(The Hague Summit, 1969: 45-6) 
 
More vociferously than many other ministers at the conference, Pierre Werner, Prime 
Minister of Luxembourg, made the case for establishing the Parliament as a fully active 
and representative member of the European system: 
 
…Economic, monetary and financial strengthening is to be matched 
by a reinforcement of the institutional provisions of the Treaties to 
increase the powers and competence of the European Parliament and make 
provision for a first step towards the election of its members by direct 
universal suffrage  
(The Hague Summit, 1969: 51) 
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The strengthening of the Parliament’s powers in the Hague Summit was reinforced a year 
later in the Luxembourg Treaty (1970) which established a common budget for the 
ECSC, Euratom and EEC. The Treaty of Luxembourg established a level of direct 
involvement of the Parliament in the overall budget of these European Communities by 
giving it the right to: 
 
…amend the draft administrative budget, acting by a majority of its 
members, and to propose to the Council, acting by an absolute majority of 
the votes cast, modifications to the draft budget relating to expenditure 
necessarily resulting from this Treaty or from acts adopted in accordance 
therewith. 
(Treaty of Luxembourg, 1970) 
 
The first enlargement of the EEC for which The Hague Summit paved the way occurred 
on 1
st
 January 1973 when the UK, Denmark, and Ireland joined the EU (McAllister, 
1997: xxii). This succession also meant the Parliament grew from 142 members to 198 
representatives, part of a steady increase in its power and representative influence.  
 
The period between the first enlargement in 1973 and the subsequent treaty establishing 
the European Union proper at Maastricht was characterised by a global economic 
recession, various crisis in energy prices, the Yom Kippur war, and high levels of 
unemployment across Europe. Nevertheless, the European project continued and the 1979 
Paris summit culminated in agreement for eventual accession of Greece to the 
Community and, importantly for this account, the first direct elections to the Parliament 
(Hix et al, 2007: 13; McAllister, 1997: xxiii-xxiiv). The introduction of direct elections in 
June 1979 meant the Parliament’s numbers more than doubled, rising from 198 to 410. 
This increased to 434 with the eventual accession of Greece in 1981. These first elections 
were an important stage in the Parliament’s democratic and legislative evolution, as it 
meant that for the first time the Parliament had, as Hix et al (2007: 14) call it,  a ‘source 
of legitimacy that is independent from national governments and national parliaments’.  
 
The inclusion of Portugal and Spain meant successive enlargements of the Parliament, 
bringing membership up to 518. The reunification of Germany in 1994 then increased 
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this to 567 (Hix et al, 2007: 13). Within this period of rapid expansion for the Parliament, 
there were two important pieces of European legislation that strengthened the 
Community as a whole and increased the Parliament’s hereto absent influence over the 
legislative procedure.  The first of these was the introduction of the Single European Act 
that came into force in 1987 and gave the Parliament a chance to read bills before the 
Council passed them as law. The Single European Act significantly strengthened the 
Parliament’s powers, and Article 7 clearly includes it in the legislative process, stating 
that: 
 
The council, acting by a qualified majority … on a proposal from the 
commission and after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament, 
shall adopt a common position.  
(Single European Act, 2005: 5) 
 
This agreement represented a strong move towards European integration that moved 
beyond economic, fiscal, and military cooperation (Hix et al, 2007: 14).  Although by no 
means it brought the Parliament on par with either Council or the Commission, it did for 
the first time give the Parliament the ability to return legislation to the Council where, in 
order for it then to be passed it required a unanimous vote (Single European Act, 1987: 
6).  
 
The second important piece of legislation at this time was the Treaty on European Union 
devised at Maastricht. Signed in 1992 and eventually enforced in 1993, Maastricht 
signalled the transition from the European Economic Community (EEC) to the European 
Union (EU). As well as establishing the European Union proper, the Treaty on European 
Union (1992) signed at Maastricht established the European Union proper, and further 
strengthened the Parliament’s role in the decision-making process.  
 
The Maastricht treaty redesigned the shape of the European project, creating a new Union 
with a greater degree of political as well as economic integration.  As part of the political 
restructuring, Maastricht empowered the European Parliament to engage more fully in the 
political and decision-making structures of the EU, requiring the Council of Ministers to 
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inform or consult the Parliament on the decisions it took, including the appointment of a 
Commission President (Treaty on European Union, 1992: 16). Importantly, Maastricht 
developed the process of cooperation between the Council and the Parliament. In an 
update to the Single European Act, a process of codecision was introduced which gave 
the Parliament greater influence in decision making (Hix et al, 2007: 11). Codecision 
went on to form the basis of the Parliament’s legislative relationship within the EU. 
 
As well as codecision, the Treaty on European Union (1992) established the concept of 
‘Citizenship of the Union’. For the first time citizens of member states were also 
European citizens, thereby establishing a concept of legitimacy in democratic governance 
and affording citizens direct representation and accountability in the EU’s decision-
making processes: 
 
…  every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is 
not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in 
elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he 
resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. 
(Treaty on European Union, 1992: 7)  
 
The Maastricht Treaty was one of the most significant developments in European Union 
integration, particularly in terms of the Parliament and its role in democratic governance. 
The increased involvement of the Parliament in the politics of the Union as a whole was 
evident in 1995 when the enlarged 567 members rejected a piece of legislation for the 
first time. Directive 95/62/EC on voice telephony had proposed ‘universal service for 
telecommunications in the perspective of a fully liberalized environment [as] an essential 
element of the information society’ (European Parliament, 1999). However, the 
Parliament in its deliberation over the referred bill had expressed a number of concerns, 
including the potential for unequal access that a deregulated telecommunications market 
could create. The official report on the communications between the Commission and the 
Parliament made clear that the Parliament ‘pointed repeatedly to the danger of 
exacerbating social divisions should liberalization lead to unequal access to the 
telecommunications infrastructures and services’ (European Parliament, 1999). 
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The Parliament’s concern that the voice telephony bill took only ‘minimal account … of 
social needs’ meant that the directive was returned to the commission with a number of 
amendments that reassert its comitment to ‘a universal service worthy of the name’ 
(European Parliament, 1999). Hix (2007: 14) argues that this first rejection of a bill was a 
landmark occasion for the Parliament and set a ‘precedent that the council cannot act 
unilaterally under codecision’s procedure’ (Hix et al 2007: 14).  
 
The activity that followed the Maastricht treaty in 1993 represented an important stage in 
the development of the Parliament as a functioning body, and cemented the change from 
its role as a group of oversight bodies for the ECSC and Euratom to an integrated part of 
the EU’s governance structure. As well as the rejection of the voice telephony bill, the 
mid 1990’s also included the first meaningful participation of the Parliament in the 
investiture and subsequent removal of a Commission and its President. 
 
Under the new investiture procedure of the Maastricht treaty, the Parliament gained the 
right to be consulted on the appointment of a President to the European commission as 
well as the ability to veto on the appointment of the President of the European 
Commission as well as members of the Commission as whole (Hix et al, 2007: 186). In 
the discussions to replace the outgoing Jacques Delors following the 1994 elections to the 
European Parliament, Jacques Santer, a Christian Democrat and Prime Minister of 
Luxembourg, found himself in a commanding position , enjoying support from the heads 
of the European States and the backing of the Parliament’s centre right parties. Despite 
disquiet from the socialist and more radical left of the European Parliament on the 
openness of the deal to present him as a candidate, Santer eventually received a majority 
vote in the Parliament and became President of the Commission (Hix et al, 2007: 186-7).  
 
It was not long, however, before, a number of crises in the Commission ensued, including 
criticism over its handling of the BSE crisis and banning of beef exports from Britain in 
1996. A much more serious set of allegations on financial irregularities followed, in 
particular on the way the Commission had implemented the 1996 budget and allegations 
of ‘fraud, mismanagement and nepotism’ (Committee of Independent Experts, 1999a: 
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27). The European Parliament refused to discharge the 1996 budget and a Committee of 
Independent Experts investigated the irregularities on behalf of the Parliament. Although 
the findings put no blame on any individual commissioner, it did uncover: 
 
… instances where Commissioners or the Commission as a whole bear 
responsibility for instances of fraud, irregularities or mismanagement in 
their services or areas of special responsibility 
(Committee of Independent Experts, 1999a:137) 
 
The report was leaked a day before its official publication, and on hearing that the 
Parliament would vote to censure it, the Commission resigned en masse. A second 
investigation into the Santer Commission reasserted the role of the Parliament, stating 
that ‘the Commission is accountable to the European Parliament ... [and] … is under a 
constitutional duty to be fully open with Parliament’ (Committee of Independent Experts, 
1999b: 38). 
 
The Parliament’s actions over the issues with the Santer Commission and the subsequent 
reports reaffirming its position in the structures of the European Union helped to assert its 
transition into a legitimate part of the governance structure. Hix et al (2007: 15-16) argue 
that the investiture and then dismissal of Santer and his commission  amounted to a ‘de-
facto’ right of the European Parliament to veto the choice of Commission President’. This 
right was formalised in the Treaty of Amsterdam that came into legislative force in 1999, 
amending and consolidating the initial Treaty of the European Union.   
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) formalised the codecision procedure that had begun 
with Maastricht. The new procedures meant legislation needed to achieve a qualified 
majority in the Council and a simple majority in the Parliament in order to pass (Hix et 
al, 2007: 20). Hix et al (2007: 21) argue that this formalisation of the right to reject 
legislation meant the European Parliament ‘developed significant independent legislative 
amendment and agenda-setting powers’, even though the Commission retained the 
exclusive right to initiate legislation. 
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The official inclusion of the Parliament in the decision-making processes afforded it and 
the overall Union democratic legitimacy. For the first time, European citizens had official 
representation in the governance structures of the EU, and there was a route to political 
accountability for politicians.  In recent years, the Parliament has continued its transition 
from ‘simply a rubber stamp’ to a body ‘independent of the executive’ (Hix et al, 2007: 
20). In 2004, the proposed Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe set out a 
constitutional basis for the formalisation of the Union. Its opening statement claimed that 
it was: 
 
Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future, 
this Constitution establishes the European Union, on which the Member States 
confer competences to attain objectives they have in common.  
(European Union, 2004: 11) 
 
Despite claims that it was representing the collective will of citizens, French and Dutch 
voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty in referendum in 2005. In its place, the Lisbon 
Treaty (2007) sought to solve many of the same issues as the constitution, but in a 
different framework that was more acceptable to those countries that had rejected the 
original Treaty. Foremost amongst Lisbon’s roles was to manage the accession of new 
member states, although Dedman (2010: 178) argues that ‘the Lisbon treaty is not 
required for the EU to operate … the Nice Treaty has perfectly adequate provision in 
place to allow the EU to grow to 30 states’. Nevertheless, Lisbon represented a rewriting 
of the EU’s major treaties, replacing both the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty passed into law on 1
st
 December 2009, its main aims reflected in its 
four stated goals: a desire to create ‘a more democratic and transparent Europe; A more 
efficient Europe; A Europe of rights and values, freedom, solidarity and security; Europe 
as an actor on the global stage’ (Europa, 2010a). A formalising of power sharing in 
decision-making structures helped to formalise a commitment to democracy and social 
rights, as did the further commitments on ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ 
(Lisbon Treaty, 2007: 232). 
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As the goals of the Lisbon Treaty show, many of its aims attempted to strengthen the 
image of the European Union as a legitimate governance structure. This was emphasised 
in one of the many official companion documents to the Treaty, which stated that Lisbon: 
 
…makes the EU more democratic, efficient and transparent. It gives 
citizens and parliaments a bigger input into what goes on at a European 
level, and gives Europe a clearer, stronger voice in the world, all the while 
protecting national interests.  
(European Commission, 2009: 18) 
 
One of the ways in which Lisbon worked towards greater integration of democracy in the 
EU was by further strengthening the European Parliament’s role in decision-making. 
Lisbon reinforced the important principle of codecision between the Parliament and the 
Council, making it an ‘ordinary legislative procedure [which] will extend to new policy 
areas such as freedom, security and justice’ (European Commission, 2009: 12).  This 
prominence is evident in the final act of the Treaty, which reaffirms a commitment by the 
Council to ‘devote every effort to strengthening the democratic legitimacy of decisions 
taken by a qualified majority’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007: 250).  
 
Although there is a strong emphasis on democracy and codecision in the Lisbon Treaty, a 
critical reading also reveals importance placed on changing a number of protocols 
involving member states.  At the same time as reinforcing the role of democracy, Lisbon 
gave more power to individual member states as part of a desire to: 
 
…encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities 
of the European Union and to enhance their ability to express their views 
on draft legislative acts of the European Union as well as on other matters 
which may be of particular interest to them. 
(Lisbon Treaty, 2007: 148). 
 
This seeming return to a system where states exercise a more direct hand in the processes 
of legislation appears to run counter to the expressed commitment for increasing 
democratic accountability and a wider remit for the Parliament. Nevertheless, there is 
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support for the position of states as the ultimate sources of authority in official 
companion documents to the Lisbon Treaty: 
 
A basic rule is that the EU will only be able to exercise those powers that 
have been conferred on it by the Member States. It must respect the fact 
that all other powers rest with the Member States.  
(European Commission, 2009: 14) 
 
Although there are some mixed messages on the role that the Parliament, the Council and 
member states play in EU decision making, the Lisbon treaty does attempt to separate the 
legislative influences of centralised EU structures and member states into clear but 
overlapping spheres of influence. This is an important move towards having a clearly 
structured decision-making process, in which the role that European democracy plays is 
both well defined and transparent.  Where ‘member states have primary responsibility in 
fields such as health, education and industry’, it is the EU that holds ‘exclusive charge 
over areas such as competition rules, monetary policy of the Euro area and the common 
commercial policy’ (European Commission, 2009: 14). In areas with no clear distinction 
such as agriculture, transport, and the internal market, then the ‘EU and the Member 
States share competence’ (European Commission, 2009: 14). 
 
Lisbon effectively established the EU and EP as a legitimate governance structure. It 
outlined a clear sphere in which the EU maintains primary authority, and although this is 
less than envisaged in the initial EU constitution, it nevertheless created the Union as a 
democratic governance structure with normative, albeit limited, authority. Within this, the 
Parliament performs a specific function in the decision-making process, thereby 
formalising the role of democracy in the EU. The amendments to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010) which followed on from Lisbon help 
to reinforce this role for democracy. The amendments clearly emphasise the rights and 
responsibilities of citizens of the European Union, which are: 
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… based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the 
individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of 
the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice. 
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010: 391) 
 
Together, the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and the reworking of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (2010) form the basis for the principle of a European 
citizenry, represented through the European Parliament. After successive stages of 
enlargement, the Parliament now contains 736 members and represents over 500 million 
citizens from 27 Member States (European Parliament, 2010a). The legislative remit of 
the Parliament now covers 83 areas, including areas of social policy; data protection; free 
movement; consumer protection; trans European networks; structural and cohesion funds; 
regulation of political funding; European administration; and the adoption of financial 
rule (Appendix 4 provides a full list of areas subject to codecision). 
 
 
5.4 The present structures of democracy and governance in the Union and 
Parliament 
 
The role that the European Parliament plays in the governance structure of the overall 
Union has changed dramatically since its original role as oversight body to the ECSC. 
The Lisbon Treaty gave the Parliament a significant role in the decision-making process, 
and whilst it is still only one part of that process, it has the ability to approve, alter, and 
reject legislation passed to it. Lisbon represents the latest stage in a long progression of 
European integration that began in 1951 with the Treaty of Paris and eventually the 
establishing of an integrated system of governance with responsibility for a number of 
areas of social, economic, and political life.   
 
The current system of governance in the European Union revolves around the process of 
codecision between the Parliament and the Council. Introduced in the Treaty on 
European Union (1993) at Maastricht, the principle of codecision created a bicameral 
system that meant the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament jointly made 
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decisions on legislation. Prior to this the Parliament was able to read bills before the 
council passed them to law and had the ability to reject the budget of the Union by 
majority vote, although in practise this meant little real influence (Hix et al, 2007: 14).  
 
Under the process of codecision in the Lisbon Treaty the European Commission, advised 
by the European Council, is the only body that can instigate draft legislation. The 
Parliament receives draft legislation first, and will then either agree it or make 
amendments. The draft passes over to the Council of Ministers who may agree with the 
Parliament, in which case it passes back to the Commission to be turned to law, or they 
may draw up a ‘common position’ of amendments that are then returned to the 
Parliament for consideration (European Parliament, 2010c). If Parliament agrees or 
chooses to take no stance on the common position, it again passes back to the 
Commission, but if there is still disagreement and further amendments are insufficient, 
legislation then goes to a conciliation committee comprising 27 members of both the 
Parliament and Council. This conciliation committee, advised by the Commission, will 
produce an agreed text which then returns to the Parliament who can either accept it, or  
canreject it by absolute majority, in which case it will be dismissed (European 
Parliament, 2010c).  
 
As well as strengthening codecision, the Lisbon Treaty defined a clear process through 
which member states also received draft legislative texts. Whilst states may not be able to 
vote on this legislation, it gives them the opportunity to liaise with their Council members 
on the direction they may wish them to take (Lisbon Treaty, 2007: 148). In its own 
literature, the European Union outlines the process of sending draft legislation to national 
parliaments: 
 
National parliaments will act as "watchdogs" … at an early stage of the 
decision-making procedure. All proposals from the Commission, 
initiatives from a group of Member States, initiatives from the European 
Parliament, requests from the Court of Justice, recommendations from the 
European Central Bank and requests from the European Investment Bank 
for adoption of a legislative act are to be sent to the national parliaments at 
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the same time as they are sent to the co-legislator (Council and 
Parliament) 
(European Commission, 2011) 
 
The formalisation of a role for both states and citizens effectively defines the remit of the 
EU. It comprises a relevant community unlike any other body, with separate institutions 
representing the wishes of member states and legally mandated European citizens. 
Together, these bodies share a large part of the legislative structure and give both parts of 
the EU’s relevant community the chance to participate in the governance process. 
 
Figures 17 and 18 (following) outline aspects of the EU’s legislative procedure, 
specifying the role that states and citizens play. Figure 17 depicts a simplified diagram of 
the codecision process, with the roles of each legislative body clearly identified. Figure 
18 puts this process into the wider context of the EU’s governance structures, displaying 
the relationships between different bodies in the EU. Figure 18 (following) also shows 
the different levels at which states and citizens may input into the legislative process.  
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Figure 17: The process of codecision 
Initial proposal put forward by the European Commission 
Parliament (1st reading) 
Makes any desired changes to draft 
Council of Ministers 
Examines draft 
Council approves 
Parliament’s draft and it is 
adopted 
Council does not approve 
Parliament’s draft, makes 
own amendments 
Parliament (2nd reading) 
 
Parliament 
approves 
redraft and it is 
adopted 
Parliament 
proposes own 
amendments 
Parliament 
rejects redraft 
and it is 
abandoned 
Proposal return to 
Commission for comment 
Council 
approves 
redraft and it is 
adopted 
Council rejects 
redraft and 
proposal goes 
to conciliation 
Amended proposal sent to 
Council of ministers 
Conciliation 
successful, 
proposal is 
adopted 
Conciliation 
unsuccessful, 
proposal is 
abandoned 
 
Source: Adapted by author (2011) from Europa (2009) 
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Council of Ministers 
The body comprises 27 government ministers 
representing each of the Member States.  It is a 
key decision-making body that coordinates the 
EU’s economic policies and plays a central role 
in foreign and security policy. Decision is 
increasingly by Majority voting, rather than 
unanimous decisions.  
European Parliament 
736 directly elected members representing the 
citizens of the Member States. The Lisbon 
Treaty reinforced the legislative powers of the 
European Parliament and increased the 
number of areas where the European 
Parliament shares the job of lawmaking with 
the Council of Ministers as well as increasing its 
role in approving the EU’s budget. 
 
The European Council 
(The President of the European Union) 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council 
became a full EU institution. It comprises the most 
senior elected political representatives of the 
Member States. Gives the EU its political direction 
and sets its priorities as well as representing the EU 
internationally. 
 
codecision 
Joint decision making on legislation and budgetary powers, 
as well as processes of conciliation when needed. 
 
 
 
Representation via 
national Parliaments 
Representation via directly 
elected of representatives  
Decisions passed to 
Commission, which 
passes them to law 
European court of 
justice 
Ensures European law is applied 
and interpreted correctly 
Advisory role to the 
commission but no 
power to force 
legislation 
Figure 18: The governance structure of the European Union after Lisbon 
Source:  Author (2011), using material from: Eurostat (2010); Europa (2010a); Nugent (2006: 399); Hix (1999: 6) 
501,259840 citizens  
 
27 member states 
 
Senior elected 
officials from 
member states 
represented in 
council 
Commission Initiates proposals, which are 
sent to the Council and the Parliament Legislation 
sent to 
member 
states for 
comment 
The Commission 
Comprises 27 Commissioners, one from each EU country, appointed by the European 
Council and then subject to a vote of approval by the European Parliament. Independently 
represent the interests of the EU as a whole, enforce the Unions policies, ensures that the 
budget is implemented, and represents the EU in international negotiations. It is the only EU 
institution with the power to initiate proposals for legislation.  
 
 
 
Legislative process indicated by red lines 
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For Hix et al (2007: 20), the reforms of codecision in Maastricht and Lisbon mean the 
‘EU legislative procedure is now a genuine bicameral procedure, under which the council 
and European Parliament have equal power’. As Figure 18 s however, there is far greater 
input for states into the governance structure than there is for citizens. State influence on 
the European Council, Commission, and Council of Ministers means that there is 
influence at every level of the EU structure. The Parliament, on the other hand, is the 
only body through which citizens may employ a direct voice, and even though it 
exercises significant powers to influence and even reject legislation; its lack of ability to 
initiate legislation effectively hampers the role of democratic governance. 
 
The European Parliament may adopt its own ‘resolutions’ or ‘initiative reports’ which, 
whilst not legally binding do indicate a desire for the Commission to initiate legislation in 
that area (Hix et al, 2007: 112). The Lisbon Treaty also created ‘citizens initiative’ in 
which a petition of one million signatures ‘allows for citizens of the EU to call on the 
Commission to bring forward new policy proposals’ (Europa 2010a). Despite this, states 
remain the dominant political entities in the Union’s structures. 
 
The model of one wholly elected chamber and one comprising selected representatives is 
not unique, for example, the Westminster model operates in the same way. What is 
unique about the governance structure of the European Union are the bodies it comprises. 
For the first time, a democratic institution in the Parliament stands along-side bodies 
representing the collective will of states. This governance structure serves to elevate the 
role of citizen in the international decision-making process. Whilst the Parliament is not 
as influential in the EU as states continue to be, its increasing role radically shapes the 
ways in which the governance of the European Union functions. 
 
 
5.5 Critical analysis of the development of governance and democracy in the 
European Parliament 
 
The development of the European Parliament as the primary democratic element of the 
European Union has been a slow process, and the history so far in this chapter shows how 
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the Parliament’s development from a set of oversight bodies to become a mandated part 
of the EU’s decision-making process. However, Horkheimer argues that we must not 
view the process of historical development as fact, but as a part of a managed history, 
which is a reflection of dominant ideological and cultural processes. In answer to this, 
Horkheimer (1992: 207) uses the concept of ‘conspicuous opposition’ as a method to 
questions historical accounts. In the case of this analysis of the European Parliament, this 
means examining the Parliament’s development in terms of its actual abilities to function 
as a democratic structure. The following parts of this chapter do this by using the three 
key principles of democracy developed in Chapter 3. These principles of legitimacy, 
representation, and accountability are a guide for areas to examine when assessing how a 
democratic system works and are discussed here in relation to the European Parliament. 
 
5.5.1 Legitimacy 
Democratic legitimacy in the European Union is an involved process, much of which 
relates to the changing role that the European Parliament plays in decision-making.  As 
Chapter 3 argued, legitimacy refers to the ways in which a body gains the right to 
represents its citizens. Legitimacy is evident in both the physical and ideological 
structures of a governance body, informing the ways in which it works as well as the 
philosophy under which it presents itself to citizens and to the wider world. These two 
aspects of legitimacy play different roles in the Parliament’s deployment, at different 
times shaping the ways in which democracy functions as part of the EU as a whole. 
 
The process of legitimating the European Union as a democratic governance body began 
with the ECSC and Euratom in the late 1940s. The emphasis at this first stage of 
European development was undoubtedly economic, as the need for reconstruction meant 
that states required access to materials and resources. Many elements of the initial treaties 
that became the EU did not include a tangible role for democracy, but concentrated on 
maintaining a collective agreement geared towards the regulation of specific materials. 
 
Democratic legitimacy was not a primary functional aspect in the early phases of 
European integration; however ideologically, democracy played an important part in 
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justifying the new bodies.  Although the impetus for cooperation at the time was 
primarily economic, pressure groups such as the Union Européene de Fédéralistes (UEF) 
and influential individuals such as Monnet advocated a more social agenda. The 
influence these bodies and individuals brought to bear was instrumental in the 
development of the oversight bodies that were part of the ECSC and Euratom. Despite 
the introduction of these oversight bodies however, governance relied almost solely on 
the signatory states. It was only though agreement by these states to allow some aspects 
of regulation to occur outside of their direct control that the collective bodies achieved 
any political legitimacy.  
 
Although the oversight bodies of the ECSC and Euratom had little influence 
procedurally, they did comprise parliamentary representatives of the six states that had 
signed the agreements. Because of this, they did constitute a new level of democratic 
European cooperation, the existence of which helped to maintain a discourse on the role 
that democracy could play in legitimating a genuine European-wide governance 
structure.  
 
The advent of the EEC in 1959 meant the combining of the various oversight bodies into 
a European Parliament, although Dedman (2010: 83) argues that this new Parliament had 
little more influence than the original bodies. However, by naming itself a parliament and 
by extending its membership, the ideological aspects of democracy championed by the 
UEF and those such as Monnet remained an important part of the integration process. 
Although the new Parliament lacked influence over the structures of the EEC, it 
maintained a strong ideological emphasis on the role democracy could play in 
legitimating European integration.  
 
The Single European act (1986/7) meant the EEC became the EU, and within this new 
body there waas a newly defined role for the European Parliament. Central to this role 
was the introduction of codecision, which allowed the Parliament to participate in the 
legislative process along with the Council of Ministers.  Codecision extended what 
legitimacy that Parliament gained though its democratic elections to the overall European 
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Union, introducing a limited but meaningful structural element of democracy to the 
ideological emphasis.  
 
There was further development in the structures of democratic legitimacy when the 
Treaty on European Union (1992) legally mandated a European citizenry to exist ‘under 
the same conditions as nationals of [a member] State’ (Treaty on European Union, 1992: 
7). The concept of a European citizen helped to legitimate the European Union as a 
governance body in its own right, with a democratic arm through which the new citizens 
could influence decision making. This Lisbon Treaty strengthened many of the structures 
within the EU, and created a governance body with clearly demarcated powers and 
responsibilities. The Lisbon Treaty overhauled the process of codecision through which 
the Parliament and Council of Ministers take join responsibility for shaping legislation. 
Under these reworked principles, an extended system of qualified majority voting that 
comes into force from 2014 involves what the EU calls a ‘double legitimacy’ as it 
requires ‘the support of 55 % of the Member States, representing at least 65 % of the 
European population’ (European Commission, 2009: 5).  
 
The concept of a double-legitimacy, which Figures 17 and 18 also display, is an 
important aspect in the EU’s own justifications of democratic legitimacy. Codecision 
represents the culmination of an ideological claim to legitimacy in which the role of the 
Parliament has slowly increased; however, at the same time these claims also show that 
the role of member states remains central to the functions of the EU. The EU is not a 
body that wholly represents citizens, indeed it was deliberately structured in order to limit 
the influence of citizens over decision making. Instead, the EU is a body that represents a 
relevant community of two distinct but highly interrelated groups: member states and 
European citizens.  
 
The divide between states and citizens is evident in the two most recent pieces of 
legislation that shape the EU’s structure. In the first instance, the reworked Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010: 391) emphasises the ‘principles of 
democracy and the rule of law’ as well as an established ‘citizenship of the Union’. This 
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document offers a clear ideological focus on democracy to match the structural 
development in Lisbon. At the same time however, Lisbon also emphasises the need to 
recognise the limits to its own influence and the ongoing role member states play in 
divesting power (European Commission, 2009: 14). 
 
There are two ways to view the division of influence in the EU in relation to aspects of 
democratic legitimacy. On the one hand, the EU represents an ongoing struggle between 
states and citizens, which have clearly demarcated ideas and roles. This approach 
presupposes a fundamental difference between states, pitting  the legitimacy of citizens 
against the legitimacy of states in a struggle for legislative authority in the EU. This 
interpretation is not necessarily representative of real-life relationships. While it is likely 
that there will be some difference between these two groups in what constitutes the best 
course of action, for example in how to reshape an economy to deal with a fiscal deficit, 
in practise there may often be many areas in which these two groups agree.  
 
An alternative reading of the divide in political authority in the EU is to view that body as 
representing a globalisation of authority that seeks to include democratic legitimacy as 
part of its process. As Figure 6 in Chapter 4 shows, states need to function on an 
international level in order to participate in the structures of a neoliberal global economy. 
By introducing a level of democracy into internationalised politics, the EU challenges the 
dominance of purely neoliberal structures, giving citizens a chance to participate in the 
decisions that shape their lives. As such, this is a structure not born from a market 
rationalisation, but from a wider ideal of what is right for both states and citizens.  
 
To a certain extent, the evidence in this chapter points towards the latter of these two 
explanations. There was no overwhelming push to increase the role of the Parliament, 
and it was not essential to the continued function of EU economic ties. However, the 
efficacy of democracy and democratic legitimacy depends on how far the Parliament 
integrates into the democratic process of the EU. If the Parliament has little functional 
input and is present in the EU simply because of its democratic credentials, then the 
legitimacy of governance is limited. If however, the Parliament plays a meaningful role 
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in decision making in which both elements of the relevant community participate in 
governance, the EU constitutes a unique type democratic global governance structure. 
 
It is possible to explore the Parliament’s integration by examining the role of 
representation and accountability. These principles of democracy identified in Chapter 3 
help to define the role democracy takes in decision making, and thereby show how far 
citizens are able to influence the political structures shaping their lives. 
 
5.5.2 Representation 
As the second key principle of democracy, representation deals with the ways in which a 
‘relevant community’ (Held 2002: 27) is able to participate in the structures of 
governance. Figure 4 in Chapter 3 shows how representation in a democratic governance 
structure is evident in two ways. Firstly, it is possible to tell how well representation 
occurs by examining  the scope of a democratic and the composition of its relevant 
community. Secondly, representation is evident in the remit of a democratic system; how 
far representative systems account for citizens.   
 
As the arguments already made on legitimacy show, what constitutes a relevant 
community in the EU has changed as the scope of the body developed. Initially, the 
relevant community constituted only those signatory states to the early treaties dealing 
with select trade regulation. The EU’s relevant community expand with the introduction 
of European citizenship, and a legally mandated role for citizens to whom the Parliament 
was directly responsible. This new expanded relevant community is evident in the EU’s 
decision-making structures, and Figures 17 and 18 describe how both states and citizens 
are now jointly involved in these processes. 
 
The combination of representation for both states and citizens in EU decision making 
shows the body to comprise a relevant community unlike that of any other governance 
structure. The EU adapts the bicermal model of many democratic states to construct a 
system with both macro and micro level representation. As Figure 18 shows, although 
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states have greater policy influence in EU structures, through the Parliament EU citizens 
enjoy a functional, if limited, representation in the decision-making process.  
 
The relevant community of the EU is fundamentally different from that of national 
democratic systems. It is not a traditional model writ large, but a combination of national 
and individual representation that gives states collective bargaining and a unified voice 
on the complex international stage, as well as providing citizens with a direct route for 
democratic representation above their national governments.  
 
It is not just the scope of representation that may show how well a democratic system 
performs, but also the remit of democracy within the structures of decision making.  The 
‘double legitimacy’ (European Commission, 2009: 5) that the EU claims is part of its 
structures operates through both states and the Parliament, although the Parliament 
remains the primary body representing citizens. One of the most significant ways in 
which democratic representation occurs in the Parliament is through elections, which 
occur at five-year intervals. The most recent elections in 2009 had an average turnout of 
43% across the 27 member states (European Union, 2009). A system of degressive 
proportionality allocates seats proportionately to the population of each member state, 
which means that ‘bigger Member States accept fewer seats than they would receive if 
the total were divided exactly in proportion to population, in order to allow for better 
representation of less-densely populated states’ (European Parliament, 2007).  The 
intention of degressive proportionality is to ensure that the allocation system is flexible 
enough to allow fair national representation and ‘enough seats to represent all major 
strands in the national political fabric’ (European Parliament, 2007). Figure 19 gives the 
resulting proportion of seats that each member state receives:  
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Figure 19: Number of European Parliament seats per country 
(2009 – 2014 parliamentary term) 
Germany 99 Austria 17 
France 72 Bulgaria 17 
Italy 72 Denmark 13 
United Kingdom 72 Finland 13 
Poland 50 Slovakia 13 
Spain 50 Ireland 12 
Romania 33 Lithuania 12 
Netherlands 25 Latvia 8 
Belgium 22 Slovenia 7 
Greece 22 Cyprus 6 
Hungary 22 Estonia 6 
Portugal 22 Luxembourg 6 
Czech Republic 22 Malta 5 
Sweden 18   
 
TOTAL 736 
Source: Europa, 2010b  
 
Although degressive proportionality assures some level of equality between states in the 
EU, it also means that European politics filters through a national framework. Citizens 
vote for political parties on a state level, and these votes then translate into a proportion 
of seats on a European level. This association between national and European politics has 
the potential to be highly detrimental for the Parliament’s attempts to function as a 
democratic body representing a clearly defined European citizenry.  
 
A further issue is the under-representation of citizens in the decision-making process. 
Although Figure 17 shows the significant role of the Parliament in codecision, when 
contrasting this with the overall structures in Figure 18, it is clear that citizens experience 
a lesser involvement than member states. The influence of states over codecision and 
over other bodies in the EU, such as the European Commission, allows them a greater say 
in the way that policy evolves.  
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There are some clear problems with representation in the EU, not least of which are the 
ongoing associations between national and European politics, and the less involved role 
the Parliament takes in decision making. Despite an unequal relationship, the 
Parliament’s role in codecision does mean a significant role for citizens in the governance 
structures of the EU. Extending a relevant community to encompass European citizens 
clearly shows the EU to have moved beyond its role as a regulatory body to encompass 
other aspects of democratic representation above the level of the nation state. Because of 
the Parliament’s role, the EU is different from any other governance structure, allowing 
states the ability to collectively bargain in a global market, whilst at the same time 
enabling citizens to exercise some democratic representation in those processes. 
However, the actual democratic success of this system relies on the functional 
relationships between democratic structures and citizens, and how well these allow 
citizens to participate in the governance process. 
 
5.5.3 Accountability: 
The third principle of democracy that Chapter 3 identifies is accountability. 
Accountability deals specifically with the functional and reciprocal relationship between 
the relevant community and those that are involved in the decision-making process. The 
ways in which systems and processes are accountable show how democracy integrates 
into decision making. 
 
As the previous section on representation argued, despite working on behalf of a pan-
European citizenry the European Parliament still often functions through the structures of 
member states. As with representation, there is a divide in accountability for elected 
MEPs between national and European structures. At a state level, the election of MEPs 
occurs through national political organisations, with members selected as part of these 
parties. Once in the European Parliament, MEPs join one of seven European political 
groupings that operate independently of the national political system.  Figure 20 
(following) displays the size of these European Parties a well as showing an indicative 
membership of national political parties. 
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Figure 20: Political groups in the European Parliament 
European political groupings   No. of seats National political party members 
Group of the European People's 
Party (Christian Democrats) 
265 
France:  New Centre Party 
Germany: Christian Democratic Union 
Group of the Progressive Alliance 
of Socialists and Democrats  
184 
UK: Labour 
France : Socialist Party 
Group of the Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for Europe 
84 
UK: Liberal Democrats 
Germany: The Free Democratic Party 
Group of the Greens/European 
Free Alliance 
55 
UK: SNP / The Green Party 
France: The Greens 
European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group 
55 
UK: Conservative / Ulster Unionists 
Poland: Law and Justice Party 
Confederal Group of the 
European United Left  
35 
UK: Sinn Fein  
France: The Left Front  
Europe of Freedom and 
Democracy Group 
32 
UK – UKIP 
Italy – Northern League 
Non-attached 26  
TOTAL 736  
Source: Europa, 2010b  
 
 
The association between national and European political parties remains a major barrier 
to creating an independent authority in the Parliament, as MEPs are subject to a duality of 
political identity in which there is the risk of conflict between national and European 
allegiance. Hix et al (2007: 133) describe a ‘principle-agent’ framework that explains 
how conflicting pressures influence decision making. On the one hand, MEPs have 
allegiance to a European political grouping through which they operate for the majority 
of the time in Europe, an allegiance which allows them to ‘secure policy and office goals 
inside the European Parliament’ (Hix et al, 2007: 134). On the other hand, the national 
political parties that elected MEPs retain significant influence over their political careers, 
as well as control over their future access to political office.  
 
Hix et al (2007: 137) conducted an analysis of voting patterns in the European Parliament 
and concluded that where there is a conflict in position, MEPs are more likely to vote 
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with their national party rather than their European political grouping. They argued that 
despite an ‘increasingly cohesive’ system in the Europeans parties, the national parties 
remain the ‘main aggregate actors in the European Parliament’ (2007: 145) as they can 
exert the most pressure on the future career of the MEP.  
 
Accountability in the European Parliament has developed through a gradual process of 
aggregation of influence from successive treaties. As with legitimacy and representation, 
there are however, some serious questions on the nature of the structures in place to 
manage the relationships between citizens and their elected representatives. Continued 
dominance of state-based systems means that a European citizenry might exist in 
principle, but there are barriers to its functions in practise. Although the Parliament does 
exert influence, there are questions over the levels of citizen’s democratic input, 
particularly in light of ongoing conflicts between national and European interests.  
 
 
5.6 Summary: the first stage of immanent criticism 
 
This chapter is the first phase of a three-stage immanent criticism, and it provides an 
historical basis for the Parliament’s functions and a starting point for their critique. As an 
historical analysis, the chapter applies Horkheimer’s (1992: 200) assessment of social 
objects located not only in time, but in particular sets of relationships which are ‘not the 
result of conscious spontaneity or the part of free individuals’ but ‘founded directly on 
oppression or been the blind outcome of conflicting forces’. Consequently, it imparts 
both an historical breakdown of the Parliament’s development as well as some critique of 
the claims of democracy made by its legislative structure. 
 
The Parliament’s growth was purposeful, shaped within the developing European Union 
in order to perform a particular role. After the initial treaties establishing the ECSC and 
Euratom, there was a slow process of developing the bodies that were to become the 
European Parliament. A more critical reading argues that this development was firmly 
under the guidance of dominant member states, and that these bodies sought the 
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legitimacy which a democratic institution such as the Parliament brought. As greater 
power was concentrated in the centralised EU structures, the democratic European 
Parliament afforded the project an air of accountability and legitimacy.  
 
The EU argues that the bicameral governance structure of the Parliament and Council 
accords its citizens a ‘double legitimacy of the people (as represented by their MEPs in 
the European Parliament) and the Member States (as represented by the Ministers in the 
Council)’ (European Commission, 2009: 16). As this chapter has argued however, this 
claim of double legitimacy for European citizens is questionable, and the study carried 
out by Hix et al, (2007: 134) certainly suggests that where there is a difference of opinion 
between national and European parties, the national party prevails.  
 
Despite the continued dominance of states, Lisbon did strengthen the Parliament’s role in 
decision making. Codecision gives the Parliament and the Council of Ministers the ability 
to adapt and reject proposals. Although the influence of citizens through the Parliament is 
less than that of states, there is a real route for participation in governance. This 
representation gives the EU a degree of both accountability and legitimacy, but crucially 
it also introduces the idea of democratic governance above the level of the state. The 
Parliament’s role imports democracy into an international political area, which is 
dominated by the non-democratic structures of a neoliberal ideology.  
 
The EU is the only body with a relevant community comprising states as well as a legally 
defined citizenry, and both of these groups enjoy representation in its governance 
structure. The EU calls this a double legitimacy, and although this term belies the 
complex nature of its representative system, it is a useful concept for explaining the dual 
role of the EU. As part of this governance structure, there is a mandated role for 
democracy in decision making that is unique amongst other non-state and multi-state 
global governance bodies. However, the extent to which this democracy is effective relies 
on its application in the legislative structures in the EU.  
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On paper, the Parliament offers democratic legitimacy, accountability, and 
representation; however, in its actual functions these processes are less well defined. 
Through a range of first-hand accounts, the following chapter explores how the structures 
of democracy and governance in the Parliamentary function. As the second stage of 
immanent criticism, it reviews the actual workings of the Parliament, and in doing so 
expands on the idea that the Parliament’s presence in the EU makes it a new form of 
governance structure that functions above the level of the state and incorporates 
democratic elements into its decision making. 
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Chapter 6 
Immanent Criticism Stage 2: A critical examination of democracy and 
governance in the EP 
________________________________________________________________________ 
6.1 Introduction: the second stage of immanent criticism 
6.2 The local level of the Parliament’s functions 
 6.2.1 Communication  
 6.2.1 Effectiveness  
 6.2.1 Critical summary of the local level 
6.3 The regional level of the Parliament’s functions 
 6.3.1 Economic model versus. social approach 
6.3.2 States versus Parliament 
6.3.3 Democracy and the European Parliament 
6.3.4 Critical summary of the regional level 
6.4 The global level of the Parliament’s functions 
6.4.1 EU/EP as a global actor  
6.4.2 Global governance and democracy 
6.4.3 Critical summary of the global level 
6.5 Summary: democracy and governance in the European Parliament  
6.5.1 Moving towards the third stage of immanent criticism: 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction: the second stage of immanent criticism 
 
As a democratic governance body, the European Parliament fills a significant role in the 
decision-making processes of the European Union. Through codecision, the Parliament 
provides citizens of the EU with a chance to influence governance above the level of their 
individual states. As the last chapter began to argue however, although EU legislation 
provides a strong role for the Parliament, in practice there are limits to its democratic and 
governance roles. 
 
As the second stage of immanent criticism, this chapter explores the nature of democratic 
governance in the Parliament’s procedures. The chapter builds on the previous analysis of 
the Parliament’s developmental history by critically examining the applications of 
democracy and governance in its structures. This part of immanent criticism embraces 
 163 
Horkheimer’s (1946) idea that the construction of social objects is part of a interlinked set 
of process in which different forces influence the eventual outcome. Consequently, this 
chapter views the Parliament as part of a ‘theoretical whole’ (Horkheimer, 1946: 183), in 
other words a manifestation of wider global political, social, and economic forces rather 
than a self-contained set of processes.   
  
As this chapter is an account of the actual working of the Parliament, the majority of the 
information in it comes from a series of first-hand accounts from those with a working 
knowledge on a wide range of its functions. Foremost amongst these is a range of 
interviews conducted specifically for this study, which asked three MEPs, three 
Academics and three involved practitioners for their perspectives on various aspects of 
the Parliament’s capabilities. The methodological discussion in Chapter 2 outlines the 
reflexive process used for conducting these interviews, and Figure 1 in that chapter gives 
a more detailed description of each interviewee and their relevance to this chapter’s 
analysis. In the analysis of the interviews, quotes from members of the different interview 
groups are signified by the following abbreviations: MEP for Members of the European 
Parliament; Ac for academics; and IP for involved practitioners. Quotes from the 
interviews are in italics to differentiate them from other sources, and the page number 
given with each quotation refers to the corresponding page from each interview 
transcript, a complete set of which is in Appendix 5, attached in digital format at the end 
of this dissertation. 
 
As well as the interviews, this chapter also utilises some other documentary evidence 
from bodies in the European Union and other similar organisations, particularly the 
African Union. As with the interviews, there is recognition that these official documents 
are subjective accounts, although their use adds another dimension to the overall analysis. 
 
Since the Parliament is a large and complicated body, the chapter looks at its functions in 
at three distinct levels: the national, the regional, and the global. Each of these represents 
a particular aspect of the Parliament’s functions that focuses on the different relationships 
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and roles of the Parliament within the EU. Figure 21 outlines these levels and the 
important areas for analysis under each.  
 
 
 
The chapter divides each of the levels into specific aspects that emerged from the 
interviews and analysis of the dissertation. Each level concludes with a critical summary 
that discusses how democracy and governance is manifest in those relationships. As well 
as offering a critique of the Parliament’s functions for the particular levels of interaction, 
the chapter concludes with a more in-depth discussion on the ways in which the 
Parliament’s presence in the EU represents a new form of internationalised democratic 
governance.  
 
 
 
Figure 21: Three levels of the Parliament’s functions for analysis 
Global level of interaction 
 The ways the European Parliament functions as a governance structure in a 
globalising world and its relationships with other global bodies 
 The integration of democracy into global governance 
 
 
Regional level of interaction 
 The conflicts between economic and social models in the Parliament’s 
functional relationship with the decision-making processes of the EU  
 The ongoing competition between states and citizens 
 The democratic experience in the Parliaments internal structures 
 
Local level of interaction 
 The efficacy of the Parliaments relationships within member states  
 The ways democratic governance is manifest for European citizens, and how this 
is communicated.  
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6.2 The local level of the European Parliament 
 
The local level of the Parliament’s functions focuses on the relationships between the 
European Parliament and its citizens. These relationships are an important indicator of 
how effective the Parliament’s democratic structures are, as well as how European 
citizens experience that democracy. While the concept of ‘local’ fits well with the idea of 
interaction at a level below the state, it is worth remembering that this covers 27 countries 
and over half a billion citizens.  
 
The treaty on European Union at Maastricht (1992: 7) introduced the concept of 
‘Citizenship of the Union’, and subsequent treaties refined this with ‘a series of 
fundamental and political rights’ (Europe, 2010c).  Legislatively, Maastricht (1992), 
Lisbon (2007), and the updated Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(2010) helped to strengthen the EU as governance structure with de facto powers across 
member states. However, the efficacy of these treaties is in the ways that they provide an 
opportunity for democratic governance.  
 
The local level of interaction focuses on two key areas, both of which emerged as 
important in the interviews conducted for this dissertation. The first deals with the nature 
of the Parliament’s communication, both with individuals and with some of the many 
projects it commissions, oversees, or implements in member states. The second area 
focuses on the effectiveness of the Parliament in implementing or influencing policy 
enacted at a national level. Although these two examples by no means constitute the full 
range of the Parliament’s activities, they do provide real examples that emerged from the 
interviews and illustrate the ways in which the Parliament functions.  
 
6.2.1 Communication: 
The involvement of citizens in the processes of governance has the potential to be a great 
legitimating force for a democratic structure. Often, this involvement revolves around the 
communication between citizens and their governance structure, as well as the 
transparency of its decision-making processes. If communication is poor, then the 
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democratic element of governance runs the risk of being limited to specific events, such 
as periodic elections. However, if there is a free flow of communication, it is more likely 
citizens will experience an interactive democratic process with the Parliament. 
 
There are a number of different mechanisms to facilitate feedback and interaction 
between the European Parliament and its citizens. The most obvious of these is the 
relationship between the MEP and their constituency members, essentially the basic 
element of a representative system. The nature of the relationship between a 
representative and those they represent is an important way to maintain the connection 
between the governed and the governors. Good communication creates strong 
relationships and engenders participation and confidence in the system, whereas poor 
communication may often leave citizens feeling they are able to bring little influence to 
bear over the structures and functions of power. 
 
In the case of the European Parliament, one of the main issues to arise from the 
interviews was a concern in the academic and practitioner groups over MEP’s perceived 
remoteness from their constituents and constituencies. The constraint of representing 
what are in some cases very large constituencies, both geographically and in terms of 
population, is compounded by the need for MEPs to spend a certain amount of their time 
in mainland Europe. Certainly, both Ac1 and IP2 felt there were problems in the 
remoteness of MEPs: 
 
…They are completely remote. I mean they are accountable … I know that 
the one  or two Labour MEPs that I’ve come across certainly try to put 
themselves about in their constituencies and particularly within their 
parties to whoever will listen to them, so they do work quite hard, I think,  
to report back.  
 (Ac1: 8) 
..... 
 
…How the hell does someone in Brussels know what the hell is going on in 
the Forest of Dean? It’s very hard. 
(IP2: 4) 
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As well as geographical constraints, the nature of European party politics means that 
MEPs find themselves as representatives of both national and European political parties, 
as well as individual causes they may champion. The effect of this is to present MEPs 
with several different sources to whom they are accountable. When asked a question on 
this directly, the MEPs indicated the range of different locations to which they feel they 
are accountable. For MEP3, accountability primarily lay with:  
 
The party in the east of England, my party, the constituency. Those are the 
people that put me here. 
 (MEP3) 
 
For MEP1, accountability was a more complex issue that depended on the nature of the 
issue at hand. He stated that: 
 
In terms of accountability, of course, we’re accountable at election time, 
we are accountable in between though …  
 
But in the European Parliament you also have to work out what’s the best 
compromise not just for your region and your country but for Europe as a 
whole. So you’re trying to get the right balance between all these things. 
(MEP1: 2&3) 
 
Both MEP3 and MEP1 identify different sites of accountability they feel they are subject 
to, and MEP1 in particular talks about the role played by different sources of 
accountability in the Parliament.  The ‘principle-agent’ framework described by Hix et al 
(2007: 133) illustrates how different sites of authority mean MEPs may often find 
themselves conflicted, an issue particularly relevant in a body the size of the European 
Parliament that deals with the wishes of citizens as well as national and European 
political parties.  MEP2 identifies this conflict: 
 
[The] easy answer,r and the correct answer is I'm accountable to the six 
million, or the six and a half million people in the South East of England. 
But the six and half million people in the South East of England cannot 
vote for me as an individual, they can only put their cross by a party list. 
So you could then say am I really accountable to the hundred and eighty 
odd thousand Conservative party members who selected me? Well, even 
there, how many came to the meeting? I mean two thousand or something? 
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I mean it is a real problem and the problem I would argue … has to do 
with the whole level on which people connect with their democratic 
institution. 
(MEP2: 1) 
 
The problems of communicating accountability are evident in the different responses that 
MEPs gave to questions on that topic. Multiple sites of authority mean that 
communication differs between individuals MEPs, and aside from some contact with 
constituency members, it appears that the Parliament as a body makes very little direct 
effort to communicate with European citizens. Practitioner IP1 who has extensive 
working knowledge of the structures of the European Parliament, argues that the 
Parliament’s direct communication with its citizens is limited: 
 
There is no direct interaction between the citizens and the Parliament, 
there are however indirect interfaces which are about to be developed. 
For example, public hearings, for example consultations of the civil 
society organisation. Also the possibility for associations of interest to 
present their points …. so it is not that the Parliament  is closed with 
regard to the concerns which are uttered by citizens... 
 
…I wouldn’t say this is accountability, but it is a level of dialogue.  
(IP1: 6) 
 
Another aspect of communication that was discussed in the interviews with the involved 
practitioners was problems in connecting major European-funded projects with the 
functions of the Parliament and local MEPs. Interviewee IP2 has worked on several large 
centrally funded European projects, and he questions the involvement of MEPs in these 
processes: 
 
There is very little contact, face-to-face contact. In our limited experience, 
you know here is a faceless bureaucracy … we never knew the name of 
anybody until problem[s] with finding ... It was anonymous…  
 
…do MEPs know what European funded projects are operating within their 
area? They have got a large area but…no contact at all… 
(IP2: 6) 
 
 169 
Practitioner IP3 echoed these concerns, and questioned the role of centrally funded 
projects. He felt that the projects he worked on were often not genuine communicative 
exercises, but were: 
  
… primarily for the validation of existing policies and policy directions, 
[and] used by departments and agencies as a means to justify their 
decisions and seemingly legitimate their actions, rather than as a genuine 
attempt to gather information on policies and provide suggestions for 
future directions.  
(IP3: 2) 
 
Both IP2 and IP3 felt there was little communicative process or ongoing impact 
associated with the European-funded projects in which they had been involved. 
Communication of findings was limited, and IP3 argued that there was not much 
evidence of the projects he had been involved in extending beyond their conclusion: 
 
… [That] there was relatively little impact of the research on EU policy 
overall… 
 
… to some degree, this was to do with levels of bureaucracy that separated 
the research/research from the decision-making mechanisms.  
(IP3: 2) 
 
Although the European Parliament did not initiate all of these projects, they are part of 
the overall governance process in the EU. These projects are an important element of the 
interface between central European agencies and European citizens, and as such, they 
afford MEPs a chance to participate and communicate with European citizens. 
 
IP1 presents a damning case of communication in his interview and from his vantage 
point within the Secretariat offers an opinion of interaction between citizens and the 
Parliament: 
Let me put this very quickly as I think we should make it clear. There is no 
direct interaction between the citizens and the Parliament, there are 
however indirect interfaces which are about to be developed. For 
examples public hearings, for example consultations of the civil society 
organisation. Also the possibility for associations of interest to present 
their points. 
(IP1: 6) 
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Lisbon made a clear attempt to involve citizens in the mechanisms of state. For example, 
schemes such as the ‘citizen’s initiative’ allow groups of citizens to petition for 
legislation on specific areas (Europe, 2010a). Nevertheless, even through many of the 
initiatives in Lisbon are yet to be implemented, there seems to be a problem with 
communication that runs deeper than a lack of structures and involves a problem with 
MEP’s multiple roles, and an ongoing lack of participation in activities in local or 
national communities.   
 
6.2.2 Effectiveness 
The second aspect to emerge from the interviews in relation to the local level was the 
effectiveness of the Parliament’s actions in member states. The role of the European 
Parliament in policy making, and the visibility of this to individuals is an important 
indicator of how the democracy is judged.  
 
For academic Ac3, one of the important ways in which the Parliament is successful is 
through the mandated existence of a European citizenry. He argues that this concept did 
much to extend the idea of a European Parliament that existed outside of national 
frameworks:    
 
[The] invention of the category of European citizen which is stamped on 
everybody’s passport … burst the boundaries of the old doctrine of 
citizenship which supposed you only can be a citizen so long as you are a 
part of a territorial state. 
(Ac3: 3) 
 
In contrast to Ac3, the other two academics expressed concerns over the degree of 
influence the Parliament wields in shaping policy at a local or national level. Academic 
Ac1, who has extensive experience of researching the application of social policy across 
Europe, felt that the Parliament exerts little influence: 
 
I rather wish I could think of an example of social policy, whether it’s 
about disability, sexuality, sexual harassment, race or whatever where you 
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could say ‘well the Parliament has really dug its foot, stuck it’s foot in 
here and changed something, but I can’t. 
(Ac1: 3) 
 
Similarly, academic Ac2 questioned the role of the European Parliament in domestic 
politics, arguing that there may be a manufactured lack of visibility when it comes to 
European Legislation: 
… I don’t see much impact. Of course, the impact of the legislation is very 
large as everyone knows. Over 50% of our legislation derives from the EP 
even though it is often initiated from outside the Parliament…. But the 
awareness of the impact is not huge, and that’s partly deliberate. I mean it 
could be made to be much larger if politicians in the nations thought it 
was useful to.  
 (Ac2: 7) 
 
Although there are differences in how each participating academic discusses the 
Parliament’s legislative role, they generally agree that the Parliament’s visibility is low in 
member states. Practitioner IP1 who is head of the Secretariat for the Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs argues that there is a problem in citizens’ perception of the 
Parliament: 
 
The problem is that citizens often do not perceive exactly the possibilities, 
which the European Union has because the powers and the forms of 
action the European Union has are much more limited than ordinary 
citizens often imagine.  
(IP1: 6) 
 
For IP1, the issue is not just that citizen’s poor sense of the Parliament’s role, but that the 
Parliament itself plays a secondary role in the Union’s overall governance structure. Any 
policy the EU does produce is not necessarily a product of the Parliament, but of the 
overall governance structure in which the Parliament is only one part. Academic Ac1 
picks up this point:  
 
[It] doesn’t seem to me that [policy is] coming from the Parliament, that’s 
coming from the social partners and it’s coming from the Council of 
Ministers. I mean… it seems to me that the power and policy making is 
done by the Commission and is approved by the Council of Ministers and 
the European Council above that.  
(Ac1: 2) 
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These views emphasise the complex nature of decision making in Europe, divided 
between the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. The Lisbon Treaty attempted to 
remedy the perceived democratic deficit created by this division, however the interviews 
here show that at the local level there is still a perception that the Parliament is less 
influential than other EU bodies.  
 
Academic Ac1 claims that the lack of involvement of the European Parliament is an 
intentional outcome of Member States’ continued dominance. Ac1 uses the so-called 
Milward thesis (1984) to argue that development is only fully realised at the sufferance 
and requirement of states: 
 
The Milward thesis … is that the EU, the EC the ECC was actually 
constructed in the 1940’s and 50’s to strengthen the nation state. Not that 
that’s a paradox. Because it gives this sense of the Council of  
Ministers fighting for the nation … so yes we don’t have wars within 
Western Europe any more, we have this place where national battles can 
be fought. And this is a strengthened national sovereignty, particularly in 
areas like social policy. 
(Ac1: 6) 
 
Ac1 makes the point that the EU functions as an extension of the member states because 
bodies such as the Parliament maintain little actual say in policies. He argues that this is 
made worse when you consider that the EU’s remit still does not encompass the same 
range of areas as national politics: 
 
In terms of the nuts and bolts of social policy, housing, rents, education, 
the EUs role is really minimalist and that’s because national governments 
don’t want to let that go because it legitimates them. If you don’t control 
things like immigration, health care, whatever, then you know, that’s 
where you get your legitimacy from. 
(Ac1: 8) 
 
This extension of the Milward thesis (1984) describes a process in which member states 
maintain legitimacy by holding onto the primary functions of statehood, including the 
ability to set the majority of policy. MEP2, who identifies himself as a Conservative 
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sceptic on the European project, argues that the failings of the Parliament lie in the lack 
of common agreement in member states and a dearth of European solidarity: 
 
[T]here’s no pan-European public opinion, there no sense of affinity, of 
allegiance of inherited loyalty. And for that reason, the European 
Parliament is like a wheel whirling in place without connecting to the 
ground. 
(MEP2: 1) 
 
Although many of those interviewed here question the efficacy of the European 
Parliament as a decision-making body, its presence in the EU does offer the potential for 
a democratic route for citizens into the functions of governance, however limited. For 
academic Ac1, although the Parliament may not be particularly effective, its presence is 
nevertheless vital to the EU maintaining democratic legitimacy as a governance body:  
 
[The Parliament] has a very very important role in legitimating the whole 
apparatus… it’s about approval, it’s about scrutiny, it’s about what the 
Commission is doing. It’s about scrutinising policy making, but it’s not 
driving it and it’s not really shifting it or changing it very much, but it has 
to be there. 
(Ac1: 2-3) 
 
6.2.3 Critical summary of the local level  
At the local level of interaction, those interviewed identified two areas of concern with 
the Parliament’s interaction with citizens. The first of these involved the nature of 
communication between citizens, funded projects, and MEPs. Several of the interviewees 
expressed a degree of scepticism regarding the levels of contact between the Parliament 
and citizens. This was particularly the case for members of the involved practitioner 
group who had engaged in centrally funded projects within member states and 
experienced limited engagement from MEPs.  
 
The principles of democracy outlined in Chapter 3, strongly connect issues of 
accountability with communication and Held and Koenig-Archibugi’s (2005: 3) 
argument that in order for effective accountability to take place, there needs to be ‘steady 
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and reliable information and communication between decision-makers and stakeholders’. 
Effective democratic accountability requires the presence of communicative structures 
within a governance body to ensure it takes place. For several of those interviewed, this 
was not always their experience.  
 
The interviews identified were several reasons for problems with the Parliament’s 
communication. The nature of representation in the European Parliament means MEPs 
are responsible not just for local communities, but maintain associations with national 
parties as well as European political parties. Consequently, the conflict that MEPs might 
experience between sources of accountability mean that there is some confusion over 
what constitutes that relevant community.  
 
The problems of managing a European-wide Parliament whilst still functioning as a 
representative of a defined area in a member state meant several interviewees felt that 
MEPs were distant or removed from local politics. Distances are political as well as 
physical. The lack of Europe-wide political parties means that MEPs retain strong ties to 
national political systems, adding a layer in between MEPs and constituents, and 
distancing citizens from the Parliament’s politics. 
 
The principles of democracy in this dissertation suggest that the nature of communication 
is an important way of maintaining transparency and therefore legitimacy in democratic 
governance. This is also identified here by practitioner IP3, who argues that the 
Parliament is involved with some European Projects ‘primarily for the validation of 
existing policies and policy directions’ (IP3: 2). Democratic legitimacy is a two-way 
process that needs to be ongoing in order to be sustained. Genuine participation and 
communication may strengthen democracy, whilst a lack of it, or a superficial attempt at 
it, might weaken the relationship between citizens and governance. The Lisbon Treaty 
(2007) worked towards strengthening the process of communication by strengthening 
codecision and allowing citizens to petition the Parliament directly; however, as the 
interviews demonstrate there is still a lack of direct communication between the 
Parliament and citizens. 
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The second area identified at the local level of the model is the effectiveness of the 
Parliament as a governance structure. Several interviewees described a struggle between 
states and citizens, and although the democratically elected European Parliament does 
provide legitimacy for EU policy, some felt that the Parliament’s overall role in the 
decision-making process was limited. The EU certainly exhibits an interest in using the 
Parliament as a legitimising force; however, the criticisms of its relationship with citizens 
must bring this into question. 
 
The Milward Thesis (1984) seems to fit the model of the Parliament described here. 
Certainly, some those interviewed talked of a Parliament that was either ‘limited’ (Ip1: 
6), with little impact (Ac2: 7), or lacking any form of European solidarity (MEP2: 1). 
There was however, some feeling that the Parliament did represent a genuine part of the 
decision-making process in the EU. Academic AC3, argued that a European citizenry, 
represented through the Parliament, helps to define the EU as a new form supranational 
state. In addition, academic Ac1 felt that even through the Parliament played a secondary 
role in decision making, it had an important part to play in scrutinising the process.   
 
Although there was some feeling that the Parliament plays an important role in the 
overall structures of the EU, there was little evidence of this at a local level. Because of 
this, the benefits of democratic governance are predominately manifest at an institutional 
level where the Parliament helps to legitimate the governance of the European Union. At 
a local level, citizens appear to experience little interaction with the Parliament. The 
emphasis on the ideological rather than the structural elements of democracy means that 
whilst it is an important part of legitimating the European Parliament and Union, 
democracy fulfils only a limited functional role. 
 
 
6.3 The regional level of the Parliament’s function: 
 
The development of the European Parliament as a democratically elected body has been a 
long process. Whilst there is clear evidence of strengthening the Parliament’s role in the 
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treaties of Maastricht and Lisbon, the evidence from the local level questions how 
effective the Parliament actually is. This second level of interaction explores the 
Parliament’s relationships on a regional level, specifically the ways in which it functions 
as democratic aspect of the EU’s governance.  There are three main areas emerging from 
the interviews: firstly, a clash between economic and social approaches to governance; 
secondly, the ongoing division of powers between states and citizens; and finally the 
actual role the democracy plays in decision-making.  
 
6.3.1 Economic model versus social approach 
One of the key areas to emerge from the interviews was the clash in the European Union 
between economic and social models of integration. This division is the product of a 
conflict between the more social role of the European Parliament and the economic 
emphasis more commonly adopted by the Council and Commission.  
 
Academic Ac1 emphasises a conflict between the need for social integration and the clear 
drive for economic cooperation that characterises the history of much of European 
integration. Speaking from a social policy perspective in which he has a wide range of 
experience, Ac1 questions the nature of European integration:  
 
[We] do seem to have got economic integration to some extent, without the 
other forms, the social integration if you like, the social policy 
integration… The function is and always has been economic integration. 
The coal and steel community and now the Euro and the situation we see 
ourselves in … It’s about economic integration and making business 
efficient and effective. 
(Ac1: 5) 
 
As with Ac1, academic Ac2 identifies ongoing tensions in the EU between social and 
economic forces:  
 
[It] seems to me there is a battle going within the European Union about 
the extent to which it will be an organisation which is making a friendly 
environment for what you describe as neoliberal economics. We used to 
call it laissez- faire.  
(Ac2: 2-3) 
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For Ac2, there are ongoing pressures on the EU to function as an environment suitable 
for neoliberal, laissez-faire political and social structures. As both Ac1 and Ac2 identify, 
the social element represented in the Parliament continues to be less emphasised than the 
management of resources: 
 
 [In] Europe you haven’t got the task of building societies, the societies 
are there. The EU is about management and coordination of those existing 
resources.  
(Ac2: 5) 
 
Although there is a strong emphasis on neoliberal structures, Ac2 also identifies a 
significant role for a social emphasis in European development. Driven initially by the 
ideologies of many early proponents, this social focus continues in some of the larger 
member states today: 
 
[This] social rights tradition is very strong in Europe and is being 
protected so that I think that it has many defenders who would not wish to 
see it disappear. Yes, I mean if it’s going to violence it’ll be in defence of 
social rights, not against social rights. 
(Ac2: 6) 
 
There is some recent support for this in Greece, where there is widespread opposition to 
austerity measures imposed by the European Central Bank and IMF including the most 
recent reports of the ECB requiring a reduction of 100,000 in the civil service and a cut in 
pensions and salaries for those that remain employed (BBC, 2011b; 2011c).  In Greece, 
as well as other countries around Europe in a similar position, the social agenda is being 
dictated by the needs of the Eurozone to reduce fiscal and structural deficits of member’s 
economies.  
 
The EU, and particularly the Eurozone, is not alone in having to introduce measures to 
address economic concerns, many other countries worldwide are in the same process.  
For example, the Credit Rating Agency (CRA) Moody’s (2011) threatened to downgrade 
US’s Aaa rating if it did not change its economic policy, a threat which Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) followed up on in early August, 2011. The EU is therefore not alone in 
suffering under the pressures of a global economy, and agencies of that economy play an 
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important role in managing how states and governance structures function. That the EU is 
no different from many other states should be no surprise; however, the fact that these 
external market forces actively shape democracies is worrying. In particular, the 
Parliament’s role as only one part of an EU that also represents economic and statist 
interests means that it is particularly vulnerable to these influences. The future of 
democracy exercised through the Parliament therefore depends to large extent on how far 
a social model may impinge on the continued dominance of economic pressures. 
 
6.3.2 States versus Parliament 
The struggle between a social model and the dominance of a market-based system is 
evident in the relationship between member states and citizens of the European Union.  
One way to observe this is through the pressure MEPs face when working on 
Parliamentary business.  
 
Hix et al’s (2007: 133) ‘principle-agent’ framework is a useful way to describe the 
different sources of authority MEPs face. MEP1 described how these different sources of 
authority impact on the decisions they make in the Parliament: 
 
Well, in first instances as with most national parliaments, members of the 
European Parliament act individually under their own conscience. They 
cannot take instructions from outside; there is no imperative mandate 
from any outside body. You have been elected to exercise your judgement.  
… 
[O]f course we do take account of national interests just as ministers in 
the Council it does matter which party they are… So just as the party 
ideological side can creep into the Council, the national interest side can 
affect debates in the Parliament. 
(MEP1: 2&3) 
 
MEP3 indicates in his interview how the lack of specific European-wide political parties 
is an issue when dealing with the multiple sources of authority.  For MEP3, the 
association with national parties means that the system in the European Parliament does 
not function properly: 
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I think that the principal sinew of democracy that we haven’t got is 
political parties at the European level. And we’ve got to develop federal 
political parties which can compete with the nationalistic, narrow focus of 
the domestic political parties. They can be affiliated as they are in the US, 
but they are essentially competing for power with the national political 
parties. That’s what we haven’t done very well. 
(MEP3: 4) 
 
 
MEP3 goes on to explain how the nature of this system leads to multiple sites of 
accountability and a disconnection between citizens, who vote at a national level for 
candidates of national parties, which then represent them on a European basis as 
members of different political groupings.  For MEP3 this disconnection is symptomatic 
of a lack of clear political choice: 
 
Essentially, you’ve got to offer people political choice and political 
choice can only be offered by political parties in a democracy. They 
have to feel that by supporting a political party or some other political 
party that decision will affect the quality of policy that flows out of 
Brussels. It’s that lack of an obvious connection, which is a real 
difficulty. 
(MEP3: 4) 
 
Despite the problems identified with multiple sites of authority, MEP1 talks about an 
overall positive influence from a European Parliamentary system that emerges from a 
range of different ideologies: 
 
We sit by political affinity. So in the Parliament you have members from 
parties that are in government in each member state and that are in 
opposition in each member state. So we bring pluralism to the system, 
right from the far left to the far right ... coming not just from the cities but 
from the regions. So we bring a lot more diversity. 
(MEP1: 1-2) 
 
MEP1 may overstate the impact of this diversity, and MEP3 argues that the actual 
decision-making processes in the Parliament may reduce the ways in which these 
positions influence policy: 
 
Well the policy is formulated here in the groups, but it’s articulated in the 
Committees. That’s where the nitty gritty work is done either on 
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legislation, clause by clause, or the tighter enquiry interrogation … The 
powers of the committees combine the powers of a Westminster select 
committee and a standing committee. We can do whatever we like.  
 (MEP3: 1-2) 
 
This position is interesting, as it suggests that power in the Parliament rests with 
committees, rather than individuals. MEP3 indicates that this reduces the effect of having 
multiple sites of accountability to some degree, although it may not eliminate all of the 
issues in a principle-agent framework.  
 
As well as the role multiple sites of accountability play in MEPs decisions, issues 
regarding the ongoing division between states and citizens also arose when discussing the 
decision-making process with interviewees. The principle of codecision means the EU 
represents both states and citizens, as MEP 1 outlines in his interview: 
 
[We] have a sort of a virtual two-chamber system in Council and 
Parliament. Council’s job is to look at things from a national interest 
point of view – the ministers are there representing their country with 
their civil servants behind them, focused on how they see things in terms of 
the national interests, at least as seen by the government of the day.  
(MEP1: 2) 
 
The problem with this system, as MEP 3 identifies, is that it effectively allows member 
states to pursue agendas of self-interest rather than the benefit of the entire Union:  
 
The Commission and the Parliament here are directed towards trying to 
seek consensus about what’s in the common interests of the European 
Union. In the Council too often it’s the spurious self interest of a state that 
either blocks progress or skews the quality of the decision in a certain 
direction or some other. Of course, nationality is still important, it still 
matters, it will always matter, but it ought not to be the prevalent factor in 
determining the direction of policy or the outcome of policy or the speed 
with which decisions are made. 
(MEP3: 5) 
 
The nature of codecision is a product of the EU’s joint representation of states and 
citizens. The consequence of this dual system is that citizens often hold less influence 
than states, largely because states remain a large part of the basic administrative structure 
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of the EU and consequently retain a monopoly on legitimate authority. For interviewee 
Ip1, Head of the Secretariat for the Committee for Constitution Affairs and heavily 
involved in the workings of the Parliament, members of both the Council and the 
Parliament have to compromise under codecision, a fact particularly evident when there 
is disagreement on a legislative issue: 
 
[None] of the actors is fully free when they come together to compromise 
because with members of Parliament, if they want to enter the compromise 
they have to consider and examine whether they will have a majority in 
the house for such a decision. And on the other side, the representatives 
for the Council before entering the compromise will have to consider 
whether in the 27 member states governments comprising will have a 
qualified majority. 
(IP1: 5) 
 
For IP1, codecision is a legitimate way to represent the will of both citizens and states, as 
he puts it: 
 
[The] European Parliament accepts the Council as the necessary place 
where the interests of the member states are legitimately voiced … 
 (IP1: 8) 
 
Although not the sole legislative body, the Parliament plays an important part in 
codecision. Furthermore, Parliament represents a legitimate democratic element in the 
decision-making structures of the European Union. However, there appears to be some 
conflict between the role of states and of citizens represented in their different bodies, 
and these differences mean important ramifications for the perception and function of 
democracy within that system.  
 
6.3.3 Democracy and the European Parliament 
The third element of the Parliament’s regional functions deals with the integration of 
democracy into the EU’s governance structures. As the primary source of democratic 
legitimation, the involvement of the Parliament in decision-making impacts directly on 
citizens’ ability to express their democratic will.  
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For practitioner IP2, one of the major issues on the exercising of democracy is the sheer 
size of the European Parliament. The success of democratic structures is jeopardised by 
the problems of managing such a large structure: 
 
…I think the size of that Parliament is enormous in terms of numbers and 
how you make that work? I'm not sure you can make a parliament like that 
work … 
 
 …How do you make such a large disparate organisation democratic? 
How do you make them accountable? … It’s hard to see how you can have 
face-to-face locality representation. 
(IP2, 14) 
 
Similarly, Academic Ac2 expresses some concern over the shape a European-wide 
democracy might take. For him, it was not a problem specific to Europe, but a general 
issue: 
 
[The] difficulty of creating something that resembles the old Athenian 
democracy in large-scale polity is a problem that’s almost as old as the 
hills. It was something that Schumpeter was writing about in the 1940’s 
and I don’t think that the creation of the European Union makes this a 
qualitatively different problem, it just is an issue which is more complex 
and will take time, not to resolve but to evolve. 
(Ac2: 2) 
 
Those interviewed expressed different ideas of the problems in creating and sustaining a 
democratic European state of some form.  MEP2 was particularly sceptical about the 
possible nature of a European-wide democracy, arguing that the role of the European 
Union was not to create a pan-European demos, but to manage the collective issues that 
Europe faces: 
 
The EU is, at least in these questions of European integration, is an 
undemocratic body that overrides the deliberately stated wishes of its own 
populations at the ballot box. 
 
 ... It is after all a Union of 25 liberal democracies so why is it collectively, 
then, behaving in an undemocratic fashion?. The answer is, I think, that 
the EU is in a sense, doing what it was designed to do. The very early 
founders of the EU, the patriarchs of the project, Jean Monnet, Robert 
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Schuman, the founding fathers, they understood from the first that this 
scheme that they had, this project of merging these ancient kingdoms into 
a single unified polity was so big, and so contentious and so bold and so 
ambitious, that it would never survive if you had to keep going back to the 
national voters for permission. 
 
 … So people talk about this democratic deficit as though it’s some kind of 
accidental side effect, but it isn’t, it was actually built into the thing…They 
deliberately created a system where supreme power is in the hands of 
unelected people, unaccountable people, 25 commissioners who are 
deliberately invulnerable to public opinion. 
 (MEP2: 3) 
 
For MEP2, the relocation of authority to a central governance structure in Europe does 
not enjoy the backing of many citizens. Furthermore, he argues that this was never really 
the intention of the Union, which established itself through a succession of treaties that 
did not stress democracy as a key element of the structure. The rejection of a European 
constitution in referenda by the French and Dutch appears to support this position, 
although in reality local referenda are often subject to a range of other domestic issues.  
 
The MEPs interviewed were all members of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 
which was heavily involved in the drafting of the constitution, and whilst MEP2 regards 
the development of further democratic systems as counter to the intended functions of the 
EU, interviewee MEP3 clearly disagrees, arguing that:   
 
We should renegotiate the whole package, or at least parts of it. The 
weaker part of the Constitution should be improved and then we try again. 
In other words, try to keep the integrity of the package deal.  
(MEP3: 6) 
 
This renegotiation is largely present in the Lisbon Treaty, which incorporates much of the 
original constitution, although for MEP3, the failure of the constitution to pass was a 
blow to increasing the role of a democratic Parliament. MEP3 outlines the importance the 
constitution might have had in terms of increasing the role of the Parliament: 
 
Parliament profited from their constitution. It was the prizewinner, if you 
like; in the power struggle between the Commission the Council, 
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Parliament and the Member States. And it’s essential that we rescue it in 
order to help parliamentary democracy grow at the European level. 
(MEP3: 5) 
  
For those in support of the constitution and the subsequent Lisbon Treaty, these treaties 
represented the latest stage in a process working towards democratic governance in the 
EU that began with the ECSC and Euratom. Ac2 touches on the legacy of this history, 
saying the outcome means: 
 
…the European Union is not a single political will. It’s a coalition … It’s 
one whose external relations have shifted quite dramatically over the last 
30 years. 
(Ac2: 2)  
 
The purported outcome of this coalition varies, depending on the perspective taken by the 
interviewees. For IP1, head of the Secretariat for the Committee on Constitutional 
Affairs, the ongoing process created a system in which: 
 
[W]e have in principle a regime of equal footing. 
(IP1: 4).  
 
For others interviewed, such as MEP2, the role of the Parliament in this coalition is 
highly suspect. Whilst he rejects the idea that the Union should be a democratic body, he 
does note that for a body that regards itself as democratic, the Parliament wields a lack of 
influence particularly when it comes to initiating legislation: 
 
We can amend and we can delay and we can sometimes block but we 
cannot initiate legislation and that is an extraordinary thing. 
(MEP2: 4) 
 
This lack of direct control over the direction of policy reinforces the division of authority 
between the main legislative bodies of the EU.  It also helps to feed ongoing debates over 
the influence the Parliament exerts over the legislation produced. In his interview, 
academic Ac2 illustrates this by questioning the actual role of the Parliament in the 
decision-making structure of the EU: 
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Is the Parliament an arena or an agent? … Things happen because of 
what is said in Parliament, but is Parliament an actor? It’s a place; it’s an 
area where a lot of these forces play against each other.  
(Ac2: 8) 
 
The lack of influence over the direction of policy means that there are serious questions 
on the extent of democracy. However, MEP1 again reiterates in his interview the 
important role the Parliament plays as an oversight body, scrutinising legislation and the 
workings of the Commission: 
 
The other role of the Parliament, as with the national parliaments is 
scrutiny of the Commission. 
 
We’ll haul in commissioners, or their civil servants because the 
Commissioners all have civil servants of course, to the Parliamentary 
committees to be cross examined and the ultimate sanction is that the 
Commission can only hold office with the confidence with Parliament 
because to take office it needs a vote of confidence and we can dismiss it 
in a vote of no confidence. 
(MEP1: 11) 
 
Although the Parliament’s influence over policy may not be as great as that of member 
states, its present role in the European Union keeps it active in the decision-making 
process and helps to legitimate the EU as a pan-European governance structure. For MEP 
1, the democracy of the Parliament helps to validate the Union by providing a clear and 
accountable route to authority: 
 
Well the European Parliament is there to provide democratic 
accountability for the decisions and the legislation that we adopt at 
European level. You have the national parliaments dealing with national 
legislation, you have local councils dealing with local matters, and the 
European Parliament deals with those matters that we have chosen to 
regulate jointly with our neighbouring countries at European level 
because there is a need or an advantage of acting at that level. 
(MEP1: 1) 
 
MEP 1 claims that the European Parliament plays a role beyond the provision of a 
democratic voice in the legislative process or providing oversight and scrutiny to other 
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bodies. He argues that the Parliament represents a distinct stage in the development of a 
new form of governance structure, different from other organisations engaged in 
international regulation: 
 
[I]t’s. the first attempt to create an elected parliament at a level beyond 
the nation state, and to have this extra degree of accountability that no 
other normal international structure has: the World Bank, the WTO, the 
IMF the OECD, you name it, don’t have an elected parliament. They are 
just a bureaucracy with ministers meeting periodically to try and give 
guidance, and countries that agree; some of them go away and maybe do 
it and maybe don’t. Here we have a legal system, because when you adopt 
legislation it’s binding among member states. 
(MEP1: 5) 
 
Academic Ac2 supports the idea that the EU represents a new form of governance 
structure, particularly in the ways in which the polity is constructed and represented: 
 
It’s a new polity; it’s a new kind of polity in the same way that the United 
States was a new kind of polity when viewed from Europe. 
 (Ac2: 2) 
 
He is however, highly sceptical of how far this new democracy might be free to act 
especially in light of the ongoing influence of other EU bodies and of member states: 
 
They will let the Parliament have this greater formal power once they have 
discovered a way of controlling it. 
(Ac2: 9) 
 
Although there is some disagreement over the effectiveness of the Parliament, its 
presence in the EU is significant insofar as it adds an element of democracy to 
international governance and regulation that has hereto been absent. How far this 
democracy gives citizens a genuine chance to influence decision making is debatable. 
 
6.3.4 Critical summary of the regional level: 
Discussion on the regional level of the Parliament’s functions set out some of the ways in 
which the Parliament operates within the governance structures of the EU. Many of the 
 187 
criticisms of these functions revolve around the ongoing conflict between a social and 
democratic emphasis in the Parliament, and an economic focus from states that derives 
from the pressures of a global market.  
 
Academics Ac1 and Ac2 both identify a conflict between economic and social forces, 
which is evident in some of the recent problems in EU states such as Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal. Serious problems in the Eurozone renewed a preoccupation with economics and 
meant that an emphasis on social policy is less evident. More so, the requirements of the 
ECB for loans to member states are often fiscally restrictive, and result in serious impacts 
on citizens in those states. This process is evident in the recent statement from the ECB 
on the join European Commission / ECB / IMF rescue package for the Greek economy. 
In this statement, it is clear that fiscal policy takes primacy over most social concerns: 
 
The government has committed to an ambitious medium-term fiscal 
strategy that will enable it to maintain its 2011 and medium-term fiscal 
targets. This strategy includes a significant downsizing of public sector 
employment, restructuring or closure of public entities, and rationalization 
in entitlements, while protecting vulnerable groups. On the revenue side, 
the government will reduce tax exemptions, raise property taxation, and 
step up efforts to fight tax evasion. 
(European Central Bank, 2011) 
 
This excerpt from the ECB statement reiterates the emphasis on economic models in the 
EU. As this dissertation argues, this emphasis is partly a consequence of the role that a 
neoliberal ideology plays in structuring a global political economy; the models of 
governance in Chapter 4 each offer a picture of global structure in which neoliberalism 
plays a significant part in the shape of governance structures. Figure 9 in particular, 
describes how states only divest power in certain areas whist retaining what Messner and 
Nuscheler (2002: 142) describe as a ‘domestic monopoly on power’. This argument 
matches Milward’s (1984) position on the primacy of states in the growth of the 
European Union, and reflects many of the responses in the interviews.   
 
Both Milward’s (1984) assessment on the role of states and the claims in this dissertation 
on the pressures exerted by global and neoliberal ideology describe how difficult it is for 
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democracy to exist at a level above the nation state.  However, whilst there is a clear 
economic pressure within the Union’s structure, there is evidence that the Parliament 
exerts a level of democratic influence over policy outcomes. Several of the MEPs 
interviewed for this work felt that the Parliament exercises some control; in particular 
through the process of codecision which means there is a clear opportunity to shape 
legislation.  
 
Although the bicameral system in the EU favours states over citizens, the Parliament 
represents a mandated democratic role for citizens, reinforced by both the Lisbon Treaty 
(2007) and the reworked Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010). 
The integration of the European Parliament into the decision-making structures of the 
European Union as a whole has helped to create a new form of governance structure. 
Although it is not a dominant element, the Parliament provides a level of democratic 
legitimacy above national politics into the EU, which involves a relevant community 
comprising both states and citizens. This structure is far from perfect, and the role of the 
states and wider considerations of a neoliberal global structure limit the exercising of 
democracy at a regional level. The following section of this chapter explores these wider 
considerations of exercising democracy and governance at a global level.   
 
 
6.4 The global level of the Parliament’s functions: 
 
The Parliament’s relationships at a global level involve the ways in which it operates as a 
governance structure in a globalising world. In this case, focus falls on two main issues: 
the Parliament’s role in the EU as it works globally, and the ways in which the 
Parliament’s democracy make the EU a unique type of governance structure on the global 
stage. As well as the interviews, this section also refers to some additional documentary 
evidence from the African Union, a regional body with similar aims to the EU but 
without a parliament providing the same type of democratic function.   
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6.4.1 EU/EP as a global actor  
On a global stage, there is no other body offering the same level of democratic function 
as the Parliament.  Its presence within the European Union means that body represents a 
new form of democratic politics with normative functions of rule at a level beyond the 
individual state. MEP1 is forthright on this in his interview: 
 
It is a government: a structure of governance, it adopts policies and 
legislation. 
(MEP1: 7) 
 
Although there are many large democratic states that exert international influence, as a 
collective body the European Union is the only one to fulfil such a clearly defined role 
for a mandated supranational citizenry. MEP3 believes the Parliament and Union 
represent a democratisation of global governance that other regions of the world can 
aspire to:  
 
I can see us as being an example to other regions of the world, like the 
Africans especially. That certainly, and the Latin Americans. 
(MEP3: 3) 
 
Academic Ac2, who has worked extensively on theorising the nature of global 
governance, agrees with this assessment of the Parliament and Union as an example of 
ways to manage democratic governance in a global era: 
 
Well, it can be a European equivalent of what the Americans like to call 
their ‘city on the hil’l … an example to the rest of the world about how 
political society might be managed. 
(Ac2: 1) 
 
Here, Ac2 implies that Europe provides a different path to the established structures of 
global power, which are largely dominated by the USA. MEP3 echoes this, arguing part 
of his role in the Parliament is: 
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...to develop a mature, strong post-national Parliamentary democracy. 
(MEP3: 2) 
 
As the regional level previously suggested, the continued influence of a social model of 
governance and an emphasis on democracy in the EU lends some counterbalance to the 
dominance of an economically driven, laissez-faire ideology. For Ac2, the resulting 
model of regional governance provides an alternative to state based, capitalist models of 
globalisation:   
 
It seems to me that the European Union, including the Parliament are 
probably the best developed example of what one might call the social 
market approach to combining capitalism and democracy. In other words, 
an approach which gives a strong significant role to social rights as well 
as to the legal and political rights that are stressed in the United States 
and also as an alternative to the kind of developing state capitalist model 
that we get in China.  
(Ac2: 1) 
 
The influence of a social ethos on governance in the European Union is evident in the 
increasing role of the Parliament in the decision-making process. The Parliament’s role 
legitimates the European Union as a governance structure, although for Ac2, the 
Parliament also partly represents a desire to create a governance structure with clear ties 
to its polity: 
 
[I]t seems to me that the European union is an example of a polity which 
has a strong vested interest in providing benefits to ordinary citizens 
because these ordinary citizens are also members of national political 
communities in which they have a vote and a vote which affects the 
willingness of member states to provide the funds for the Commission. 
 
In other words, there is a … practical interest as opposed to an 
ideological interest on the part of the European Union as an institution, as 
a set of bureaucrats and officials in securing their own income by making 
sure that they’re providing for ordinary citizens. 
(Ac2: 1) 
 
For Ac2, the European Union represents a different type of regional or governance 
structure to any other collective body currently functioning at the same level. The history 
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of social rights that have developed with the Parliament means that the EU retains a much 
stronger focus on the social rather than the economic or ideological nature of integration. 
MEP 1 echoes this position, claiming that it is the collective and social structure of the 
EU that allows it to function effectively on the global stage, negotiating with 
organisations such as the WTO: 
 
[It’s] inevitable in that with a common market we have a common external 
tariff which has to be negotiated as single thing. But that also, conversely 
gives us a lot more leverage in shoulder matters. There isn’t just one super 
power. The European Union’s share of world trade is actually larger than 
the United States so that gives a better balance to world affairs and gives 
us a stronger voice than we would have if we were all going in there 
defending completely different positions. 
(MEP1: 8) 
 
MEP1 feels that the EU’s role as the world’s largest economy (see also IMF, 2011e) 
gives it the ability to integrate social elements into its structure. Rather than being 
dominated by neoliberalism, its influence means that it is able to modify some of the 
excesses of that system within its own governance procedures. However, as this chapter 
argues, there remains a strong emphasis on economic structures in the EU. 
 
Despite a continued economic focus in the EU, academic Ac1 argued that the 
internationalisation of democracy that Parliament represents might potentially come to be 
an alternative model of global power to the economic and military influence of states like 
China and the USA. For Ac1, the EU’s social emphasis stands against the economic 
neoliberalism of US domestic and foreign policy: 
 
I think the US is really scared of the EU. I mean, not scared in terms of 
threatened militarily but economically, and they are right to be. There is 
an insecurity in America about… you know, its either the Trojan horse of 
social democracy, an alternative model to the liberal model or what’s left 
of the left which is fine. It’s kind of a beacon of civilisation to the brutality 
of some aspects of American social policy. 
(Ac1, 10-11) 
 
For most of those interviewed, the European Parliament makes the Union a unique 
structure in global politics.  The only other governance body similar in terms of its stated 
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aims is the African Union. The AU grew out of the Organisation of African Unity, its 
draft Constitutive Act of the African Union came into force in 2002. At the launch of the 
African Union, its chairperson Thabo Mbeki set out two tasks: 
 
The first task is to achieve unity, solidarity, cohesion, cooperation among 
peoples of Africa and African states. We must build all the institutions 
necessary to deepen political, economic and social integration of the 
African continent. Our second task is that of developing new forms of 
partnerships at all levels and segments of our societies, between segments 
of our societies and our governments and between our governments.  
(African Union, 2009) 
 
The similarity between these commitments and those of the European Union is striking, 
particularly with the inclusion of a social as well as an economic component to 
integration.  The AU now consists of 52 member states (African Union, 2010a) and is 
structured in a similar way to the EU, with a primary Assembly of the African Union 
representing heads of state, and a secondary legislative body in the Council of Ministers, 
composed of Foreign Affairs ministers from member states (African Union, 2010b). The 
AU does contain a Parliamentary body, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), although its 
role in the decision-making process is largely perfunctory, similar in many ways to that 
of the European Parliament in its first incarnations with the ECSC and Euratom. The AU 
states that its Parliament presently fulfils a role that contains:   
 
…consultative and advisory powers only, with the aim of ultimately 
evolving into an institution with full legislative powers. 
(African Union, 2004) 
 
As with the European Parliament prior to the introduction of universal European suffrage 
in 1979, Article 4 of the protocol establishing the African Economic Community and 
PAP states that Member States: 
 
‘…shall be represented in the Pan-African Parliament by five (5) 
members, at least one of whom must be a woman’ 
(PAP, 2007) 
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The initial phase of the PAP as an oversight and advisory body was intended to only last 
for its first five-year mandate, and by the time its second mandate arrived in 2009 it was 
hoped that the PAP would take a more direct role in the legislative procedures of the 
African Union.  As part of this, there was also a plan to initiate direct elections for 
members. This did not happen for various reasons, including intransigence of member 
states; however in his speech at the inauguration of the second PAP, President of South 
Africa Jacob Zuma appealed for the AU to transform the PAP from an advisory body to a 
legislative one: 
 
We look forward to the day when the peoples of Africa can send their 
representative to the seat of this parliament to fashion laws that will bring 
about a tangible improvement in all their lives 
(Zuma, 2009) 
 
Although the PAP still has no directly elected members and it is not a legislative part of 
the AU, it does represent a move towards democratic representation at a regional level. 
At the Pan-African Parliament’s meeting in October 2010, Ibrahim Mayaki, head of the 
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) an economic 
development programme of the African Union, called for greater recognition of the PAP: 
 
[as] a key organ of the African Union, particularly in promoting popular 
participation and representation of African peoples in decision-making and 
good governance.  
(PAP, 2010: 4) 
 
He went on to affirm the commitment of the African Union to support ‘the Pan-African 
Parliament’s transition from a consultative parliamentary forum into a fully-fledged 
legislative body (PAP, 2010: 4). Nevertheless, the PAP is not a Parliament in the same 
sense as its European counterpart; it does not yet have a mandated concept of African 
citizen, and exercises a minimal role in the legislative process. Consequently, only the 
European Union offers democratic governance above the level of the nation state, and 
although there remain some serious questions over the effectiveness of its democracy, it 
is a mandatde aspect of the EU’s political structure. 
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6.4.2 Global governance and democracy 
With respect to the global level of interaction, a number of the interviewees regarded the 
integration of the Parliament into the structures of the EU as an important step towards 
introducing democracy to wider ideas of global governance. Academic Ac2 pointed out 
that the EU is only the latest attempt to collectivise governance in Europe:  
 
Well at the very least the EU is one of a number of experiments that have 
been going on for the past century to replace the form of global 
governance which was prevalent for three or four centuries before, in 
other words the European empires. 
(Ac2: 3) 
 
Although there have been a number of different projects in Europe, this chapter argues 
that the role of the Parliament sets apart the EU as different from previous European 
projects, as well as from many of the other global attempts at creating a governance 
structure. For the European Union, the Parliament represents something achieved by no 
other collective governance or regulatory body: a functioning democratically 
representative body with influence over legislation. In his interviews, MEP1 puts forward 
a supporting case for this idea:  
 
… not saying the EU is perfect, but there is a level of democratic 
accountability there that we’ve built into the system that we should 
actually be proud of, which is missing in all of these other international 
structures. The fact that you have a directly elected parliament, the fact 
that national parliaments have been brought into the system. 
 
All that is something we’ve achieve at a European level which is not 
existing in these other bodies. 
(MEP1: 8) 
 
Despite the lauded role of the Parliament in the EU, the overall democratic element is by 
no means the dominant aspect of decision making.  For Academic Ac3, this combination 
of state and citizen does not mean that the Parliament and Union are undemocratic, but 
that they represent the latest manifestation of an ever-transforming democracy:   
 
[We] should think what we mean by ‘democracy’ in order to make 
different sense of these processes. This flies in the face of, its cuts against 
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the grain, of those who say no no no no, democracy can only be thought of 
as ultimately a territorial state phenomenon. And so it follows that from 
that position … that the precious institutions of Westminster democracy 
can only be preserved by basically keeping at arm’s length all these other 
external cross- boarder processes.  
(Ac3: 7) 
 
Ac3 feels there is a need to reassess how we understand democracy, and argues that it 
would be wrong to conceive of democratic systems only functioning as state-based 
mechanisms. For him, as with others interviewed, the European Parliament is a new form 
of democratic structure, for which we must adjust our perceptions accordingly: 
 
…we have to change our notion of democracy because, if you think about 
it, if in some sense democracy is the will of the people, or self government 
of the people, what the European Parliament has done as work in practise 
has been to introduce the notion of multiple mechanisms [of achieving 
this]. 
(Ac3: 11) 
 
It is clear that the European Union is not a simple transposing of traditional state-based 
democracy system onto a regional or global level. Its structures are different from other 
bodies, partly because of its unique relevant community.  The presence of a functioning 
Parliament means that citizens enjoy direct representation at a global level to a degree not 
present in any other global body.  
 
6.4.3 Critical summary of the global level: 
At the global level, both of examples show a clear image of the Parliament as the only 
body offering democratic accountability above the level of the state. Although (and as the 
other levels of interactions here illustrated) the Parliament’s role in EU decision-making 
and its presence in local and national communities is limited. Nevertheless, for European 
citizens, the Parliament represents an additional layer of democratic representation, 
providing them with a direct voice to an international political body, which they exercise 
alongside their national democratic systems.  
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The European Parliament is unique in its role in international politics. Both MEP1 and 
academic Ac1 argue that because of the Parliament, the EU represents a real alternative 
to present models of global governance.  The role of the Parliament in decision making 
elevates democratic governance in the EU above the level of states, and as such, it stands 
against Milward’s (1984) argument of state superiority and the basic interpretations of the 
neorealist model of extended states. Similarly, the Parliament’s presence in the EU does 
not fit with a hegemonic model of global governance. Although its role is limited, it does 
present a counterweight to neoliberal structures that dominate the global political and 
economic environment, offering a social model alongside the more established economic 
focus.  
 
The perceptions in the global level of interaction outlined bear some similarity with the 
model of concentric governance outlined in Chapter 4. This model imagines a more 
complicated set of global networks, interlinked by ideological and political structures. 
Here, the EU forms an influential ideological ‘core’ that offers as alternative to more 
neoliberal structures of global governance. As a result, the Parliament is not just a new 
form of democratic governance above the level of the state, but offers a potential for 
challenging the dominance of established international systems that do not emphasises 
democracy. 
 
Despite continued questions over the effectiveness of the Parliament’s democratic role in 
the Union, the arguments presented here make a case for the EU as a new type of 
governance structure, which employs democracy above the level of national political 
systems.   Academic Ac3 in particular argued that we should not judge the transference of 
democracy to the Parliament in terms of traditional systems. Rather, democracy is an 
ever-evolving concept and its role in the European Parliament is different from any other 
system. The final section of this chapter explores this argument in context of the claims 
of this thesis. 
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6.5 Summary: democracy and governance in the European Parliament  
 
  
As the second stage of immanent criticism, this chapter constructs a functional 
interpretation of the European Parliament that is built from a range of first-hand accounts 
and supplemented by official documents. Examining the Parliament’s relationships at a 
local, regional, and global level allows the chapter to construct an image of the wide 
variety of different relationships and roles the Parliament performs. Although the material 
in this chapter by no means represents the entirety of the Parliament’s functions, it does 
provide an indicative range of perspectives on the different ways in which the Parliament 
operates.   
 
Throughout the analysis here, two images of the Parliament are dominant. The first of 
these is a perception that the Parliament does contain a degree of democratic function, but 
that often this is not well exercised. At a local level, there is an image of the Parliament 
having little interaction with citizens. While there were benefits to the well-defined role 
of the Parliament’s democracy in decision making, these benefits are primarily in the 
legitimation of the European Union as a governance body. Democracy therefore plays an 
ideological rather than a functional role in the EU, so whilst there is a genuine route for 
citizens into decision making through the Parliament, the role of the Parliament remains 
secondary to that of member states.  
 
The conflict between states and citizens was also evident at the regional level of the 
model. Here, it was felt that there was a struggle between the economic desires of states 
and the more social influences of the Parliament. Despite limitations of the role of the 
Parliament compared to that of states in the structures of the EU, the principle of 
codecision cemented in the Lisbon Treaty (2007) meant that those interviewed felt 
democracy and democratic accountability played a functional role in decision making.   
 
Although it is not always effective, the role of the Parliament in the structures of the EU 
is well defined. Codecision means that, along with the Council of Ministers, the 
Parliament plays a direct input into decision-making. Furthermore, the Parliament has 
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clear structures in place to provide accountability. Periodic elections ensure that citizens 
are able to choose who represents them and although there is some conflict over sources 
of authority for MEPs, the Parliament does provide a source of legitimacy for the 
governance structures of the EU.  
 
The role that Parliamentary democracy plays in the EU is a form of democratic 
governance structure unique amongst others presently functioning in the global 
environment. A relevant community that encompasses both states and citizens elevates 
democracy as a supra-national presence in the global political environment. In Chapter 3, 
Kahler’s (2005: 9) assertion that ‘electoral institutions are only one part of the 
institutional panoply of modern democracy’ supports the idea that we should not view 
democratic governance in purely state-centric terms. Similarly, Keane’s (2008; 2009: 
583) ideas of ‘monitory democracy’ mean that aspects such as accountability, 
representation, and legitimacy also occur through non-state mechanisms, although 
arguably it requires an acceptance of these mechanisms for them to be effective. The 
European Parliament does just this, showing democracy to be a legitimate route to 
governance at a level above the nation state. This is not to say that structural support for 
democracy is unimportant, but that democracy’s ideological presence helps to cement its 
ongoing importance in self-determinate governance.  
 
6.5.1 Moving towards the third stage of immanent criticism. 
The introduction of the Parliament’s democracy into EU decision making represents a 
step towards increasing collective democratic governance on a global stage. The social 
influence that the Parliament brings act as a counterweight to a strong neoliberal ideology 
that pervades international structures, creating what interviewee Ip1 (7) calls ‘a new kind 
of balance’ to global governance. This new balance is a result of both citizens and states 
participating in global governance.  
 
Despite the positive role the Parliament plays in bringing democracy into global 
governance, there are some serious failings in the ways it expresses democracy, both for 
its citizens and in the EU’s decision making. Democracy is a constantly evolving system, 
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and this dissertation argues that there is potential in the Parliament’s democracy to 
function as a vehicle for forwarding a social agenda. This agenda could focus on the 
rights of individuals in contrast to the market emphasis of a dominant neoliberal 
ideology.  
 
The final stage of immanent criticism in the following chapter proposes a range of ways 
to develop democracy and governance in the Parliament. In doing so, it addresses the 
commitment to praxis in Horkheimer’s (1956: 182) philosophy, which requires work not 
just to be critical, but also to actively seek to ‘transcend’ the inequalities in the structures 
of our social world. 
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Chapter 7 
Immanent Criticism Stage 3: An exploration of the potential of the 
European Parliament:  
________________________________________________________________________ 
7.1 Introduction: The third stage of immanent criticism. 
7.2 A critique of the European Parliament’s functions. 
7.2.1 Issues of democracy 
7.2.2 Issues of governance 
7.3 The potential of democracy through the European Parliament 
7.3.1 Reform of the Parliament’s role  
7.3.2 Dedicated European Political Parties 
7.3.3 Increased transparency 
7.3.4 Stronger and more involved civil society 
7.3.5 Summary: potential of democracy in the EP 
7.4 The potential of governance through the European Parliament  
7.4.1 Citizens over states 
7.4.2 Democracy over neoliberalism 
7.4.3 Summary: potential of global governance and the EP 
7.5 Beyond structural critique 
7.6 Summary: The potential of the European Parliament as a democratic regional-global 
governance structure 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction: the third stage of immanent criticism. 
 
 
As a democratic governance body, the European Parliament occupies a unique position in 
world political structures. It gives its citizens the opportunity to influence some of the 
decisions at an international level that affects their lives. As this dissertation has argued 
however, there are some serious flaws in the ways in which these democratic and 
governance functions operate. This chapter is the final stage of immanent criticism, 
which sets out some of the most important criticisms of the Parliament a range of 
practical suggestions for overcoming them. 
 
The chapter initially provides a summary and critique of the main areas identified in the 
other two stages of immanent criticism in which the Parliament’s functions fall short of 
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their potential. This summary is a basis for the chapter to examine some practical ways in 
which improvements could me made. It does this by dealing with the two concepts of 
democracy and governance in turn. In the case of democracy, it sets out measures that 
could improve the ways democracy works in the Parliament.  For the section on 
governance, the chapter discusses suggestions for ways in which the Parliament may 
better integrate into the EU’s functions in present global structures. 
 
The suggestions for practical measures in this chapter are the culmination of the first two 
stages of critique in Chapters 5 and 6, as well as the theoretical work on democracy and 
governance in Chapters 3 and 4. The suggestions made here also refer to an important 
Green Paper on The Future of Democracy in Europe (Council of Europe, 2004). A 
number of academics and members of EU bodies wrote this paper in order to bring 
forward for discussion issues to do with democracy and governance across European 
states. Although not specifically dealing with the EU, the analysis in the Green Paper 
contributes some useful insights into areas that affect democracy, including issues of 
European enlargement and globalisation. The paper also deals with what it calls 
‘possibilism’ that is, the regard for ‘potential reforms of formal institutions and informal 
practices’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 11). This is a concept very similar to the idea of 
potentiality that this third stage of immanent criticism addresses, and as such, the Green 
Paper is a useful source of material for the chapter. 
 
As well as the Green Paper, the analysis also takes material from a range of surveys 
conducted by various bodies that focus specifically on issues of democracy and 
governance related to this study. Foremost amongst these is a set of ‘Parlemetre’ reports 
which details citizens' perceptions of the European Parliament. Conducted by the 
European Commission through their agent Eurobarometer every three years, these 
surveys explore questions that involve the nature of EU citizens’ perceptions of the 
Parliament’s functions, especially in relation to its democratic role (Eurobarometer, 
2011). As well as Parlemetre reports, Eurobarometer conduct surveys three to five times 
a year that focus more generally on citizens’ perceptions on the way the EU and its 
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bodies are working. Together, these surveys offer a valuable source of primary data that 
contributes to the analysis of the Parliament. 
 
The final element of critique goes beyond some of the structural concerns that immanent 
criticism focuses on to embrace wider ideas of potentiality within Horkheimer’s critical 
philosophy. It is a more radical criticism of the Parliament’s role in a global political 
environment shaped by neoliberalism, and its suggestions therefore focus less on 
structural reform and more on wide-ranging challenges to the established global order. 
 
 
7.2 A Critique of the Parliament’s functions 
 
This initial section of the chapter complements the criticism of the Parliament laid out in 
the first two stages of the immanent process. It explores in detail some of the main issues 
that arose around the Parliament’s democratic and governance functions, identifying 
important areas in which democracy and governance need to be developed. In making 
these criticisms, it utilizes a range of arguments from the theoretical chapters at the start 
of this dissertation, and supports these with further insights from the Green Paper on The 
Future of Democracy in Europe (Council of Europe, 2004). 
 
The first stage of immanent criticism in Chapter 5 set out the Parliament’s growth from 
an oversight body in the ECSC to a mandated part of EU decision making. Although this 
part of the process was mainly establishing the historical basis from which the Parliament 
grew, it also argued that the process of democratic development lay firmly within the 
control of member states.  Because of this, the Parliament fills only a secondary role in 
the decision-making structures of the EU, and although the most recent treaties went 
some way to strengthening the Parliament’s role, citizens still benefit from less input in 
the decision-making process than member states.  
 
The second stage of immanent criticism in Chapter 6 argued that the nature of democracy 
and governance in the Parliament raises some serious problems. In the first instance, it 
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claimed that the Parliament had very poor visibility in terms of its functions in member 
states. Secondly, there were concerns over the nature of governance structures in the EU, 
and the role that the Parliament played within them. Finally, there were issues around the 
overall role democracy plays in decision-making.  
 
The concerns from these two stages of immanent criticism are set out here under the 
headings of democracy and governance. This aids the subsequent discussion on their 
potential later in the chapter. 
 
7.2.1 Issues of democracy 
One of the issues identified with the democratic nature of the European Parliament 
reflects problems with its functional visibility for citizens. Both of the first two stages of 
immanent criticism identify problems with the Parliament’s role in member states. 
Chapter 6 in particular, argued that there was not enough engagement either with citizens 
or with centrally funded projects situated in local or regional communities.  
 
The Green Paper on The Future of Democracy in Europe suggests that ‘EU institutions 
lack the legitimacy of their national counterparts and the gap between EU citizens and 
European institutions seems to be growing’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 47). Support for 
this comes from a Eurobarometer survey in 2008, which found that of 27,000 EU citizens 
asked for their perceptions of the EU’s regional policy, 48% were unaware of EU support 
to their city or region (Eurobarometer, 2008).  Although these figures reinforce the 
argument that the Parliament experiences low visibility in member states, this problem is 
common to many governance structures. For example, a similar survey conducted in 
2008 by Ipsos MORI on behalf of London Councils found that 55% knew nothing at all 
or not very much about their local council (Ipsos MORI, 2008).  
 
The Parlemetre report in February 2010 found that in the UK 74% of those asked felt 
they were ‘badly informed’ about the European Parliament’s activities, compared to an 
average of 68% across all 27 Member states (Eurobarometer, 2010: 1). Despite this 
seemingly negative outcome, the European Parliament (2010e: 2) in its response and 
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analysis of the survey described the result as a ‘significant trend reversal’ when compared 
to the previous survey in 2007. 
 
Another concern around democracy was a picture that emerged of the Parliament’s role 
in the EU providing little opportunity for democracy to influence decision making. 
Chapter 5 establishes an argument in which the structures of the Parliament remain 
dominated by the influence of member states, a process that Figure 17 demonstrates by 
describing how codecision involves citizens in the legislative process. Chapter 6 takes 
this argument further, and the interviews show how the Parliament concentrates more on 
ideological aspects of democracy rather than on providing functional ways for citizens to 
participate.  
  
A recent Eurobarometer (2010) survey shows that there is wide national variance across 
the EU in citizen’s perceptions of the nature of democracy in the European Parliament. 
Averages across the whole EU show that 64% perceive the European Parliament as 
democratic. This is much higher than the 42% who felt the same in the UK 
(Eurobarometer 2010: 2). Similarly, an average of 38% across the EU felt that the 
European Parliament listened to citizens, contrasting with 27% in the UK (Eurobarometer 
2010: 2). Although the overall results are better than those in 2007, the specifics of these 
Eurobarometer surveys display a different sentiment between states.  It is clear that there 
are problems with the nature of democratic legitimacy in the Parliament in regards to the 
perceptions of EU citizens, and the resulting image is one of a Parliament struggling to 
make its presence felt in local communities.  
 
Crouch’s (2004: 6) concept of ‘post democracy’ discussed in Chapter 3 describes how 
poor visibility or lack of engagement leads to problems in the ways democracy and 
governance function. When the governance process does not involve citizens or where 
citizens evidence little evidence of those statutes working, there is a risk of 
disenfranchisement. Consequent difficulties in accountability, representation and 
legitimacy in the European Parliament that stem from this poor visibility run the risk of 
de-legitimating the whole Union as a body that speaks for citizens. It will be interesting 
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to discover if the upward trends in visibility continue in the next set of Eurobarometer 
surveys, in light of the stringent financial aid programmes run by the ECB in Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal, or if these interventions direct public awareness onto other EU 
bodies, such as the ECB. 
 
7.2.2 Issues of governance 
As well as issues on the nature of democracy, there were concerns in the earlier stages of 
immanent criticism over the European Parliament’s role in democratic governance above 
the level of the state.  The Green Paper on The Future of Democracy in Europe (Council 
of Europe, 2004)  identified a number of challenges in this area, querying how well 
Europe’s ‘well-established formal institutions and formal practises “fit” with the much 
more rapidly changing social, economic, cultural and technological arrangements that 
surround it’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 14). The Green Paper regards the EU as subject to 
evolving social and political forces that challenge democracy’s foundations ‘both 
materially and normatively’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 14).  
 
The Green Paper goes on to state that the ‘shift of economic and political competencies 
from the national to the European level has (so far) not been matched by a corresponding 
shift in democratic legitimacy’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 47). Although there is evidence 
in this dissertation to suggest this is the case, particularly in light of the Parliament’s 
lesser role in decision making, it is also true that the Parliament and the Union are not 
simply state-based models of democratic governance writ large for the international 
stage. Their joint role as a composite of 27 different states and over 500 million citizens 
means they represent a unique relevant community, and a source of legitimacy unique 
among similar bodies.  
 
The principle of codecision affords the Parliament a unique position in the decision-
making structures of the EU. The social and democratic attention it imports to 
governance tempers the economic models that states feel they must adopt in order to 
function in a global neoliberal political environment. Nonetheless, there remain serious 
concerns over the role the Parliament plays in decision making, as Figure 18 in Chapter 5 
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demonstrates. This secondary position of Parliament in decision making impacts on the 
role that democracy plays in the governance of the EU. As Chapter 6 expounds, there is a 
conflict between economic and social models in the European Union. The regulatory and 
economic requirements of states are influential in both the Commission and Council of 
Ministers, whilst on the other hand, the Parliament seeks to manage and represent the 
issues of European citizens.  
 
The Green Paper also expresses concern about the division between states and citizens, 
suggesting that there is a ‘trade-off between institutions that promote democratic 
legitimacy and institutions that promote output and functional legitimacy’ (Council of 
Europe, 2004: 68). This argument echoes the findings of Keohane and Nye (2003: 390), 
who suggest that in systems of governance, democracy is often ‘traded off against other 
values’. Where bodies such as the Parliament concentrate on democratic forms of 
participation, other institutions are more concerned with ensuring that the Union delivers 
results, with less regard for how the process occurs. 
 
For the Green Paper, the distinction between democratic legitimacy and functional 
legitimacy is material to understanding the ways that democracy works in the EU. The 
Green Paper identifies democratic legitimacy as a product of ‘participation, access and 
accountability’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 68). Using categories similar to those devised 
in this dissertation, the Green Paper forwards the idea that the ongoing involvement of 
citizens is vital to the democratic legitimation of governance.  
 
Unlike democratic legitimacy, functional legitimacy ‘require[s] institutions to operate in 
place of citizens’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 68). This approach views governance as the 
product of institutions that are more concerned with the maintenance of social and 
political life than that processes of democratic rule. As a result of this difference, the 
Green Paper contends that institutions that adhere to functional types of legitimacy are 
‘eroding citizens’ sense that they can influence collective decision making’ (Council of 
Europe, 2004: 68). 
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The contention of this dissertation, reflected in the Green Paper, is that the EU is slipping 
towards a functional legitimacy in which citizens lack influence over the nature and 
direction of the structures and decisions made. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is 
a result of continued dominance of states in EU governance structures. As Chapter 4 
establishes, this is partly due to a dominant neoliberal ideology that shapes the global 
political environment and is therefore a strong force in defining the capacity of states. 
The desire for states to operate effectively in this environment means democracy must be 
‘traded off’, as both Keohane and Nye (2003: 390) and the Green Paper suggest (Council 
of Europe, 2004: 68).  
 
The second reason for a slip towards functional legitimacy is a ‘tendency towards 
bureaucratisation’ and a ‘shift from politics to administration’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 
70). This is congruent with Milward’s position (1984), where control always ultimately 
resides with states. There is evidence for this in the immanent criticism. For example, the 
historical analysis of the Parliament’s development suggests that it is only through the 
acquiescence of states that the Parliament has realised any real influence. It is also 
evident in Chapter 6, particularly at the local and regional levels of interaction, where 
several of those interviewed felt the Parliament had little tangible authority or influence. 
In both cases, the consequences of a shift towards functional rather than democratic 
legitimacy are that the Parliament and the EU risk becoming a body in which democracy 
is a secondary element to governance.  
 
 
7.3 The potential of Democracy through the European Parliament 
 
As the main democratic component of the European Union, the European Parliament 
gives democratic legitimacy to its rule, providing an avenue for EU citizens to influence 
policy. The formalised role in decision-making which codecision gave the Parliament 
signifies a new system of internationalised democracy with a relevant community that 
represents both states and citizens. Because of the new nature of EU democracy, 
traditional definitions of are unsuitable for describing the functions of the Parliament. In 
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their place, the dissertation applies three principles to provide a guide for analysing how 
democracy is manifest in the Parliament’s structures. These principles also direct analysis 
to areas where democracy might be improved, and this provides some specific discussion 
on ways to enhance the Parliament’s democracy that culminates in four suggestions for 
enhancing democracy.  
 
The first principle of democracy is legitimacy. As Chapter 3 describes, legitimacy refers 
to the ways in which a democratic structure achieves and maintains a right to govern. 
This is evident in the physical as well as the ideological structures of an organisation, and 
both of these elements are an important gauge for the role that democracy plays in the 
governance process. 
 
The Green Paper on The Future of Democracy in Europe (Council of Europe, 2004) also 
identifies legitimacy as a key concern for democratic systems. Although these 
suggestions are relatively unspecific, they do suggest some general solutions to 
addressing problems in legitimacy. The Paper also takes a useful approach in describing 
these strategies, as Figure 22 (following) indicates, dividing its focus into several 
categories. Direct and indirect strategies refer to the requirements of strategies in terms of 
legislative or structural change, and it applies these either to the structures of a polity or 
directly to citizens.  
Figure 22: Suggestions from the 2004 Green Paper on improving 
democratic legitimacy  
 
Direct Strategies Indirect Strategies 
 
Polity-based 
Subjecting guardian 
institutions to the direct 
control of democratically 
elected bodies 
Promote a system of 
horizontal checks based on 
reciprocal vigilance 
between guardian and 
democratic institutions 
 
Citizen-Based 
Devise mechanisms, other 
than electoral control, 
which guarantee popular 
participation and control 
Promote institutions that 
operate a vertical check 
over political institutions by 
allowing for citizens’ voice. 
Taken from: Council of Europe (2004: 71) 
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The target of these suggestions is not directly the EU, but its aim is to promote a general 
discussion on democracy in Europe.  Furthermore, the Green Paper published these 
suggestions around the same time as the initial constitution for the EU was under 
consideration, and consequently before the Lisbon Treaty (2007) that replaced the 
constitution came into force.  Although Lisbon developed the role of the Parliament in 
the EU, particularly in relation to codecision, there is little improvement for many of the 
areas which the Green Paper suggests are important.  
 
Although the suggestions made by the Green Paper are in many cases too general to 
apply specifically to the European Parliament, the structure with which it presents its 
suggestions is useful (Council of Europe, 2004: 71). In particular, the divide between 
polity-based and citizen-based initiatives is a robust way of approaching some of the 
issues this dissertation contends are problematic in the Parliament’s democracy.  
 
The following four sections present some discrete ways to improve democracy in the 
European Parliament. These suggestions derive from the analysis in this dissertation, 
using the immanent criticism of Chapters 5 and 6 as well as the more general theoretical 
discussions from earlier in this work. They also utilise useful terms applied in the Green 
Paper to help articulate these issues (Council of Europe, 2004: 71).  
 
7.3.1 Reform of the Parliament’s role 
One area of democracy identified as problematic was the more limited role that the 
Parliament plays in the EUs decision-making structures. This is particularly prescient for 
democratic legitimacy, as the Parliament is central to the ways that the EU justifies is 
democratic role both ideological and structurally. If democracy in the Parliament is seen 
or felt to be flawed, then this brings into question the right of the EU to function on 
behalf of its relevant community.  
 
The most obvious way of directly addressing reform at a polity level is an overhaul of the 
current structure of EU governance bodies. The nature of the European Union is such that 
both states and citizens presently require representation in its structures, and although it 
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may increase democratic legitimacy to move to a structure that did not incorporate states, 
this would not reflect the Parliament’s unique relevant community. However, there is 
clearly an imbalance towards states in the current system, and redressing this would go 
some way to increasing overall democratic legitimacy.   
 
One solution to developing the role of the Parliament could be to redefine the current 
structure of the EU to allow both the Parliament and the Council of Ministers to initiate 
legislation. This would provide the two bodies that represent the relevant community of 
the EU with a much more involved role in the legislative process. The ability to initiate 
legislation may also help to increase the connections between the Parliament and citizens 
by creating a more direct route to transformative action. Through their representatives, 
citizens could be given the chance to shape the EU’s functions more immediately.  
 
As a complex structure with a relevant community that encompasses both citizens and 
states, the nature of multi-level governance in the European Union means that 
accountability is sometimes hard to locate. Although giving the Parliament a clearly 
defined role in the EU, the process of codecision, exacerbates the overall complexity of 
decision-making. Legislation passes though several bodies, each of which influence it in 
different ways and exhibit varying levels of transparency in their deliberations. To some 
extent this is an inevitable outcome of a multi-house system, although in the EU this is 
amplified as only one of the bodies in the process is directly elected and therefore 
accountable through democratic structures. The Green Paper raises this problem more 
generally, arguing that ‘multi-level governance and decentralisation challenge democratic 
norms of accountability’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 72). However, just because a 
structure is complex does not mean that it should be unaccountable, and the Green Paper 
suggests this is achievable through a process of ‘inter-level accountability’ (Council of 
Europe, 2004: 71). 
 
Inter-level accountability within a multi-level system of governance involves a well-
mandated and established process of checks and balances between different sections of 
the governance structure. To a certain extent, this already exists in the EU with the 
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Parliament’s role in scrutinising legislation, the EU budget, and choices for Commission 
President. In practise, however, a real improvement in accountability means widening 
this form of monitory and inter-level accountability that would involve the Parliament 
playing a more engaged role.  This could create greater transparency through a process 
that subjects all levels of governance to some democratic authority. It would also go 
some way to reducing the domination of states in the governance system, as well as 
placing greater status upon the social aspects of EU policy.   
 
The greatest mechanism for achieving accountability is to extend the role of the 
Parliament in decision making. The moving of all decision making into the hands of 
elected members would increase accountability in decision making as well as the overall 
legitimacy of the Union. However, as this process of immanent criticism suggests, the EU 
at present comprises a relevant community that is a composite of state and citizens, and 
its decision-making structures necessarily reflect this.  
 
One possible solution to increasing democracy whilst ensuring representation for both 
parts of the EU’s relevant community is to elect representatives for the Council of 
Ministers. Transforming the Council of Ministers into an elected body may also serve to 
create a democratic bicameral system, where the elected Council could comprise 
representatives from member states, put forward for election at the same time as 
Parliamentary candidates. This would leave open an avenue for state representation in the 
EU, whilst subjecting the Council to the same democratic procedures as the Parliament.  
 
Reform of the legislative system in the European Union would enrich the nature of 
democracy exercised. A more involved role for the Parliament in decision making might 
help to resituate the body away from state centric polices yet still allow states to 
participate in this unique governance structure. Ultimately, a greater role for the 
Parliament in decision making would increase democratic legitimacy of the EU as a 
whole. 
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7.3.2 Dedicated European Political Parties 
 
One of the main problems with the exercising of democracy in the Parliament is the lack 
of a functioning, unified pan-European political system. In particular, this work identified 
the current system that elects MEPs through the domestic parties of member states as 
damaging for the nature of democratic representation in the Parliament. The problem of 
dual party affiliation creates an area of tension for MEPs who are faced with a national 
party that controls the source of re-election and a European Party which represents their 
everyday working environment. It also hinders the development of European wide 
political parties, as the national associations continue to have influence over MEPs and 
their voting patterns.  
 
There has been extensive debate on the ways in which a set of Europe-wide political 
structures has, and continues to, develop. Ladrech (2010) describes two processes that 
strengthen European-wide democratic politics. In the first instance, he highlights the 
ways in which European political influence is increasingly acting on national party 
politics. He argues that because the EU is ‘undeniably interwoven in the policy and 
decision-making process of domestic governance’, it is therefore ‘reasonable to assume 
that national political parties may have also exhibited internal organisational change as 
elements of their domestic environment have altered’. The second element to 
Europeanisation has been the development of transnational political groups and party 
federations ‘the extra-parliamentary wings of the party groups within the parliament’. 
These groups, although not as influential as the main party groupings, have become ‘a 
permanent feature of the European union party universe’ (2010: 129). In both these cases, 
Ladrech sees a steady progression towards Europeanization that is beginning to change 
the nature of both domestic and EU politics. 
 
Despite a movement towards a more centralised European political system, Ladrech 
(2010: 210) is sceptical on the level of overall change, arguing that there are only ‘very 
modest outward or formal exchanges … which are traceable to EU influence’. Ladrech 
does, however, identify a role for emerging ‘interest groups’ and ‘Euro-associations’, 
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which are increasingly supplementing the domestic political arena (2010: 211). Although 
far from political parties in a traditional sense, and still playing a supplementary role to 
the established political groupings, these associations offer an alternative route to pan-
European collective action that gives European citizens a voice in centralised European 
politics. 
 
As with Ladrech, Hix (2008) believes there is the potential for a genuine party system in 
the European Parliament to emerge. He argues that voting in the Parliament is already 
‘much more along transnational party lines then national lines’ (2008: 114). However, the 
political organisations that currently exist in the EU are ‘rather loose umbrella 
organisations with few incentives to coordinate genuine political action across EU 
institution. Consequently, Hix (2008: 136) argues that there is ‘very little coordination of 
positions and alliances across the three EU institutions’, rather informal agreements and 
coalitions deal with issues on an individual basis.  
 
The problems Hix (2008: 119) identifies with democratic politics in the European 
Parliament are exacerbated by what he sees as a disconnection between citizens and the 
‘emerging democratic politics in the European parliament’. Hix (2008) argues that the 
continued association of European politics to domestic politics and political parties 
means that European citizens have little information on which to base voting decisions, 
other than the traditional connections to the domestic parties from which MEPs are 
drawn. Accordingly, it is difficult for citizens, during elections or at other times, to 
‘identify the protagonists and the positions they represent’ (2008: 136). As a 
consequence, Hix (2008: 119) claims that European citizens ‘do not vote in European 
parliament  elections to influence which parties form the majority in the European 
Parliament’.  
 
The conflict between national and European politics may make it hard for citizens to 
envisage a route from political ideologies at the national level where elections take place, 
to the European level where MEPs sit in different ideological blocks. This disconnect is 
noted in the 2010 Parlemetre survey where 39% of European citizens questioned felt that 
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MEPs sat in Parliament according to national rather than political affiliation (Ipsos 
MORI, 2008: 2). The Green Paper on The Future of Democracy in Europe also refers to a 
problem with political groups, which it believes arise as part of the gradual transfer of 
power from states to the EU unmatched by a corresponding boost in representation 
(Council of Europe, 2004: 46).  
 
For Hix (2008: 85), the missing element in European Political organisation is ‘the 
substantive content of democracy: a battle for control of political power between rival 
groups of leaders with rival policy platforms’. The lack of what he terms ‘open political 
contestation’ (2008: 101) means it becomes very difficult to know ‘whether the policies 
of the EU really are the choices of European citizens’ (2001: 85). For Hix (2008:101), the 
solution to this impasse is greater open competition that would ‘significantly strengthen 
these nascent transnational party organisations’ and, ultimately, ‘force the realignment of 
these organisations and the establishment of European-wide political forces’. 
 
The development of transnational party groups, such as the Party of European Socialists 
(PES), is often cited as an example that highlights the ways in which European Politics is 
becoming more democratic. Both Ladrech (2010) and Hix (2008) present a case in which 
these bodies, although imperfect, have the potential to offer centralised democratic 
European politics. Lightfoot (2005: 144) however, claims that this case has been 
overstated, and that both Hix and Ladrech have ‘underestimated the strength of the 
factors that limit its effectiveness’. In particular, Lightfoot (2005: 145) points to the 
realpolitik dynamics of managing policy at a transnational level, in which policy is a 
result of ‘tensions between domestic constraints and ideological preferences’ and where 
‘party elites/government actors wrestle with the task of constructing sustainable, sub-
optimal policy bargains’. The consequence of this is a European Political system that is 
‘elite dominated, pragmatic, and limited in ambition’ (2005: 145). 
 
Despite Lightfoot’s (2005: 147) critical reading of European politics, he does concede 
that the EU has the potential to become a ‘complete polity’, in which ‘Europarties could 
offer the voters choices for the future development of this polity’. For Lightfoot (2005: 
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147), it is ‘future European integration [that] may hold the key to the development of true 
Europarties’. As the EU increasingly takes on the functions that were once the remit of 
domestic politics in member states, Lightfoot (2005: 147) sees it as possible that these 
‘Europarties may take on more of the functions of national political parties’. 
 
For Lightfoot (2005), Ladrech (2009), and Hix (2008), European-wide political parties 
remain some way off. This does not mean, however, that greater democratic politics 
cannot develop in other forms. The Green Paper on The Future of Democracy in Europe 
reflects this idea of democracy as multifaceted process and rejects ‘the notion that there is 
one ideal type of democracy’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 89). Supported strongly in this 
dissertation, this idea extends to the nature of representation in the Parliament insofar as 
there is no set way in which representation should occur. It is however clear that there 
could be a great improvement in representative functions in the European Parliament, 
particularly in the case of political parties. Clear roles for such parties would ideally 
allow citizens to receive a much sharper indication of their connection to European-wide 
political ideologies. The Green Paper suggests that ‘the development of a genuine party 
system among EU member states would constitute an important step towards creating a 
European demos’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 46). Although the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union (1992) introduced the concept of European citizen, there needs to be an 
extension of this process needs in order to better connect European citizens with 
European politics.  
 
The introduction of dedicated European political parties and the strengthening of ‘open 
political contestation’ (Hix: 2008: 101) would help to develop democracy in Parliament 
plays and strengthen its role as a European-wide political institution. Disassociating 
European from national political parties could ostensibly reduce the distance between 
voters and the structures of power. It may also help to solve the complications in multiple 
sites of authority for MEPs, who would no longer be subject to national party politics.  
The creation of dedicated European political parties may also assist in cementing the idea 
of a European demos, for both citizens and EU policy makers. Along with this, there is 
the potential to supplement these European wide political parties with other mechanisms 
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that allow citizens to voice their democratic rights, such as Ladrech’s  (2010: 210) 
‘interest groups’ and ‘Euro-associations’. Lightfoot’s (2005: 147) argues that the 
presence of the bodies in a growing EU would help to create the EU and its Parliament as 
a ‘complete polity’. 
 
7.3.3 Increased transparency 
Common across many of the issues raised on the Parliament’s democratic governance in 
this dissertation is a lack of transparency. By their nature, many of the other suggestions 
here also help to increase transparency in the structures of the Parliament and EU.  
Although it is clear that certain complicated aspects of running a multi-state governance 
body require specialised bodies, this does not mean that these bodies must function 
outside of the remit of democratic accountability. Bringing all aspects of European 
governance within the remit of the European Parliament would mean that citizens could 
have some kind of input in all aspects of decision making. This may be as simple as 
ensuring that all such bodies include MEPs sitting on them and reporting to the 
Parliament or Council of Ministers, and who could then exercise the power to bring 
decisions from these bodies to their respective chambers for debate. The resulting 
increase in transparency would also help to heighten accountability and perceptions of 
legitimate government in the EU as a whole.  
 
As well as these direct approaches to improving transparency, certain indirect ways exist 
to develop this in the Parliament. One solution would be to subject a wider range of 
bodies within the EU to scrutiny from democratically elected Parliamentary members. 
Members of the Parliament sitting with non-elected parts of the governance structure, 
such as the Commission and European Council, could assist in countering the lack of 
democratic involvement in some areas of the Parliament’s functions. This would also 
formalise the legitimacy of the EU, giving citizens a route through the Parliament into all 
aspects of the EU’s functions, and thereby increasing transparency in decision making 
and governance.   
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A further way to increase transparency would be to encourage MEPs to take a more 
active role in their national states and local constituencies. As the interviews in Chapter 6 
pointed out, there is a feeling that MEPs do not directly engage much with issues in their 
local areas. This was particularly the case with those who are involved with running 
European projects and experienced little interaction with their respective MEPs. This is a 
difficult issue to resolve given the complications of distance in the role of MEPs who 
have large geographical constituency areas, and owe a commitment to be in Brussels or 
Strasbourg at Parliamentary sessions. Nevertheless, fostering greater interaction between 
citizens, European projects, and MEPs should go a long way to improving the 
relationships between the governed and the processes that govern them. 
 
Some of the ways to help increase MEP involvement could include the use of information 
technology that would enable them to participate in European debate and discussion 
whilst remaining in their local constituency. An alternative to this might be MEPs teamed 
up more actively in regions, so that one can be present in Europe while the other is in the 
constituency. Both of these options would help to forge better relationships with citizens, 
and in doing so, involve them more in the workings of the Parliament.  
 
7.3.4 Stronger more involved civil society 
According to the Green Paper, the challenges facing the nature of the state and 
governance in Europe mean that ‘civil society has probably been affected more than any 
other aspect of democracy’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 56). One way they suggest to 
redress this decline is fostering movement toward ‘an embryonic European civil society’ 
(Council of Europe, 2004: 57). Although the idea of European citizen already exists, 
reinforcing a European civil society could open further channels another method whereby 
this collective citizenry might express its wishes and hopefully political consciousness of 
Europe as a political entity distinct from statutes. 
 
In Chapter 3, the idea of a strong civil society was central to debates on the shape of 
modern democracy. Shaw (2002: 169-70), for example argued that the nature of civil 
society and the state would likely constitute the focus for conflict, a position with some 
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merit particularly in light of recent clashes in Europe as a result of the ongoing recession. 
Chapter 3 supports Keane’s (2009: 690) argument that representation in modern 
democratic systems is applicable ‘to a much wider range of settings than ever before’. 
Rather than rely on traditional forms of democratic structures, individuals are finding 
other ways to represent their views, particularly through civil society organisations.  
 
Enlivened civil society bodies create a parallel structure to traditional governance and one 
that can represent citizens’ views outside of the formalised bodies of governance.  
Currently, there is a loose commitment in the EU to facilitate this kind of input and 
monitoring from civil society bodies. Protocol No 7 in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 
made it compulsory that "the Commission should … consult widely before proposing 
legislation, and, wherever appropriate, publish consultation documents". The Lisbon 
Treaty (2007: 150) reiterated this with a similar commitment that ‘before proposing 
legislative acts, the Commission shall consult widely’. However, these commitments are 
at best vague; there is scarse definition of what constitutes a consultation. In fact, the only 
process written into Lisbon for this purpose was the process of sending new legislation to 
national parliaments in order to ‘consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with 
legislative powers’ (Lisbon Treaty, 2007: 151).  
 
Increasing practical democratic representation through civil society would involve 
locating responsibility of consultation more firmly with citizens. Reinforcing the 
relationship between the citizen and the EU would help to engender a European ethos and 
expand the concept of a European demos. A European civil society would also act as a 
monitory body for both the Parliament and the EU as a whole, imbued with its own 
sources of legitimate authority deriving from its freely subscribing membership of EU 
citizens, and operating as external checks and balances to the functions of governance 
bodies within the European Union.  
 
As an informal check and balance, civil society organisations add another layer to the 
processes of accountability in a state or governance body. Regenerating the role of civil 
society bodies should greatly inflate the accountable element of democracy in the 
 219 
European Parliament. In Chapter 4, Keane’s (2009: 689) idea of monitory democracy 
made a case for pursuing accountability through less formal democracy structures, 
existent in the public sphere and outside of traditional institutions.  Keane is attempting to 
find in monitory democracy ‘new ways of democratic living for little people in big and 
complex societies’ (2009: 690) where there is a lack of faith in traditional methods of 
political accountability. Instead of state-based methods of representation and 
accountability, civil society bodies allow individuals a different avenue in which to 
express opinions or beliefs. Keane argues that these bodies may operate as ‘power-
scrutinising inventions’ (2009: 690) which protect or project the interests of groups who 
choose to support them. The success of these organisations or pressure groups is then 
partly down to the democratic choice of individuals to lend their support. As an example 
of this, Keane (2009: 961) cites the Green Paper on The Future of Democracy in Europe 
as a case in which a group of leading European academics were commissioned to write a 
report that went on to become an effective influence on the EU.     
 
Keane’s (2009: 689) concept of monitory democracy has the benefit of facilitating 
participation for a much wider group of people.  Since most civil society bodies possess 
less stringent membership rules than states, monitory democracy encompasses a much 
wider relevant community than traditional systems of citizenship. This is particularly true 
in an information age when individuals enjoy the opportunity to participate in campaigns 
and activities dispersed across Europe without having to be physically present.  
 
A stronger European civil society, even if not within an improved mandate for 
consultation, should enable a greater voice for citizens. Operating as a check and balance 
on the functions of the European Union and Parliament, a stronger civil society would 
increase the ways in which it was possible for citizens to influence the nature of policy 
and would represent citizens’ opinions outside of formal channels. As part of this, a 
clearly mandated role for consultation with civil society bodies would also facilitate a 
chance for making opinions known outside of formal elections, not just to citizens but for 
all those living in the European Union,.  
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A stronger civil society may also assist in strengthening the Parliament’s image as a 
representative body as it would serve to reinforce the concept of European citizen, with 
rights responsibilities and representation in an accountable and legitimate governance 
structure. It could also enhance accountability by allowing non-citizens with a stake in 
the EU to contribute to processes of governance. 
 
7.3.5 Summary: potential of democracy in the EU 
The strategies suggested here for improving the Parliament’s democracy are organised 
along similar concepts to the Green Paper on The Future of Democracy in Europe 
(Council of Europe, 2004: 71) Figure 23 (following) divides the strategies into four 
categories depending on their focus. Strategies are targeted either at polity structures or 
on the role of citizens and these are also divided into direct and indirect approaches, 
referring to those that require legislative change and those that involve little or no new 
legislation.  The intention of these four strategies is to advance practical ways for 
improving the nature of democratic accountability. Whilst many focus specifically on the 
Parliament and its functions, aspects of them may be implemented outside of the 
Parliament’s direct control but still remain closely associated with its role.  
 
Figure 23:  Author’s suggestions on improving democracy   
 Direct Strategies Indirect Strategies 
 
 
 
Polity-based 
1. Reform of the Parliament’s 
role 
Increase influence of Parliament as 
elected body. 
 
Extend process of democratic 
elections to Council of Ministers 
 
Commission chosen and populated 
by members from Parliament and 
Council 
3. Increased transparency 
Strengthen horizontal checks with 
more transparent monitoring of all 
bodies. 
 
Push MEPs to be more active in local 
constituencies. Encourage more 
involvement with local projects 
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Citizen-based 
 
2. Dedicated European political 
parties  
Introduction of European-wide 
political parties, 
 
Dissociate European political 
parties from national parties 
 
4. Stronger, more involved civil 
society 
Stronger role for civil society 
organisations 
 
Actively seek to strengthen the idea 
of a European citizen with rights and 
responsibilities outside of their 
nation state 
 
Although these strategies are presented in four categories, there is a great deal of 
crossover between them.  For example, the introduction of dedicated European political 
parties would also require some central, structural readjustment in the Parliament, 
although in principle political parties are an extension of citizens’ requirements. 
Similarly, increased transparency applies to a whole range of different aspects in 
governance, although its inclusion in the polity-based category is because these are 
essentially mechanisms of the Parliament that require action. The division of the 
strategies into the categories also means that their implementation can occur 
independently. They do not rely on each other in order to function; however, collectively 
they offer a more comprehensive package of practical changes for addressing democracy 
in the Parliament and EU.  
 
Working towards better democracy is not the only way to improve the functions of the 
European Parliament. There are governance issues that relate to the ways in which it 
operates that, although closely associated with its democratic role, embrace wider 
considerations of global political structures.  The next section considers these issues, 
exploring the role of Parliament in a wider context of global governance.  
 
 
7.4 The Potential of governance through the European Parliament. 
 
The four strategies for improving democracy concentrate on establishing some practical 
methods for developing the democratic functions in the European Parliament. Although 
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these strategies go some way to addressing the failings of the Parliament identified in this 
immanent criticism, there remain wider considerations of the Parliament’s governance 
role in the EU and its significance for democratic governance above the level of the state.  
 
This part of the chapter examines two of the most pressing aspects of governance in the 
European Parliament that the immanent criticism revealed. Firstly, it suggests ways to 
address the ongoing struggle between state and citizens in the EU’s governance 
structures, paying specific attention to the ways in which the Parliament may be able to 
strengthen its role. Secondly, it sets out some of the more serious problems of a 
democratic body operating in an overwhelmingly neoliberal global environment, 
advancing suggestions for the Parliament to function in such a situation. 
 
7.4.1 Citizens over states  
The ongoing dynamic between states and citizens continues to shape the nature of the 
Parliament and the Union as a whole. This is evident throughout the immanent criticism, 
which emphasises on several occasions how the power-sharing arrangements in the EU 
mean that citizens exert less influence than states in decision making.  
 
The arguments of economic historians Milward (1984) and Dedman (2010: 11) tie the 
Parliament’s growth to the will of member states, and the history of Parliamentary 
development described in Chapter 5 certainly supports them. Although a social emphasis 
emerged alongside the economic and structural desires of states, manifest initially as the 
oversight bodies for the ECSC and Euratom, states continued to retain the largest share of 
influence in decision making.  
 
More recently, the Lisbon Treaty (2007) formalised a process of codecision that allowed 
both the Parliament and Council of Ministers to participate in decision making. Despite 
this seeming movement away from the state as the sole or primary locus of control, this 
immanent criticism raises some real questions as to the effectiveness of the European 
Parliament as a part of the Union’s overall governance structure. The interviews in 
Chapter 6 detailed a range of views on the Parliament, many of which although 
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supportive of its principles and some of its functions, viewed it as little more than a 
‘talking shop’, as academic Ac1 (3) termed it.  
 
Part of the Parliament’s success within the EU lies in its ability to function effectively 
alongside states. Despite several negative opinions in the interviews, and an historical 
analysis that shows a continuing emphasis on states, a certain amount of evidence 
suggests the Parliament contains a tangible potential for incorporating a genuinely 
democratic aspect to governance. Although the democracy exercised so far leaves 
significant room for improvement, as the previous section illustrated, ongoing legislative 
developments meant that democracy plays a meaningful, if not dominant role in decision 
making. 
 
If the Parliament is able to maintain its influence in the EU by implementing some of the 
changes discussed in this chapter and outlined in Figure 21, it could ultimately strengthen 
its position in the EU and in wider political roles. Not least, promoting a more involved 
role for MEPs should foster a better democratic relationship between citizens and 
Parliament, improving the Parliament’s legitimacy. Similarly, encouraging the growth of 
a European-wide civil society could allow the Parliament to develop its democracy 
without having to rely on changes at the structural level.  This may involve a function for 
monitory systems of democracy in which an enlarged relevant community would 
participate in governance. 
 
The process of strengthening the Parliament’s governance requires developing the 
transition from what Dedman (2010: 7) terms ‘interdependence’ to ‘integration’. Outlined 
in Chapter 5, this idea posits that for democratic governance to be truly effective at a 
supranational level there needs to be more than cooperation over common needs. In its 
place, a process of integration in the European Parliament and wider Union must involve 
a coming together of states and / or citizens not as individual bodies, but as a functional 
whole.  The creation of a European citizenry was part of this process of integration as it 
allows citizens to transcend individual states and function at a collective level. If the 
European Parliament can continue to work towards integrating the wishes of a European 
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citizenry then it has the potential to strengthen its role in the EU, and in doing so increase 
the influence it may bring to bear on decision-making.   
 
As well as using democratic methods to develop democracy internally, the European 
Parliament can also help to improve its representation of citizens by improving its role in 
a global political environment.  The neorealist model described in Chapter 4 portrays an 
image of the European Union as a vehicle for extended statehood. In this so-called 
‘neorealist interpretation’ of global politics (Payne and Samhat, 2004: 34), states are 
geostrategic units in a multi-polar world that regulates itself through treaties, agreements 
and, occasionally, force. Whilst this position is generally dismissive of any other source 
of authority other than states, its interpretations of global relationships mean that any 
regional influence from democratic bodies such as the European Parliament has the 
potential to diffuse across regional networks of states. This ‘diffusion effect’, as it is 
being termed here, contains the potential to initiate a wider movement for the inclusion of 
democracy at a supranational level of governance. 
 
The diffusion effect of European regional democracy is evident in the African Union, 
which adopted a template similar to that of the EU. Whilst the AU does not yet contain a 
Parliament that functions in the same way as the EU, it does place a significant 
importance on the ideological aspects of democracy, and uses these as a way to help 
legitimate its actions. There is an ongoing commitment in the AU to matching these 
ideological aspects of democracy with tangible structures, including the strengthening of 
the Pan-African Parliament towards a role very similar to its European counterpart. 
 
For the emphasis on integration to continue, the Parliament needs to maintain its present 
role in the structures of the Union and develop this where possible. It also needs to be 
more active in helping to initiate similar projects in other areas, offering the benefit of its 
experience to nascent regional democratic bodies. By doing this, the European Parliament 
might contribute a structure to global governance that does not rely solely on nation states 
and that contains the potential to challenge the dominance of economic modes of 
globalised authority. 
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7.4.2 Democracy over neoliberalism 
Although the Parliament plays an important role in maintaining and developing its own 
democratic functions, it does not do this in a global environment devoid of other 
ideological forces. The influence that a neoliberal ideology exerts in structuring global 
political, economic, and social exchange must not be underestimated, and as this 
dissertation has argued, these neoliberal processes represent a serious and ongoing threat 
to democratic development.  
 
The hegemonic model in Chapter 3 described the dominance of a neoliberal ideology, 
building upon the critical perspectives of, amongst others Strange (1996), Hardt and 
Negri (2001), and Callinicos (2003). It conceptualises a social and political world 
dominated by the ideological tenets of neoliberalism in which market economics is the 
primary force structuring human action, and which is more concerned with maintaining 
the structures of international markets than providing individuals with the opportunity to 
influence the political decisions that shape their lives. Furthermore, these authors argue 
that the defence of this ideology is often aggressive, supported by a network of powerful 
states and international organisations.  
 
Streeten (2001), Hardt and Negri (2001), Callinicos (2003), and  Crouch (2004) all argue 
that an aggressive neoliberal ideology places the needs of the market as first and foremost 
with social considerations of democracy secondary. In this hegemonic approach, 
structures such as the European Parliament allow citizens influence within accepted 
limits that do not impinge upon the ultimate neoliberal goal of the institution. The 
dominance of an economic over a social model in the hegemonic model means that it is 
difficult to comprehend how developing a democratic element to governance could be 
possible in the European Union and Parliament.  
 
For Crouch (2004), the inevitable outcome of a system that depends solely on a market-
driven ideology is a fundamental decline in democracy.  In its place, elites and those with 
the ability to influence a market system geared towards economic regulation and 
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management drive policy. There are recent examples of market influence over state 
functions, one of the most evident of which is the ongoing role of influential Credit 
Rating Agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, in directing national 
economic policy. In an interview in 1996, Friedman discussed the way that Credit Rating 
Agencies influence world markets and the economic policies of states. He stated that:  
 
There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There's 
the United States and there's Moody's Bond Rating Service. The United 
States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody's can destroy you 
by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it's not clear sometimes 
who's more powerful 
(Friedman, 1996, cited in Guardian, 2011b) 
 
The influence that CRAs such as Moody’s bring to bear is evident in the recent 
downgrading of the US credit rating. An initial threat by Moody’s (2011) and other rating 
agencies to reduce the US credit rating from AAA helped to define fraught debates on 
economic policy in that country. On 5
th
 August, 2011, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
downgraded the US credit rating from AAA to AA+, meaning that the US must now pay 
a higher price for lending on the international bond markets (see Appendix 6 for full 
version of Standard and Poor’s, 2011: 3). Justifying their decision, S&P state that they 
take ‘no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures that Congress and the 
Administration might conclude is appropriate for putting the U.S.'s finances on a 
sustainable footing’. However, in their wider rationale for the decision S&P discuss the 
issues that led them to make their decision: 
 
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as 
America's governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less 
effective, and less predictable than what we previously believed…the 
resulting [statutory debt ceiling] agreement fell well short of the 
comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had 
envisaged until quite recently. It appears that for now, new revenues have 
dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition, the plan 
envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in 
other entitlements, the containment of which we and most other 
independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability 
(See Appendix 6  for Standard and Poor’s, 2011: 3) 
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Despite S&P being careful to state that they take no position on the US proposed fiscal 
policy, they openly discuss two distinct aspects of the recent debt–ceiling agreement in 
the US that they feel did not go far enough. In response to this criticism, President Obama 
was critical of S&P, saying that ‘markets will rise and fall. But this is the United States of 
America. No matter what some agency may say, we've always been and always will be a 
triple-A country’ (BBC, 2011d) 
  
There are similar concerns in the Eurozone, where aggressive pricing from bond markets 
has promoted rapid fluctuation on Spanish and Italian government bonds (BBC, 2011e). 
Unlike the US however, the reaction of  the Eurozone was to suggest regulation for CRAs 
in 2008 (Europa 2011), and in July 2011 Michel Barnier, the EU's internal market 
commissioner, delivered a speech to an EU conference aimed at improving how financial 
markets work in the EU. He argued that: 
 
We need to be more demanding when it comes to how CRAs rate 
sovereign debt. These ratings play a crucial role not only for the rated 
countries but for all our countries: a downgrading has the immediate effect 
of making a country's borrowing more expensive, it makes states weaker, 
and there are possible effects of contagion on neighbouring economies. 
(Barnier, 2011) 
 
The problems that states face with CRAs gives one example of how an internationalised 
economic environment makes it difficult for even the most powerful states to function in 
isolation. The influence of a neoliberalised market economy up on states threatens the 
credibility of democracy to function in such a market system. However, the proposal 
from Europe is interesting, as it suggests that there is some movement away from outright 
reliance on market mechanisms, and that neoliberalism and market economics may be 
managed more tightly at a local level. 
 
The argument that neoliberalism is transformed rather than transforming at a local level is 
evident in the concentric-governance model discussed in Chapter 4 and throughout parts 
of the immanent criticism in this dissertation. This position is one of ‘global statehood’, 
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in which the international political world is structured around a core of states with the 
most power and influence. Czempiel (2000: 256) argues that a core of powerful states on 
similar lines to the hegemonic model maintains a strong focus on a neoliberal ideology 
and institutions either directly sponsored by or affiliated with this core. Here, bodies such 
as the IMF and World Bank help in maintaining the dominance of the market-led global 
structure. However, this model of concentric governance also conceives world structure 
as more fluid, with states and collective bodies such as the EU less tied into the structures 
of neoliberalism. Although the global system remains dominated by a neoliberal 
ideology, this is modified at a national or regional level to form distinct structures or 
interpretations of that system. Shaw’s (2002: 192) premise underpinned this model is of a 
continued ‘resilience of some national centres and the continuous emergence of new 
centres of would-be authoritative force’. 
 
The revised version of a core-periphery model in Chapter 4 incorporates more space for 
an institution such as the European Union, allowing the Parliament to function more 
freely than possible in the hegemonic model. Neoliberalism is still a powerful influence, 
but it is tempered by the social and democratic influence of Parliament, creating a new 
form of governance structure, creating what academic Ac2 (1) described in his interview 
as a ‘social market approach to combining capitalism and democracy’. 
 
The interpretations in concentric governance render a more accurate representation of the 
European Union and Parliament’s role. Although the power of international markets and 
regulatory bodies is dominant in shaping institutions, the idea that local forces may 
influence governance suggests there is room for bodies such as the Parliament to grow.  
The structures of democracy might function more freely within this approach than in the 
hegemonic model and consequently there is a much greater chance for organisations such 
as the Parliament to influence the direction taken by the European Union. Although 
citizens are still inevitably tied into the liberalised structures of modern capitalism, within 
these confines they experience a much greater opportunity to affect the ways in which 
their governance structure operates. 
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Despite the continuing role of neoliberalism in global structures, the European Parliament 
has the opportunity to present an alternative route to internationalisation less reliant upon 
an economic model. This more optimistic approach builds on the idea of a ‘diffusion 
effect’ in democracy, which ultimately entails a reduction of global neoliberal influence 
beginning at regional and local levels. Although institutions such as the EU function in a 
global environment predominantly structured by a market-driven neoliberal ideology, 
their ability to adapt this ideology at a local or regional level means that they may 
exercise more control the ways they organise governance.  
 
A great deal of evidence is collated by this dissertation in favour of the above approach, 
not least of which is the continually evolving nature of the EU and the Parliament’s place 
within it. There is an undeniable concentration within the EU upon market issues, 
typified in the recent concerns over the future of the Eurozone; however, this is not 
surprising as monetary union is a large part of the integration project. Nevertheless, a 
social outlook from the Parliament provides what Shaw terms (2002: 192) a ‘continued 
resistance’ to neoliberal dominance, and a temper to its economic focus.  
 
Although the European Parliament is not a dominant element in the EU’s structures, its 
democratic influence does occupy a genuine place in decision making. The benefit of this 
is to create the Parliament as an alternative method of globalising authority that does not 
function along neoliberal lines. There is already some evidence of this occurring in the 
route that the African Union is increasingly taking. The ongoing progress towards a 
democratic Pan-African Parliament implies that democracy will play a larger part in 
future modes of global governance.  
 
For democracy to prosper in a global environment, bodies like the Parliament need to 
sustain their goal of introducing democracy at the supranational level. This requires a 
concerted effort from the Parliament to maintain its orientation, particularly in times of 
economic crisis when there is a tendency to emphasis purely economic approaches to 
problems. Only by continuing to solidify its position in the structures of the EU can the 
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Parliament champion democracy as a genuine challenge to the dominance of neoliberal 
approaches to governance.  
 
7.4.3 Summary: Potential  of global governance and the EP 
As with the strategies for democracy, the suggestions for improving governance in this 
chapter yield practical ways to address some of the issues identified in this immanent 
criticism. The proposals for governance incorporate some of the previous ideas on 
democracy as part of a wider drive to reinforce democratic governance and project that 
onto the decision-making processes of the European Union. 
 
Figure 24 (following) breaks down the approaches to developing governance into three 
approaches, in each case describing the actions required as well as the intended outcomes 
of these approaches.  
 
Figure 24: Author’s suggestions for improving governance  
Approach Action Intended outcome  
Foster greater 
democratic 
integration through 
the Parliament 
 
Implement suggestions on 
improving Parliament-focused 
democracy, such as better 
interaction of Parliament / MEPs 
with citizens and increased  
connections with civil society 
bodies 
Strengthened democracy in the Parliament 
without having to radically alter structures of 
the Union. 
Increase in forms of monitory democracy. 
Encourage 
diffusion effect of 
democracy 
Where possible, use the 
Parliament as an example of how 
democracy can function at a  
supranational level 
Increase in the number of supranational 
democratic bodies worldwide.   
Offer of solidarity in more networks of 
democratic structures. 
Offer ‘continuing 
resistance’ to 
neoliberalism 
Strengthening the Parliament’s 
democratic structures and 
encourage other forms of 
democracy. 
Evidence that democracy can function at a 
supranational level, and therefore offer a 
genuine alternative to neoliberal globalisation. 
 
Each of the three approaches targets a specific area of governance, and incorporates some 
elements of the suggestions for improving democracy. However, in this case these three 
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approaches also consider wider aspects of democratic governance in the face of continued 
neoliberal pressure.  The first approach deals specifically with the Parliament and its own 
democracy, suggesting that strengthening its internal democratic structures and functions 
would allow it to represent citizens without having to alter radically the way in which the 
EU works.  The second approach considers the role that the Parliament might play in a 
global world by encouraging other bodies such as the AU to adopt or develop greater 
democratic aspects of governance. In doing so, it hopes that the diffusion effect of 
democracy will amplify its presence in states and global political institutions. The final 
approach for improving governance combines the first two in a hope that a Parliament 
that functions more democratically, and that tenders other global bodies solidarity and a 
template for internationalising democracy, may present a substantial challenge to 
neoliberal dominance in global governance.  
 
Along with the detailed suggestions on democracy, the three approaches to developing 
governance made here represent a structural critique of the European Parliament. This 
critique follows immanent criticism’s stress on developing bodies to function better as a 
vehicle for human organisation.   This means that whilst they may hint at major changes 
in organisational structures, they are not as radical as some other aspects of Horkheimer’s 
work. The following section proffers a more radical critique of democracy and 
governance as part of a wider approach to the criticisms contained in this dissertation.  
 
 
7.5 Beyond structural critique: 
 
As a method of analysis, immanent criticism searches for practical ways in which to 
develop the social structures that govern the world, however its genus in the work of 
Horkheimer and critical theory mean that it is part of a more radical tradition. Part of this 
radicalism is implicit in the ongoing critique of neoliberalism that underpins immanent 
criticism and the interpretations in this dissertation; however, immanent criticism as a 
practical method does not always go as far beyond structural critique as other aspects of 
Horkheimer’s work or critical theory generally. 
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The dominance of a capitalist mode of production in global neoliberalism undermines 
any other system that emerges as a challenge to its economic and social dominance. 
Writing in the late 1960s, Horkheimer (1992: 250) was critical of the modern era and ‘the 
real nature of the new relations of production’, which he argues is inseparable ‘from the 
economic’. For Horkheimer (1992 252) the economic rationalism of capitalism 
fundamentally distorts society and the individual within it, so profoundly changing the 
nature of human activity that ‘under the totalitarian lordship of evil, men may retain not 
simply their lives but their very selves only by accident’.  
 
The arguments of Horkheimer are not diminished with time; indeed the systems of 
production and control of which he was so critical have only increased in magnitude and 
reach. The global inequality that a neoliberal system creates diminishes the opportunities 
for real democracy, as Crouch (2004: 6) argued through his concept of ‘post-democracy’. 
Writing on democracy’s future in a system of market-capitalism, Dahl (2000: 179) states 
that ‘the relation between a country’s democratic political system and its non-democratic 
economic system has presented a formidable and persistent challenge to democratic goals 
and practises throughout the twentieth century. That challenge will surely continue in the 
twenty-first century’. Dahl (2000) paints a pessimistic picture of the clash between 
democracy and neoliberal capitalism in which there is little chance of the two coexisting 
in governance. The future for democracy is further degraded, he argues, by the continued 
internationalisation of political power, which he regards as ‘likely to expand the domain 
of decisions made by political and bureaucratic elites at the expense of democratic 
controls’ (2000: 183) 
 
Although Horkheimer uses an immanent method as a way to explore and then suggest 
practical solutions to the failings of social structure, ultimately this is part of a wider 
tradition that ‘is not concerned only with goals already imposed by the existent ways of 
life, but with men [sic] and all their potentialities’ (1992: 245). For Horkheimer, this 
potential may be unreachable as long as capitalist economics remains the dominant 
method through which social organisation is articulated.  He argues that: 
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[it] would be mechanistic … to judge the future forms of society solely 
according to their economy…if in the present state of society economy is 
the master of man and therefore the lever by which he is to be moved to 
change, in the future men must themselves determine all their 
relationships in the face of natural necessities. Economics in isolation will 
therefore not provide the norm by which the community of men is to be 
measured. 
(Horkheimer, 1992: 249) 
 
Horkheimer’s (1992: 247) struggle is ‘against the illusory harmonies of liberalism and the 
broadcasting of the contradictions immanent in it’. In order to pass beyond the 
inequalities and injustices of present systems, he argues that we must fundamentally 
change the ways in which we imagine our social existence. The outcome of this 
assessment is a system in which ‘the economy must serve man, not man the economy’ 
(Horkheimer, 1992: 247) 
 
Although radical change is highlighted as the ultimate solution to inequality, 
Horkheimer’s approach remains inherently practical, and he suggests that ‘the abolition 
of this state of affairs aims at a higher principle of economic organisation and not at all at 
some philosophical utopia’ (Horkheimer, 1992: 249). As part of this practical approach, 
the realistic assessment of democracy and governance in this dissertation could play an 
important role in helping to move beyond present systems. Improving the ways in which 
bodies such as the European Parliament function is the first stage in working towards 
supplanting the dominant and destructive economics of neoliberalism and replacing it 
with a system that is more just, and entails greater freedoms. The approaches to 
governance and suggestions for democracy should therefore be realised as a beginning to 
transformation, rather than as an end in themselves.  
 
 
7.6 Summary: the potential of the European Parliament as a democratic regional-
global governance structure 
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As the final stage of immanent criticism, this chapter provides some specific strategies 
and suggestions for improving the ways in which democracy and governance function in 
the European Parliament and, by extension, in a wider global political environment. This 
is the second element of the thesis in this work, which affirms that there is a greater 
potential in the Parliament’s democratic and governance functions than is presently 
manifest.  It is also part of the dedication of immanent criticism to achieve practical ways 
of moving beyond the inequalities of present social structures.  
 
Potentiality in democratic regional and global governance relies largely on bodies such as 
the European Parliament. These collective institutions possess the ability to voice the will 
of citizens above the level of national politics, and denote a challenge to the dominance 
of an established market system guided by a neoliberal ideology. The Parliament’s slow 
but continued progress towards a more integrated role in the EU lends a means for 
introducing greater levels of democracy into supranational systems of authority. For this 
progression to continue necessitates constant revaluation of democracy’s application by 
and through bodies such as the European Parliament.  Ultimately, democracy in global 
governance should function freely when neoliberalism ceases to be the defining force of 
global political, social and, above all, economic structures.  
 
The final chapter summarises the arguments made in the three-stage immanent criticism 
conducted in this dissertation. It highlights the most important parts of the two elements 
of the thesis, as well as other important aspects to derive from this work. It also describes 
several ways to extend this study to encompass a wider view of democracy’s role in 
global governance.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions: a summary of democratic regional governance in the 
European Parliament 
________________________________________________________________________ 
8.1 Conclusions of the thesis 
8.1.1 The EP as a new form of democratic regional governance structure. 
8.1.2 The democratic and governance potential of European Parliament 
8.2 Other applications from the dissertation 
 8.2.1 Immanent criticism  
 8.2.2 Principles of democracy 
 8.2.3 Reflexive interviewing 
8.3 Furthering the study on democracy and governance in the European Parliament 
8.4 Final reflections on the project 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
8.1 Conclusions of the thesis 
 
As an exploration of democracy and governance in regional-political bodies, this 
dissertation has concentrated on the European Parliament which is the most developed of 
such bodies. It presents a thesis arguing the Parliament is a new form of democratic 
regional governance structure with a relevant community that combines the wishes of 
state and citizens. In operating at an international level, the Parliament elevates 
democracy as a genuine alternative to governance beyond the state.  The thesis proceeds 
to suggest a number of practical ways to improve the Parliament’s democratic and 
governance functions. 
 
The nature of democratic governance in the European Parliament continues to be a 
contentious issue. For those that view the European project as a retrenchment of state 
dominance and neoliberal power, the Parliament represents a system of governance 
where democracy is subordinate to the demands of a market system. On the other hand, 
for those that view the EU and its Parliament as a functioning democratic governance 
body, there is at least the possibility to envisage a greater potential for democratic politics 
above the level of the state.  
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A particular problem in discussing the changing nature of democratic governance is the 
varying interpretations that exist for both democracy and governance. In the modern 
world, democracy is a central concept in discussions on the nature of governance and the 
functions of a state, often defining aspects of social and cultural systems. The lack of any 
universally agreed parameters for what constitutes a democratic system means that there 
is always the potential for disagreement. Similarly, considerations of governance depend 
largely on ontological interpretations of how an interconnected world functions. Different 
conceptions of institutors such as the European Parliament are inexorably tied into 
varying interpretations that determine its possibilities. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 dealt with the problems of defining democracy and governance, in each 
case constructing a conceptual framework to assess the nature of these aspects when 
manifest in a governance system.  Chapter 3 devised a set of three key principles for 
evaluating a democratic system, and Chapter 4 offered several ontological perspectives 
interpreting global structures in a different way. These theoretical discussions are a robust 
basis for this dissertation, providing the subsequent immanent criticism of the European 
Parliament with a wider context in current debates on democratic governance.  
 
The immanent criticism of the European Parliament applied a process adapted from the 
work of Max Horkheimer (1946; 1992). Founded on a socially constructionist 
epistemology which understands knowledge as a social process, it traced the ways in 
which  dominant forces in history shape the functions of present-day social institutions. 
As part of this process, the immanent criticism examined the European Parliament 
through three aspects: it historical development; its present functions; and its potential 
role. This three-stage process gives a unique insight into how Parliament has grown into 
its role, as well as its potential to develop further.  The thesis of this work that is 
supported in this three-stage process makes two arguments on the Parliament: firstly, that 
it represents a new form supranational democratic governance structure with a unique 
relevant community; and secondly, that there is greater potential in its present structures 
than is currently evident.  The main arguments are summarised in the following sections. 
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8.1.1 The EP as a new form of democratic regional governance structure. 
The argument that the European Parliament represents a new form of democratic 
governance structure is made primarily in the first two stages of immanent criticism. 
These chapters assemble a range of evidence to support the idea that the European 
Parliament brings a democratic element to regional governance unlike that of any other 
similar body and that in doing so, it is representing a new relevant community of states 
and citizens.  
 
The EU and its Parliament are not alone in offering some form of democracy at a level 
beyond the state. For example, Greenpeace and Amnesty International allow their 
members to voice concerns on certain pressure issues, however these are pressure groups 
rather than governance institutions and therefore do not exert the same levels of 
influence. Other international institutions such as the UN give states the chance to 
participate on collective issues, although in the case of the UN there is no attempt to 
regulate the everyday functions of states, or to provide individual citizens with the chance 
for democratic engagement.  
 
Dedman’s (2010: 7) distinction between interdependence and integration is useful in 
understanding the difference between pressure groups and international bodies such as 
the UN and the European Union. Where the former produce some form of 
interdependence, the EU represents a form of political integration that is typified in the 
functions of the Parliament. The European Parliament is the only collective governance 
body to represent directly a citizenry comprising members from multiple states, allowing 
these citizens the chance to shape policy and direct governance at a supranational level.  
 
As this dissertation points out however, the Parliament is far from an ideal expression of 
the democratic function, and there are a number of areas which attract serious concerns 
on how the Parliament integrates the will of citizens into the EU. Foremost amongst these 
is the continued inability of the Parliament to initiate legislation, a fact that greatly 
reduces the role of democracy in decision making. Similarly, EU member states retain a 
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greater chance to influence the policy process than does the Parliament, an imbalance that 
was addressed in recent treaties but which still exists.   
 
Although there are problems with its role, the Parliament’s role in the EU introduces the 
voice of citizens into decision making at a supranational level. The addition of a 
democratic element to the EU is such that it creates a unique relevant community, where 
alongside member states the individual citizen experiences a genuine chance to influence 
the political decisions that shape their lives. Although the Parliament’s role is limited, 
this dissertation argues that its presence is significant enough in EU decision making to 
represent a genuine democratic influence in governance.  
 
The presence of the Parliament in the structures of the EU means that both states and 
citizens enjoy representation in its regional governance. In this way, the Parliament acts 
as a genuine balance to the influence of a pervasive global neoliberal ideology over 
governance. Its presence also means that the EU as a whole represents an alternative 
route to international governance which is not solely reliant on a neoliberal ideology, but 
also incorporates the wishes of over 500 million legally mandated European citizens.  
 
8.1.2 The democratic and governance potential of the EP 
The second aspect of the thesis addressed the emancipatory requirements of 
Horkheimer’s (1946, 1992) philosophy upon which this exploration of the European 
Parliament was structured. The nature of this research as both exploratory and 
emancipatory meant that it was not sufficient to simply critique the Parliament, but it was 
also required to provide a range of suggestions for ways in which it could move beyond 
its present state. Consequently, the final stage of immanent criticism in Chapter 7 
presented alternatives to develop democracy in the Parliament and EU as a whole, as well 
as an assessment of global governance and how the Parliament might develop.  
 
The chapter presents four specific actions which, if adopted could improve the ways that 
democracy functions in the European Parliament. The design of these suggestions allows 
them to be implemented individually or collectively, although together they cover a wide 
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range of the issues raised in this immanent criticism. Figure 25 (following) summarises 
these suggestions, dividing them between direct strategies that involve fundamental shifts 
in structure and function and indirect strategies, which do not need new legislation. There 
is also a divide between those that concentrate on changes at a polity level (meaning they 
require fundamental changes to the way the EU works) and those that focus on 
developing the role of citizens and other non-governmental bodies.   
 
Figure 25:  Summary of author’s suggestions on improving democracy  
 Direct Strategies Indirect Strategies 
Polity-based 1. Reform of the Parliament’s 
role 
 
3. Increased transparency 
Citizen-based 2. Dedicated European political 
parties  
4. Stronger, more involved civil 
society 
 
As well as the suggestions for ways to improve democracy in the Parliament, the final 
stage of immanent criticism also discusses the potential that a democratic Parliament 
brings to governance beyond the level of the state. Chapter 7 argues that the introduction 
of democracy into global governance faces some severe difficulties in challenging the 
dominance of neoliberal market economics. However, it does appear that the democratic 
element the Parliament integrates into the EU shows a degree of challenge to neoliberal 
dominance. For this to continue, the Parliament needs to maintain its position in EU 
decision making, strengthening this where possible through the suggestions on 
democracy already made. By doing this, the Parliament may function as an example for 
other similar bodies who are seeking to introduce democracy into their supranational 
structures. For instance, the African Union is moving more towards an EU-style model of 
regional governance, although as yet it has not adopted many of the same concepts and 
processes.  
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In order for the European Parliament to function as a genuine democratic institution in 
governance above the level of the state, it must be allowed to participate more fully in 
decision making. If this occurs, then there is a chance for citizens to genuinely influence 
their own social and political lives in an increasingly globalising world.  In this sense, the 
place of Parliament and the Union represents part of the wider debate on the future of 
governance structures: if democracy works in the EU, there is the potential for it to work 
across other global governance structures. 
 
If the Parliament is able to maintain its position in EU governance structures and if it is 
able to help to develop democracy in supranational governance worldwide then there is a 
real chance for it to be an alternative route to internationalised power. The European 
Parliament has the potential to be a beacon for globalising democracy, and the unique 
role it plays in the EU is an alternative to neoliberal globalisation with the potential to 
generate a wider change in how global governance occurs. 
 
 
8.2 Other applications from the dissertation 
 
As well as the two main arguments of this thesis, this dissertation contains other elements 
with a wider application outside of this work. Of these, three have the most significance: 
the adapted process of immanent criticism; the key principles of democracy used to 
evaluate the Parliament; and the method of reflexive interviewing used in the fieldwork.  
 
 8.2.1 Immanent criticism 
The process of immanent criticism that is adapted for this dissertation derives from 
several of Horkheimer’s analyses on how to explore and then move beyond the problems 
faced in modern society. It is an inherently practical application of critical theory that 
does not lose any of that philosophy’s wider concern for the reasons behind social 
problems, or the considerations of how to move beyond them.  
 
As a methodological application, immanent criticism has been largely ignored by 
mainstream sociological and political theorists. This is partly due the fact that 
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Horkheimer himself only really talks about it as part of his wider discussion on an 
immanent method that criticises the dialectic within modern capitalism. This dialectic is 
presented by Horkheimer and much of the Frankfurt School as a contrast between the 
classic liberalism with which capitalism justifies its logic of the market, and a reality 
where a false logic of the market ultimately subjects all aspects of social life to a rationale 
that is ‘the rationale of domination itself’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 121).   
 
Unlike other members of the Frankfurt School at the time, Horkheimer sought to 
challenge this dialectic in the structures of modern society as well as in its philosophy, 
and immanent criticism is a way to apply these ideas to contemporary social bodies. 
Because of its wider remit on the potential of such bodies in organising social action, 
Horkheimer’s approach is particularly suited to big institutions such as governments. The 
subsequent work on Horkheimer’s immanent method completed by Held (1980) and 
Geuss (1999) add to this body of thought and help contextualise it in terms of its potential 
as a method of research.  
 
Despite its applicability, there are few if any pieces of research that conspicuously apply 
Horkheimer’s immanent method, although arguably any approach that contrasts an 
organisation’s claims against its actual functions is a step towards this. What sets 
immanent criticism apart, however, is its requirement for praxis. Knowledge should not 
be an end in itself, and immanent criticism requires research to produce outcomes with 
practical applications in the potential of organisations. 
 
Through applying a form of immanent criticism in this dissertation, I hope that I have 
gone some way to reintroducing it as a method of investigation. In the current global 
political environment, it provides a creative way to explore the failings of large social 
institutions, particularly those that regulate our everyday lives. More than this, immanent 
criticism may contribute a way to transcending the inequalities of present times, given its 
commitment to praxis assists in directing research into practical solutions for daily 
problems. 
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8.2.2 Principles of democracy 
The principles of democracy that Chapter 3 constructs were part of a solution in this 
dissertation to the problems faced in analysing the nature of democracy in the European 
Parliament. They do however possess a much wider application than in this study. They 
concentrate the exploration of democracy into three key areas that together tender 
insights into how that system works, and as such are applicable to any democratic system, 
whether a state or any other body.  
 
These three key principles are particularly relevant to new forms of democratic structure, 
as they do not rely on traditional models for their analysis. As Chapter 3 showed, 
democracy is a shifting concept that has undergone a wide variety of applications over its 
2500-year history. Using traditional approaches to modelling democracy can mean 
couching new systems in terminology and approaches that do not fully encompass the 
ways in which they operate. This is evident in this dissertation vis-à-vis the new form of 
relevant community that exists in the EU. This term, borrowed from Held (2002: 27), is 
crucial in communicating how it is that the European Parliament functions as part of a 
whole body incorporating the wishes not just of states or citizens, but combining both.  
 
Using key principles to describe a democratic system is not an inherently new process; 
many descriptions of democratic governance base themselves around key ideas. 
However, those formulated for this dissertation differ insofar as they are not associated 
with definitive structures, or indeed ideologies. They are a guide rather than a template 
for understanding how a system applies democracy, and as such are as open to 
interpretation as the democratic system itself. 
 
8.2.3 Reflexive interviewing 
Devised as part of this dissertation’s desire to adhere to a socially constructionist 
epistemology, reflexive interviewing is a technique for social researchers to explore 
situations in which they have little initial knowledge or where there is a chance that their 
own knowledge may develop to a significant level that requires an adoption of the 
interview schedule. In the case of this dissertation, reflexive interviewing lent a way to 
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deal with what Gillingham (2005: 55) terms ‘elite interviews’: interviews with those who 
are in positions of power, knowledge or influence that facilitate a substantial degree of 
knowledge in a specific area. 
 
Reflexive interviewing is a way of setting up fixed interview topic areas that remain 
constant throughout the whole interview process, but facilitating a wider degree of 
variation on the questions within each of these topic areas. This has the benefit of 
producing a defined interview structure for the researcher, whilst allowing them to 
reflexively incorporate changes to their knowledge and understanding into discrete 
questions, and therefore to extract the most out of each interview. Although not suitable 
in every situation, reflexive interviewing is a method that combines structure and 
consistency with a reflexive adaptation that social constructionism asserts is an inevitable 
outcome of research.  
 
 
8.3 Furthering the study on democracy and governance in the European Parliament 
 
There are number of ways to develop the findings of this study. One approach would be 
to extend the analysis of the Parliament to cover the Council of Ministers. This adds an 
important extra level of analysis to areas such as codecision and power sharing, which 
can broaden the focus to encompass aspects of democracy and governance within other 
parts of the EU. On the same note, including a wider range of MEPs, academics and other 
involved actors in a set of interviews may help to extend the perspectives on how the 
Parliament currently functions. 
 
Another way to develop the findings of this study could be to apply the principles of 
democracy devised for this research in another study. Examining a body such as the 
African Union and the Pan-African Parliament would provide a valuable compliment to 
this exploration of regional governance, expanding its global reach as well as its portrayal 
of the ways in which democracy and neoliberalism coexist. Similarly, extending the study 
to another regional body that clearly does not incorporate democracy in its makeup, such 
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as the North American Free Trade Agreement, would help to demonstrate how the EU, 
and to some extent the AU, resemble new forms of democratic governance at an 
international level.  
 
 
8.4 Final reflections on the project 
 
The future of democratic global governance relies heavily on the role of the European 
Union and its Parliament. These bodies, however, face some serious challenges, and how 
democracy develops in the European Union will, I suspect, depend on two contingencies. 
Firstly, it is likely to rely heavily on the consequences of the so-called debt crisis in 
Europe and the outcomes of this for the Eurozone. Although the Eurozone is by no means 
the entirety of the European Union, its importance to the process of integration is vast.  
 
The Euro represents the latest phase of integration and if it were to fail, then it is almost 
certain that the entire European project would need to be re-examined. The ongoing 
troubles with Greek debt repayments present a significant challenge to the mechanisms of 
the Euro, and how the ECB and other Eurozone states manage these issues is likely to 
have important ramifications for the wider Union. If the financial problems affecting 
Greece spread to Italy, Spain and even France, then a more extensive redefinition of 
European monetary union may well be required.   
 
If the debt crisis in Europe and America escalates, as seems likely, then there might be a 
more fundamental reorganisation of global structures. In such a situation, there is 
arguably an opportunity for democratic structures to reassert themselves in a global 
system with its ideology in crisis. For example, it is possible that the crisis in the 
Eurozone will result in tighter fiscal union, which may also exert a positive impact on 
social union. In the same way, a renewed global recession could offer states and 
democratic institutions a chance to reclaim some portions of control that they ceded to the 
international market.  
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Although none of the options for developing the function of the European Parliament in 
this dissertation represents the revolution that Marxist theory predicts, it may be that a 
crisis in neoliberal, market-based dominance opens the door to other ideological 
structures. In such a situation, meaningful democracy, already an established part of the 
European Union, may have the chance to assert itself on a global stage. The resulting 
global structures, however, are far from certain. 
 
The second element that has the potential to define the future of regional democracy, at 
least in Europe, is the will of member states to surrender portions of their sovereignty to 
centralised governance. As this dissertation has argued, member states are still the 
primary stakeholders in the EU, and despite an increasingly influential Parliament, they 
still determine much of its political direction. Domestic pressures in some European 
states mean an increasing rejection of further integration, with some states questioning if 
deeper connections are a good idea at all, especially in light of the current problems in the 
Eurozone. The ongoing conflict between social and economic models aids this division, 
and makes it difficult for citizens to envisage how a European Parliament can effectively 
influence their lives.  
 
The issues of recession and a will to integrate, although not exhaustive, represent some of 
the upcoming challenges to regional democratic governance in the EU. However, the EU 
and its Parliament are used to negotiating difficult transitions. This is evident in the 
changes that took place during the process of researching and writing this dissertation, 
which included the failed European Constitution and its replacement in the Lisbon 
Treaty, as well as a global recession that hit Europe Particularly hard. Continuing this 
research to monitor the ongoing and changing forces acting upon the EU and Parliament 
is important, not just from a political standpoint but from a sociological one, as 
ultimately, these processes are about the control that individuals command over their own 
lives.  
 
Further integration in Europe is reliant on many factors, particularly given such an 
unstable global economic and political environment.  Democratic regional governance 
 246 
however, remains a viable alternative to the economic neoliberalism that characterises 
much of the present global structure. The presence of the European Parliament in the 
wider EU represents the most advanced resistance to neoliberal ideology on an 
international level, and its further expansion through some of the methods proposed in 
this dissertation would ultimately help to allow individuals and citizens to retain control 
of their political and social destiny. 
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